Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)
2008

Origin of Intentionality
Darryl J. Murphy
Wilfrid Laurier University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Murphy, Darryl J., "Origin of Intentionality" (2008). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1061.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1061

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @
Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

1*1

Library and
Archives Canada

Bibliotheque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A0N4
Canada

Your file Votre reference
ISBN: 978-0-494-46152-5
Our file Notre reference
ISBN: 978-0-494-46152-5

NOTICE:
The author has granted a nonexclusive license allowing Library
and Archives Canada to reproduce,
publish, archive, preserve, conserve,
communicate to the public by
telecommunication or on the Internet,
loan, distribute and sell theses
worldwide, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, in microform,
paper, electronic and/or any other
formats.

AVIS:
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver,
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public
par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer,
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres,
sur support microforme, papier, electronique
et/ou autres formats.

The author retains copyright
ownership and moral rights in
this thesis. Neither the thesis
nor substantial extracts from it
may be printed or otherwise
reproduced without the author's
permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these.
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement
reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian
Privacy Act some supporting
forms may have been removed
from this thesis.

Conformement a la loi canadienne
sur la protection de la vie privee,
quelques formulaires secondaires
ont ete enleves de cette these.

While these forms may be included
in the document page count,
their removal does not represent
any loss of content from the
thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires
aient inclus dans la pagination,
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

Canada

Origin of Intentionality
by
Darryl J. Murphy
Master of Arts, University of Guelph, 2005

THESIS
Submitted to the Department of Philosophy
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Doctor of Philosophy
Wilfrid Laurier University
©2008

ABSTRACT
The modern origins of intentionality reside in the early work of Franz Brentano—
specifically, his Psychologyfroman Empirical Standpoint (1876) and the notion of the
"intentional inexistence" of the object of consciousness presented therein. "Intentional
inexistence", says Brentano, is the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the
objects that occupy our desires, aversions, thoughts, and all of our conscious activities in
general. According to Brentano, "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental inexistence. In
his book on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that
the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is
in the thinking intellect." This reference to sensation has prompted scholars, almost
invariably, to identify Aristotle's theory of sensation (or aisthesis) as the source of
Brentano's concept and, in doing so, to disregard the reference to Aristotle's theory of
intellect (or nous) that concludes the passage. Contrary to conventional wisdom, that
interprets intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's theory of sensation, I argue that
the notion of nous is the only notion in Aristotle's psychology that is sufficient to respond
to what we today call the "problem of intentionality" (or that set of problems
encapsulated in the phrase), and that Aristotle seems to have been led to characterize
nous the way that he does for many of the same reasons that Brentano is led to postulate,
or, rather, reinvigorate, the scholastic notion of intentional inexistence.
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PART I - INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1.

THE PURPOSE AND CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF THE

PRESENT STUDY

Introduction
The goal of the present study is to begin to formulate a single solution to two problems:
(1) what I will refer to as the "conventional problem of intentionality," and (2) what I will
refer to as the "genetic problem of intentionality" for now, but will later argue is the
overarching problem that encapsulates the first. As I will argue, these two problems and
the muddled understanding of the notion of intentionality that they derive from are at the
heart of the greater concern of the cognitive sciences—namely, the desire to achieve a
robust and coherent account of the emergence and workings of consciousness. And so,
towards a resolution to the problem enumerated above, and towards a more
thoroughgoing understanding of intentionality itself, this book will revisit the roots of the
notion of intentionality in Aristotle's philosophical psychology set out in his DeAnima.
My central thesis is this: Contrary to conventional wisdom, we ought to understand
intentionality as a derivative of Aristotle's notion of the intellect (or nous) rather than his
notion of sensation (or aisthesis). As I will demonstrate, Brentano's notion of intentional
inexistence has far more in common with Aristotle's notion of intellect (nous) and has the

potential to render a far more substantial and naturalistic notion of intentionality than the
predominant notion that is primarily derived from Aristotle's theory of sensation
{aisthesis). Furthermore, I will argue that nous is the only notion in Aristotle's
2

psychology that is sufficient to respond to what we today call the "problem of
intentionality" (or, rather, the set of problems encapsulated in the phrase), and that
Aristotle seems to have been led to characterize nous in the way that he does for many of
the same reasons that Brentano is led to postulate, or, rather, reinvigorate, the scholastic
notion of intentional inexistence. This argument is at loggerheads with both the argument
that we traditionally attribute to Brentano, namely, that it is with his theory of sensation
that Aristotle addresses the problem,1 and with more recent suggestions that that Aristotle
addresses this problem with his notion of imagination (phantasia).2
This introductory chapter will proceed in three parts: the first will briefly explain
the problem in response to which the notion of intentionality was formulated, the notion
of intentionality itself, and the problems resulting from its formulation in Brentano. The
second will elaborate upon those aspects of Aristotle's psychology with which I propose
we revise the currently received notion of intentionality. Specifically, I will discuss
Aristotle's notion of intellect (nous) understood, for the time being, through the reading
of Lloyd Gerson (2004), and its various similarities to intentionality in Brentano. Having
thus introduced most of the concepts central to this study, I will proceed to outline the
various parts and chapters of the study, to introduce its lesser theses, and to reiterate its
central goal and thesis.

§ 1.
§ 1.1.

Intentionality

and Associated

Problems

THE CONVENTIONAL PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY

The conventional problem of intentionality3 lies in our inability to explain what Caston
describes as "that feature of our mental states in virtue of which they can correctly be said
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to be of or about something or, more generally, possess content" and to do so using
strictly physicalistic language ("physicalistic" being one of the adjectives applied to
sciences that have as their basic components discrete particles that compound to make the
world and its many objects). The concept from which this problem gets its contemporary
name—the concept of intentionality—was first (re)introduced to modern thinkers by
Franz Brentano. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (referred to throughout
what follows as Psychology), Brentano addresses this problem through his analysis of
consciousness, which begins by establishing an important ontological distinction:5 "All
the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical
and the class of mental phenomena."6 Among physical phenomena Brentano includes
"color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which
I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination."7 Mental phenomena,
on the other hand, include "Every idea or presentation [Vorstellung] which we acquire
either through sense perception or imagination."8 The term "presentation" does not, as
one might expect, refer to any sort of mental image or its content. Rather, the term
"presentation" refers to the presence of content in our intellectual activities. By way of
example Brentano offers the hearing of a sound, or the seeing of a color, the suggestion
being that the act of hearing (or, rather, the activity in which one becomes conscious of
sound) and the act of seeing (similarly characterized) are "presentations" whereby the
subject is brought into a relationship (which we call consciousness) with the sound. An
understanding of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena is integral to an
understanding of Brentano's Psychology in general and his theory of intentionality in
particular. Brentano prepares us for this distinction between mental and physical

4

phenomena through his deliberate inclusion of five individual sense-specific phenomena
among the class of the physical. Among the class of mental phenomena Brentano adds to
his previous examples, "every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every
inference, and every conviction or opinion, [and] every doubt" 9
And so Brentano's analysis of consciousness primarily involves, first, the
definition of mental phenomena, and second, the thorough elaboration of the various
types of mental phenomena and their efficacy. He begins his analysis by defining mental
phenomena in the most general sense. In this much-quoted passage Brentano tells us
that,
Every mental phenomena is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content,
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In
presentation something is presented, in judgement
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate
hated, in desire desired and so on.10
To paraphrase, Brentano tells us that the distinguishing characteristic of mental
phenomena is that they are content-full and that what makes them content-full is that
some content exists, in a literal sense, within them. Brentano uses the phrases
"intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object", "immanent objectivity", and "includes
something as object within itself to refer to the content-fullness of mental phenomena.
And so he says that in every mental phenomenon, e.g. judgement, "something is affirmed
or denied, in love loved, in hate hated."11

5

Mental differ from physical phenomena in that mental phenomena contain an

object, whereas physical phenomena do not. A colour, for example, does not contain
anything as an object in the sense that its colouredness is influenced by something within
it that is discernable from its whole. There is no aspect of the whiteness of this sheet that
makes it a white of a certain sort except that it simply is white of a certain hue.12 In
contrast, the intensity of my love for my wife is influenced by my wife; it is tempered by
the way she exists for me. Following Brentano, an entire branch of the philosophical
community has come to refer to that which distinguishes mental from physical
phenomena as their "intentionality". The difficulty in understanding this notion often
arises from a failure to grasp Brentano's initial distinction between mental and physical
phenomena.
This theory of intentionality has given rise to an entire school of thought and,
some might argue, the continental/analytic rift in professional philosophy.13 Brentano is
explicit with respect to whose work he believes the theory of intentionality originated in:
namely, Aristotle. He does not, however, explicitly identify in which of Aristotle's
works this theory is to be found. A few vague suggestions are made in a footnote:
Brentano tells us that "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental inexistence. In his book on
the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense
contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the
thinking intellect."14 This reference to Aristotle's theory of sensation has prompted
scholars to identify this theory as the source of Brentano's concept15 and, in doing so, to
disregard the reference to Aristotle's theory of intellect that concludes the passage. This
reading interprets intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's description of sensation
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and its characterization as the receiving of the form of an object without its matter (DA
412a3-6), the practical import of which is that intentionality in Brentano is that which
accounts for the simple presence of an object in thought, or, as recent commentators like
Sorabji and Caston suggest, it accounts for the underlying subject of every predication.
As Caston (1998) rightly points out,16 Aristotle's theory of sensation, as well as
any of its derivatives and recapitulations, is insufficient to adequately account for the
problem defined above as the conventional problem of intentionality. This is because
both Brentano and Aristotle are very clear that sensation is a bodily activity.17 This is
clear, for Aristotle's part, when he says, "if the old man [whose vision has deteriorated
due to his advanced age] could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well
as the young man." (DA 408b20-21) These comments are made within the context of a
discussion concerning the deterioration of one's intellectual capacities, i.e., one's ability
to think. In fact, Aristotle goes on to say that "thinking and reflecting decline through the
decay of some other inward part and are themselves impassible." (DA 408b24-25) It is
important to notice that although one's capacities for sensation and for thought are
similarly vulnerable to degradation, the degradation of one does not necessarily entail the
degradation of the other. If, however, sensation were adequate to account for the
intentionality of thought, then in the event of the degradation of one's capacity for
sensation we could expect a concurrent degradation in the capacity to think. In light of
these deficiencies of Aristotle's theory of sensation to account for the intentional
character of mental phenomena, we are led to consider from what other elements of
Aristotle's psychology one might derive an understanding of intentionality.

7

§ 1.2.

T H E GENETIC PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY

Unfortunately, Brentano's articulation of intentionality gives rise to a myriad of other
problems both ontological and epistemological.18 Not the least of these problems is what
I will refer to as the genetic problem of intentionality. Stated briefly, this is the problem
of generating a genetic account of consciousness (i.e., an account of how consciousness
comes to be and passes away) that is consistent with the qualifications Brentano
stipulates with respect to intentionality. Specifically, the passage cited above stipulates
that (1) every mental phenomenon, i.e., every instance of consciousness, is conditioned
by intentionality, and (2) that intentionality is itself the antecedent condition of the object
of consciousness.19 Further to this, Brentano states that "the term 'consciousness,' since
it refers to an object which consciousness [Bewusstsein] is consciousness of, seems to be
appropriate to characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing
characteristic, i.e., the property of intentional inexistence of an object."20 This has the
effect of stipulating that (3) consciousness is the antecedent condition for the presence of
an object. The cumulative effect of these three stipulations is that Brentano's
conceptualization of consciousness involves a circularity that precludes the possibility of
accounting for the genesis of consciousness. This is because, according to the previous
stipulations, each element of his model is conditioned by another: the presence of
consciousness is conditional upon its object; the presence of the object is conditional
upon intentionality; the presence of intentionality is conditional upon consciousness, or:
Consciousness
Object
Intentionality

— Object
= Intentionality
= Consciousness

8

And so, aside from any of the epistemological criteria one might devise with respect to
the adequacy of a theory of intentionality, the preceding analysis demands that such a
theory account for the genesis of consciousness, at least in the human organism.
We shall explore this and other problems associated with intentionality more
thoroughly in the following chapter. For now, we will turn our attention to those aspects
of Aristotle's psychology that I propose will serve as the basis for the revision of the
currently received notion of intentionality.

§ 2.

Gerson 's Reading of Intellect in Aristotle

Gerson's interpretation of nous in Aristotle is based upon a series of analogous
relationships that situate nous (or, rather intellect) in Aristotle's overall picture of the
living organism. According to Gerson's Aristotle, all bodies are the composite of form
and matter. Living bodies, on the other hand, are the composite of a soul and some body
that is itself made up of form and matter. In living bodies, however, the composite-body
is subject to the efficacy of soul. It is the soul that animates the body literally enlivening
the form/matter composite. This, says Gerson, is what Aristotle means when he
describes the soul as the first actuality of a potentially living body. (DA 412al9-21) 21
Gerson's understanding of nous is an extension of this analogy: in souls that possess
intellect (nous) it is the soul that is subject to its activity. This analogy emerges, says
Gerson, from Aristotle's comment that "[i]t is doubtless better to avoid saying that the
soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his
soul." (DA 408bl 1-13)22 After which Aristotle says that the soul is the subject of
thought "in so far as it has intellect." (DA 408b26-27)

9

Gerson's discussions concerning the role of intellect in Aristotle's psychology
reveals in his interpretation an emphasis upon efficient causation. For Gerson it is
intellect that is responsible for the actualization of intelligible forms; this process is what
Aristotle calls "thinking." Specifically, this process involves the immediate relation of
nous to its object of thought. Conjoined with its ensouled body, nous becomes identical
with its object through its own initiative. From this account we can understand that in
order for nous to bring about the actualization of form it must exhibit certain qualities:
first and foremost nous must be non-bodily. Aristotle must conceive it as such because,
according to Gerson, "[w]hen thought has become each thing in the way in which a man
who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the
power on his own ability), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense
from discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself." (DA 429b5-9) Aristotle's
account of the efficient operation of nous requires Aristotle to further characterize it
using the infamously troubling list of characteristics we find: (i) first at DA 14, where
intellect is said to be a "sort of substance," that it "comes to be in us," that it is
"indestructible" (phtheiresthai), and that it is "unaffected" (apathes)-^ (ii) later at DA
429al4-b5, where we are told intellect is "unmixed" (amige) and "separate" (choristos);
and (iii) finally at DA 430a23, where intellect is said to be undying (athanaton).
Ultimately, Gerson reads DA III 5 as the culmination of a number of discussions
that Aristotle has pursued throughout the whole of the treatise. It is only at this point
that Gerson's Aristotle is prepared to conclude that thinking is possible and intelligible
to itself because intellect is singular; no mechanism of efficiency need be posited
because intellect initiates its own activity (in other words, an infinite regress of intellects
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is not necessary to account for thought). Nous for Gerson's Aristotle is one of the
necessary conditions for intellectual activity. Understood in this way intellect must be
unmixed, unaffected, and immortal (athanaton). To suggest anything less, insists
Gerson, is to deny the possibility of thought. This is what Aristotle means when he
articulates the penultimate conclusion of DA III 5: that without the continuous activity of
the intellect, nothing thinks.24

§3.

Intentionality

and Intellect

The commonalties between Brentano's theory of intentionality and Aristotle's theory of
the intellect, as read by Gerson, fall into three categories: (1) commonalties with respect
to the relationship of intentionality to consciousness and the relationship of intellect to
soul, (2) commonalties with respect to the role of intentionality and the role of the
intellect, and (3) commonalties with respect to the character of intentionality and the
character of the intellect.

§ 3.1.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTENTIONALITY TO CONSCIOUSNESS IN COMPARISON
TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTELLECT TO SOUL

Recall that Gerson reads Aristotle's description of the soul as the first actuality of a
natural body {DA 412a 19-21) as stipulating that the body constituted as the composite of
form and matter is subject to the efficacy of the soul. In an analogous fashion the soul is
the subject of thought, and so is instantiated in its possession of intellect.25 In Brentano's
Psychology the relationship of intentionality to consciousness is analogous to the
relationship of intellect to the soul. This is clear when Brentano tells us that
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consciousness arises with mental phenomena. He writes, "the term 'consciousness,'
since it refers to an object which consciousness [Bewusstsein] is consciousness of,
seems to be appropriate to characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its
distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of intentional inexistence of an object."
Brentano continues, "[a]ll mental phenomena are states of consciousness".28 These
comments have the effect of attributing a causal efficacy to intentionality not unlike that
attributed to intellect by Aristotle. DA 408b26-27 stipulates that the relationship between
soul and intellect, being analogous to the relationship between soul and the composite
body, implies a certain efficacy on the part of intellect to effect the actualization of soul.
So too, it would seem, does intentionality exhibit a certain efficacy in its capacity to
effect the actualization of consciousness. The actualization of soul in Aristotle through
its possession of intellect is parallel to the instantiation of consciousness through
intentionality. This is true in so far as consciousness is, as Brentano says, "appropriate to
characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e.,
the property of intentional inexistence of an object."29

§ 3.2.

T H E R O L E OF INTENTIONALITY COMPARED TO THE R O L E OF INTELLECT

The commonalties with respect to the relationship of intellect to soul and that of
intentionality to consciousness are a function of their conceptual role in the respective
psychologies of their authors. Again, based on the distinction between the "part of the
soul that is called intellect" and the "intellect itself Gerson establishes two things: (1)
that intellect is that in which the content of thought resides, and (2) that intellect is selfaware. The first role of intellect is wholly bound up with the identity postulated by
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Aristotle between the knower and the known. The "intellect itself, Gerson reads, is

unlimited in its potency so that when it comes to exist as the "part of the soul that is
called intellect" it can actualize the intelligible forms of its object in such a way that it
becomes, in a literal sense, its object. This is parallel to Brentano's statement that mental
phenomenon (the analogue of thought in Aristotle) is characterized by the intentional
inexistence of its object. In other words, the intentional inexistence of the object is
analogous to the actualization of intelligible forms in the intellect. This is the sort of
actualization that Brentano refers to in the footnote that is often cited by those who
identify Aristotle's theory of sensation as the originary concept of intentionality. The
receiving of form without the matter is not, however, analogous to the sort of
actualization that Brentano refers to by the phrase intentional inexistence. Brentano
refers to the sensory sort of actualization only as part of his serial account of the events
that occur in thought, thought (i.e. intentional inexistence) being the culmination of the
cognitive event. Thoughts in Aristotle, like mental phenomena in Brentano, do more
than put the object before the subject—they present the object as an object accompanied
by significance of some sort.
Indeed, Brentano goes even further than Aristotle with respect to the identity of
the object of thought in that Brentano concedes nothing more than the intentional
inexistence of physical phenomena. As he states: "We have no right, therefore, to
believe that the objects of so-called external perception really exist as they appear to us.
Indeed, they demonstrably do not exist outside of us." 30 Brentano is, however, readily
willing to attribute "real existence" to mental phenomena. He writes:
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as
13

well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a
phenomenal and intentional existence.
Presumably, "real existence" refers to some sort of self-sufficiency, however, Brentano
never offers a lucid account of the term. Ultimately, Brentano concludes that "we will
nevertheless make no mistake if in general we deny to physical phenomena any existence
other than intentional existence."32 Such a conclusion suggests that, for Brentano, real
existence is subordinate to intentional inexistence to the extent that the real is found in
the intentional. Nevertheless, it is clear that Brentano accounts for the content-fullness of
mental phenomena through his postulation of the intentional inexistence of the object.
Intentionality, like intellect in Aristotle, affects the contentfulness of mental
phenomena.
The second role Aristotle attributes to intellect is bound up with the problem of
intellect's awareness of itself. Aristotle addresses this problem by positing, contrary to
his predecessors, a unified intellect endowed with self-awareness and maintains that selfawareness is a function of the unity of its passive and active aspects. The unity of
intellect prevents Aristotle from having to posit an infinite regression of intellects in
order to account for self-awareness. Such is the case in Brentano's Psychology as well.
Brentano calls this sort of self-awareness "inner perception", and the substantiation of the
possibility of such perception, contra Comte, is one of Brentano's prime motivations for
writing his Psychology. It is because of the possibility of inner perception that
psychology from an empirical standpoint is possible. Brentano tells us that "[w]e would
never know what a thought is, or a judgement, pleasure or pain, desires or aversions,
hopes or fears, courage or despair, decisions and voluntary intentions if we did not learn
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what they are through inner perception of our own phenomena."

What Brentano is

saying here is that, like intellect in Aristotle, inner perception not only puts before us the
immediate object of our thought, it also puts before us the very mode in which the object
is being presented. In other words, our capacity for inner perception enables us to be
aware of our awareness, and the nature of that awareness.35 This "nature of that
awareness" is what I will later refer to as the "meta-character" of the conscious act.

§ 3.3. THE CHARACTER OF INTENTIONALITY COMPARED TO THE CHARACTER OF THE
INTELLECT
It is reasonably clear that the intellect in Aristotle's psychology and intentionality in
Brentano share similar relationships to their respective subjects and similar roles in their
respective psychologies. Both are responsible for the content-fullness of their respective
subjects. Consequently the notion of intentionality accounts for those same exigencies of
thought that are accounted for by intellect in Aristotle. Like Aristotle, who is led to
conclude that the activity of intellect is an antecedent condition for human intellection,
Brentano, whose stipulation that every mental phenomenon—which itself implies every
moment of human consciousness—is characterized by the intentional inexistence of an
object, seems compelled to conclude that the activity of intentionality is equally the
antecedent condition of consciousness. And so, Brentano's intentionality is of the same
character as Aristotle's intellect in that it too is required to be, in some sense, separable,
unmixed, unaffected, eternal, and immortal to the extent that intentional relatedness, i.e.
consciousness, remains a real possibility. In this way, the application of Aristotle's
notion of the intellect is the more likely inspiration for Brentano's comments cited earlier,
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especially those to the affect that "we will nevertheless make no mistake if in general we

deny to physical phenomena an existence other than intentional existence."36

Conclusion: An Outline of the Present

Study

The ultimate purpose of this study is to substantiate thoroughly the analogy between nous
in Aristotle and intentionality in Brentano with the objective of arriving at a more
comprehensive and more accurate understanding of this essential aspect of psychological
states. The study will proceed as a trilogy of parts, the first of which includes this
introductory chapter and Chapter 2, which will explain in greater detail Brentano's notion
of intentionality and how it was formulated in response to a crisis within the science of
psychology. It will elaborate further upon the conventional problems associated with
intentionality and will proceed more thoroughly to articulate the problem discussed
briefly in section 1.2 of this chapter, specifically that problem originating in Brentano's
own articulation of the theory. I will come to refer to this hitherto unnoticed problem as
"the genetic problem of intentionality" and will explain how it arises out of a petitio
principii implicit in the dependency relationships that obtain among the various elements
of Brentano's model of consciousness.
Part II will demonstrate the deficiencies of the conventional understanding of
intentionality, and the primary antithesis of the argument of this study, that is, the
understanding of intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's theory of sensation
{aisthesis). Chapter 3 will explicate the "first actuality of aisthesis"', which we will come
to understand as the antecedent conditions for sensual activity. This chapter will explain
how, according to Aristotle, in order for sensation to occur the following conditions must
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be met: (i) there must be present an appropriate mediating element, one that represents a
state of qualitative neutrality with respect to the range of qualities that might be sensed,
(ii) the organism must possess an organ that is composed, in part, of elemental
constituents that are homogeneous with the mediating element and, in so being, is itself
qualitatively neutral with respect to the range of qualities that it is meant to sense.
Chapter 4 will discuss Aristotle's account of actual sensation, or, as we will come to
understand it, as "the second actuality of aisthesis". This discussion will reveal that
Aristotle's treatment of aisthesis is, in fact, an account of the presence of sense data in the
subject and not, as is commonly understood, an account of the actualization, in some
way, of sensed qualities in the sense organ. Chapter 5 will explore the relevant
extensions of Aristotle's theory of sensation including the sense that we are sensing, the
common sensibles, and the imagination. Part II will conclude with Chapter 6, in which I
will illustrate the disanalogy between aisthesis and intentionality based upon two integral
dissimilarities between the two: (1) the essential difference in their functioning with
respect to the object of thought, and (2) the essential difference with respect to the
character of their activity. These important differences will lead us to conclude that an
understanding of intentionality that is limited to a recapitulation of Aristotle's notion of
aisthesis must remain essentially incomplete.
Part III will represent the constructive part of the study. Its structure will parallel
that of Part II and accordingly, Chapter 7 will explicate the "first actuality of nous". The
first actuality of nous will be understood as an activity that itself represents the
antecedent condition for thinking. This activity will be explicitly distinguished from
thinking itself and will come to be understood as a primitive component of Aristotle's
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ontology. Chapter 8 will explicate "the second actuality of nous", which we will come to
understand as thinking proper. Given the similarities between nous and intentionality
that will emerge from chapters 7 and 8,1 will conclude that nous in Aristotle is the proper
analogue to intentionality in Brentano. The study will then conclude with some
reflections upon the practical import of this conclusion, including the revisions to our
understanding of intentionality that it entails and how such revisions allow us to escape
the problems of intentionality that we will now turn to in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2.

BRENTANO AND THE PROBLEMS OF
INTENTIONALITY

Introduction
In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) Brentano reintroduces the notion
of intentionality in answer to what is sometimes referred to in the contemporary literature
as the "hard problem" of consciousness or, simply, the "problem of experience."37 In
Brentano's own time the problem might have been branded the "problem of
introspection", but we must be cautious not to interpret the problem too narrowly so that
we can understand that what is referred to is a set of problems generally associated with
the scientific credentials of psychology: What is the proper language for explaining what
it is like to be conscious? Can states of consciousness be described objectively? And
last, but not least, what constitutes an adequate account of the instantiation of
consciousness? Intentionality or, rather, the intentional inexistence of the object of
consciousness is a key component to Brentano's answer to these questions. It is the
analysis of mental phenomena, characterized by the intentional inexistence of an object,
that reveals the felt qualities of experience. These problems persist even today, as does
the relevance of Brentano's analysis of them, for intentionality has come to represent a
set of fundamental problems in contemporary philosophy of mind38 and has served as a
foundational concept in the development of the cognitive sciences.39
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Following this introduction, I shall review the problems in response to which
Brentano revived the notion of intentionality, the notion of intentional inexistence as it is
articulated by Brentano, and the problems that the notion of intentional inexistence has
itself given rise to. These problems, which I will refer to as the "conventional problems
of intentionality", concern the sorts of entailment operative in mental/intentional
phenomena and are understood as epistemological in nature. I shall then elaborate upon a
problem that has yet to be articulated in the literature and which arises out of careful
analysis of Brentano's formulation (or re-formulation) of intentional inexistence. The
articulation of this problem is the central objective of this chapter; it arises out of
Brentano's insistence that one of the necessary conditions of consciousness is the
intentional inexistence of its object. As we shall see, this stipulation entails a radical
interdependence of the elements belonging to Brentano's model of consciousness, and it
precludes the possibility of an account of the emergence of consciousness in its
particularity. I will refer to this problem as the "genetic problem of intentionality", and,
as I will suggest, it represents the ontological basis of the conventional epistemological
problems. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of the genetic
problem of intentionality.

§ 1.

The Problems of Psychology

Contemporary with Comte, and later still with Brentano, was a concern for the legitimacy
of the various sciences and the criteria according to which a mode of inquiry might truly
be called a science. This was Comte's concern when he wrote his Systeme de Politique
Positive (1851-54). In the four volumes that comprise the Positive Polity (as it has come
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to be known in English) Comte elaborates upon what he sees as the three phases of the
evolution of a science—(1) the theological, (2) the metaphysical, and (3) the positive—
and sets out to rank what are, in his opinion, the six fundamental sciences—(i)
Mathematics, (ii) Astronomy, (iii) Physics, (iv) Chemistry, (v) Physiology, and (vi)
Social Physics (in that order). Comte's precise and elaborate criteria for this ranking and
his justification for the exclusivity of this list of so-called "fundamental sciences" are not
central to our present concerns.40 For our purposes, what is relevant is the conspicuous
absence in this list of the science of psychology. Comte's claim is that the psychology of
his day has stagnated in the metaphysical phase of its development. This criticism is
twofold: Comte is critical of (1) the object, and (2) the method of psychology.
In his "Comte and Psychology" (1922)42 Bodenhafer explains Comte's
dissatisfaction with any science whose object is not delimited independently of its
practitioner. Bodenhafer quotes Comte as saying:
However, some misconceiving in this respect the actual and
unalterable direction of the human mind, have endeavored
during the last ten years to transplant among us German
metaphysics and to found under the name of psychology a
pretended science completely independent of Physiology,
superior to it, and exclusively the study of the phenomena
termed moral.43
This passage, along with his later characterizations of psychology as "the vague and
chimerical pursuit"44 and as the "illusory science of personified abstractions", 45 is
revealing. Comte's concern seems to be that the object of psychology is obfuscated by its
non-ostensible and therefore abstract nature, i.e., it is speculative in so far as it objectifies
non-physical entities and, in so doing, indulges in abstractions. The conclusion we are
led to, if we follow Comte, is that only ostensible physical objects exhibit the sort of
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concretization that conditions the possibility of a science proper. For this reason, Comte
does not reject the possibility of a psychological science outright. Rather, he promotes a
physics of the mental, a science based upon what he perceived to be the potential to
analyze mental phenomena solely with regard to their ostensible physical instantiations.46
Comte's critique of the methods by which the psychology of his day was
practiced is intimately related to his criticisms of its object. Specifically, Comte is
critical of introspection, or what he calls "internal observation". Comte argues:
Man can observe what is external to him and also certain
functions of his organs, other than the thinking organ. To a
certain extent he can even observe himself as regards the
passions he feels, because the cerebral organs on which
these depend are distinct from the observing organ properly
so called. It is, however, evidently impossible for him to
observe his own intellectual acts, for the organ observed
and the observing organ being in this case identical, by
whom could the observation be made? . . . . To render this
possible the individual would have to divide himself into
two persons, one thinking, the other observing the thoughts.
Thus man cannot directly observe his intellectual
operations; he can only observe his organs and their results.
.. .There is therefore no place for psychology, or the direct
study of the soul independently of any external
considerations.47
Here Comte suggests that the speculative and abstract nature of the methodology of
psychology entails a certain identity between the object and the observer because of the
latent subjectivity involved in the delineation of the object. Interestingly enough,
Comte's criticism of the psychological method alludes to, albeit implicitly,48 an
adaptation of the Aristotelian principle of sensation—namely, the identity between the
senser and the sensed—that, as we shall see, Brentano later uses to rehabilitate empirical
psychology. Comte cites the identity between the perceiver and the perceived as a
further deficiency of the object of psychology. Here again we see his underlying concern
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with the clear differentiation and delimitation of the special object of the given science.
In this context, however, the deficiency is a function of the method of introspection.

§ 2.

Intentional Inexistence as a Response to the Problems of Psychology

Brentano sets out to rehabilitate the science of psychology, largely in response to these
criticisms leveled by Comte. His point of departure is to delineate the domain of
psychology, then narrow the focus of the science to a specific object. Psychology, says
Brentano, is an empirical science distinguishable from the rest by the private nature of its
object:
the natural sciences study the properties and laws of
physical bodies, which are the objects of our external
perception, psychology is the science which studies the
properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within
ourselves directly by means of inner perception.. .49
The phrases "external perception" and "inner perception" are here meant to be
understood in subtle contrast to Comte's phrase "internal observation". I shall elaborate
upon them in the discussion that follows. For now, however, it is sufficient that we
understand that, along with metaphysics (the objects of which are the rules that are
common to the empirical sciences); the natural sciences (the objects of which are external
bodies); and psychology (the objects of which are the "properties and laws of the soul"),
these three domains of science exhaust knowledge in its totality.
Having delineated the domain of psychology in this way, Brentano proceeds
further to articulate his basic conceptual framework as a further qualification of the
proper object of psychology. He proceeds by making the fundamental distinction
between physical and mental phenomenon. According to Brentano, "All the data of our
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consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of
mental phenomena."50 It is important to notice that this distinction is explicitly a
distinction between two sorts of "data of our consciousness" that emphasizes the internal
nature of both physical and mental phenomena. The facts with respect to the internal
quality of both sorts of phenomena are complicated by Brentano's claim that physical
phenomena are revealed through external perception. What must be remembered is that
physical phenomena include "color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I
hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the
imagination."51 In other words, physical phenomena are not concrete individual
substances (in the Aristotelian sense) as one might surmise from the use of the phrase
"external perception". Physical phenomena are to be understood, rather, like Lockean
secondary qualities.52 That this is indeed the proper construal of physical phenomena is
confirmed when, shortly after defining them, he makes reference to Locke's famous
experiment in which he submersed his hands, one having been warmed, the other having
been cooled, in the same pool of water and experienced it to be simultaneously two
different temperatures.5
The defining characteristic of mental phenomena is their possession of intentional
content, or, rather, an inexisting object:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content,
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way.54
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As we have already seen, in this passage Brentano identifies the distinguishing
characteristic of mental phenomena—namely, their content-fullness. Brentano uses the
phrases "intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object," "immanent objectivity," and
"includes something as object within itself to encapsulate the content-fullness of mental
phenomena.55 And again, this is the passage referred to when Brentano is credited with
the reintroduction of intentionality to modern philosophy. Although he does not himself
use the noun "intentionality" as it is used in the contemporary philosophical vernacular,
he does employ the adjective term "intentional" {intentional)56 from which the noun form
is derived. In Brentano then, intentionality can be understood as the ontic basis of mental
contents: the object of any specific mental phenomenon exists in the intention of the
psychic event. We shall elaborate upon this further in section 4 of this chapter and even
more in Chapter 9.
Brentano's response to the problems of psychology discussed above becomes
more explicit in his extended analysis of mental phenomena: "Every idea or presentation
which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a
mental phenomenon."57 To be clear, the term "presentation" [Vorstellung] in the above
passage refers not merely to the presence of content in our cognitive activities. The
examples of mental phenomena Brentano offers include the hearing of a sound, and the
seeing of a color, the suggestion being that the presentation is identical with (i) the
content of the presentation, (ii) an awareness of the activity of the sense apparatus
involved. Brentano adds to this (iii) a certain subjective character. He says that in some
the object is presented as loved, in others as hated, in others as affirmed, as denied, as
desired, and so on. The mode of presentation of the mental phenomena is an essential
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aspect of it and is a function of its intentional character. In what follows, I shall refer to
this subjective character as the "meta-character" of psychological states. A thorough
understanding of Brentano's notion of "intentional inexistence" requires an appreciation
of all three of these aspects: (i) the content, (ii) reflective awareness, and (iii) the metacharacter of psychological states.
Brentano's response to Comte's concern with the lack of concretization exhibited
by the object of psychology can now be understood as the claim that the psychologically
relevant part of experience, i.e., its intentional character, is fixed to, and always given as,
concomitant with the presentation of the real physically delimited and external object.
This is significant not only for Brentano's response to Comte, but also for our current
investigation and our later comparisons of Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence
with aisthesis in Aristotle, on the one hand, and nous in Aristotle, on the other.
Brentano's use of the German "Vorstellung" connotes a certain cognitive maturity with
respect to its substantive content. By this I mean that the substantive content of that
which is presented (again "Vorstellung") in mental phenomena is already something
conceived of as an object, it is conceptualized to an extent that might support subjective
valuations of the sort Brentano exemplifies: "something is affirmed or denied, in love
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired."5 Ultimately, we must understand that the variety
of our mental phenomena, our thoughts, emotions, desires, and, in short, all of the things
we want to talk about when we engage in psychology, is accounted for by the three
aspects of mental phenomena identified above.
It is not yet clear how we are to analyze mental phenomena scientifically if not
through introspection. Brentano answers this question with what he, with Kant, calls
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"inner perception" (innere Wahrnehmung).

Through inner perception one engages his

or her sense or awareness of his or her own presentations and their essential structure. In
other words, inner perception allows one to attend to the concomitant awareness of
sensation, presence of content, and the meta-character of the presentations he or she is
subject to. 60 Inner perception is Brentano's fundamental response to Comte's rejection of
introspection. He writes: "Another characteristic which all mental phenomena have in
common is the fact that they are only perceived in inner consciousness."61 Whereas
physical phenomena are seen through external perception, mental phenomena are the
object of inner perception. Further,
inner perception possesses another distinguishing
characteristic: its immediate, infallible self-evidence...
Moreover, inner perception is not merely the only kind of
perception which is immediately evident; it is really the
only perception [Wahrnehmung] in the strict sense of the
word.62
Brentano's postulation of the noetic superiority of inner perception seems to represent his
attempt to come to grips with the Kantian problem concerning our knowledge of things in
themselves. An appreciation of this context helps to understand his later, and repeated,
statements to the effect that, "the phenomena of so-called external perception [i.e.,
physical phenomena] cannot be proved true and real.. ,".63
For our present purposes, the significance of Brentano's formulation of inner
perception is twofold: First, rather than trying to defend the objectivity of introspection or
attempting to devise some form of sufficiently objective mode of introspection, Brentano
abandons objectivity as a criterion of science altogether in favour of self-evidence and
infallibility. Inner perception is, for Brentano, neither objective nor subjective—it is a
self-evident, or apodictic, method for conducting psychology scientifically. Second,
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Brentano's insistence that inner perception is the only true perception posits, like
Aristotle before him, an identity of sorts between the subject and the object which
obfuscates the ontological status of both. This obfuscation is central to the problem that I
will discuss at length in section 4. Despite the relative ambiguity with respect to its
implicit ontology, the significance of intentional inexistence, or, rather, intentionality, in
Brentano's model of consciousness is clear: He employs it to account for the contentfullness of mental phenomena. It is the bearer of content and the bridge between the
mental and the physical.64

§ 3.

The Conventional Problem of

Intentionality

Much of the contemporary work addressing the problem of intentionality65 in mainstream
philosophical circles responds to the problems articulated by Chisholm (1916 - 1999) in
his 1956 article entitled "Sentences About Believing", or to various expressions of these
problems offered in more recent works.66 According to Chisholm, the intentional is that
which takes as its object something that does not exist.67 The capacity to do so, says
Chisholm, is what Brentano identifies as the "mark of what is psychological."68 We can
already see certain latent ontological concerns surrounding the definition, and function,
of intentionality: according to Chisholm intentionality, as the mark of what is
psychological, is its capacity to take (whatever this taking may involve) as its object
something that does not exist, i.e., something that, by whatever standard, he is denying
the being of. Although Chisholm does not, unlike Brentano, qualify being in any explicit
way in this paper, it is clear from the contrast he draws between intentional and nonintentional sentences—non-intentional being those that describe the "merely physical"—
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that what he means when he says that the "object does not exist" is that it is not
physically instantiated. Chisholm, however, is not here concerned with the ontological
status of the object.
The explicit purpose of Chisholm's article is to express his dissatisfaction with
attempts to "translate" what he calls intentional language into physical language. In
critiquing these attempts he seeks to illustrate that intentional language is indeed
unavoidable. He begins by formulating three criteria for determining whether a sentence
is intentional. A sentence is intentional if (1) "it uses a substantive expression—a name
or a description—in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies
either that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival expression truly
applies."69 Chisholm offers the following example of such a sentence: "[A] man is
thinking of the Dnieper Dam."70 Regardless of the factual existence of the Dnieper Dam,
we can understand that the sentence is intentional, according to this criterion, because
neither the affirmation nor the denial of the sentence implies anything with respect to the
factual existence of the dam. It only speaks to the factual existence of a man who may or
may not be thinking of it. A sentence is intentional if (2) its principal verb "takes as its
object a phrase containing a subordinate verb", as, for example, in the sentence, "He is
contemplating killing himself."71 In this case the sentence is intentional because it
includes a subordinate verb ("killing") the facticity of which is irrelevant to the facticity
of the primary verb ("contemplating"). A sentence is intentional if (3) it contains an
indirect reference to a thing such that "its replacement by a different name (or
description) of that thing results in a sentence whose truth-value may differ from that of
the original sentence."72 For example, the truth of the sentence "Kramer knows that
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Harrison is the father of three children" does not entail the truth of the sentence "Kramer
knows that Harrison is the father of Sarah, Mary, and Tom." The intentionality of
sentences of this sort is considerably less obvious than that of the previous sorts. These
sentences are intentional because their individual meanings are dependent upon the
substantive value of the descriptions "is the father of three children" and "is the father of
Sarah, Mary, and Tom" respectively. In other words, although both descriptions refer to
the same object—namely, Harrison—the meanings of the two sentences are distinct and
the truth of the one does not imply the truth of the other.
With reference to these criteria for what constitutes an intentional sentence,
Chisholm argues that attempts to recast intentional sentences into physical and nonintentional language have been unsuccessful because they require us to "use a vocabulary
which we do not need to use when we describe non-psychological, or 'physical',
phenomena"74 and that this vocabulary amounts to a loosely veiled intentional language.
For my purposes the attempts at translation that Chisholm critiques and the specifics of
his analysis are not important. What is important is that Chisholm's criteria define
obstacles inherent in intentional sentences that preclude (or have precluded) their
reduction into physicalist terms. Furthermore, it can be observed that all of the criteria
identified by Chisholm refer to their specific nuances and their expression of what I have
referred to as the "meta-character" of the intentional act.
Recall that the term "meta-character" refers to the subjective character of the
intentional act. Specifically, it refers to the judgemental character, the loving , the hating,
or the desiring character of the act.
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same
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way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate
hated, in desire desired and so on.75
All of the examples offered by Chisholm as he articulates his criteria build upon the
general list offered by Brentano. Chisholm's first example (of the Dnieper Dam) adds
the "as thought", his later two examples add the "as contemplated" and "as known"
respectively. In fact, Chisholm's criteria can be read as a system of classification of the
varieties of meta-character that psychological states might exhibit. Understood as such,
Chisholm's analysis of intentional sentences provides us with a deeper understanding of
the conventional problem of intentionality and specifically its origin in the meta-character
of psychological states. It is precisely this that eludes translation into physicalist
language.
In his "Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality" (1998) Caston characterizes
the obstacles identified by Chisholm generally as "failures of common patterns of
entailment."76 What he means by this is that intentional sentences, or sentences about
psychological phenomena, do not involve the same sorts of entailment that sentences
describing physical phenomena do. One expects certain things to follow from the later
sort of sentences that do not follow from the former. According to Caston,
As failures of common patterns of entailment, they
[intentional sentences] are at odds with our intuitions about
the rest of the world and so in need of explanation. The
struggle to find such explanations, I would suggest,
constitutes the real problem of intentionality.77
Caston then proceeds to summarize Chisholm's criteria and to expand upon them with
reference to Anscombe and Geach but, as we can already see, Caston is even more
explicit about the epistemological essence of the problem as he sees it. The problems
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Caston enumerates are failures of understanding. He explains that an adequate analysis
of intentionality must account for five peculiarities of psychological phenomena: (1) their
"failure of existential commitment", (2) their "failure of truth-functionality", (3) their
"failure of intersubjectivity of coextensive expressions salva veritate", (4) their "failure of
the excluded middle", and (5) their "failure of quantifier exportation."78 (1) represents a
restatement of Chisholm's first criterion and, to reiterate, means that neither sentences
about psychological, or intentional, phenomena nor their negation imply a commitment to
the factual, and by this he means physical, existence of the object. (2) corresponds to
Chisholm's second criterion: neither sentences about intentional phenomena nor their
negations entail the truth or falsity of the object predicate. (3) Corresponds to Chisholm's
third criterion: sentences about intentional phenomena do not entail anything with respect
to the subject's relation to the object beyond that which is explicitly contained/expressed
within the sentence. For example, "Sherlock Holmes knows that Jack Stapleton is a
murderer" does not entail that "Sherlock Holmes knows that Jefferson Hope is a
murderer", nor does it entail that "Sherlock Holmes knows that Jack Stapleton is the heir
to the Baskerville fortune." In other words, Sherlock Holmes' knowledge that Jack
Stapleton is a murderer does not entail that Sherlock Holmes has any additional
knowledge about Jack Stapleton or about murderers.79 (4) is similar to (3): for any
specific sentence about an intentional phenomenon the sentence will not entail that its
object is or is not of a particular sort, e.g., "Sherlock Holmes is thinking about Jack
Stapleton" does not entail that "Sherlock Holmes is thinking about a man who is a
murderer" nor does it entail that "Sherlock Holmes is thinking about a man who is not a
murderer." (5) is similar to (1): for any specific sentence about an intentional
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phenomenon that involves the quantification of its object the sentence will not entail the
factual existence of its object qualified in that same way, e.g., "Sherlock Holmes is
thinking about a murderer" does not entail the factual existence of any particular
murderer.
According to Caston the explanation of these five peculiarities with respect to the
entailment of sentences describing intentional phenomena, compared to that of sentences
describing physical phenomena, is the crux of the problem of intentionality. In Caston
too, however, the ambiguity with respect to the epistemological entailments of sentences
describing intentional phenomena originates in the meta-character of the phenomena.
Brentano might observe that, with regard to the previous example, that which ambiguates
the epistemic entailment of the sentence is the fact that the murderer referred to in the
sentence exists "as thought about". Here again, it is to the meta-character of the act
depicted that the conventional problem of intentionality can be traced.
In a more recent description of the problem Simons speaks to the nature of the
explanation sought. In his "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of Intentionality
(Natural or Otherwise)" (2001) Simons delineates three sets of conditions for an adequate
account of intentional phenomena: (1) "Metaphysical Prerequisites", (2) "Internal
Constraints: the Systematics Requirement", and (3) "External Constraints: the Integration
Requirement".80 Included under the heading of "Metaphysical Prerequisites" for an
adequate account of intentional phenomena are the requirements that: (i) it accommodate
the language of folk psychology; (ii) it "adhere to a robust but critical epistemological
realism about the world"; and (iii) it "employ an ontology without unbridgeable
ontological divides such as that between an eternal and a temporal realm or between
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spatial body and non-spatial mind."

The "Internal Constraints: the Systematics

Requirement" include that: (i) the so-called symptoms of intentionality, by which he
means the failures of entailment as described by Caston,82 be accounted for; (ii) the
accounts "get the subjective phenomenology of intentionality right";83 and (iii) the
concept accounts for the many varieties of intentional phenomenon.84 The "External
Constraints: the Integration Requirement" include that: (i) the account be compatible with
Darwinism and the predominant notions of evolution and natural selection;85 (ii) the
account be sufficient to yield an explanation of intentionality displayed by social
groups;86 and (iii) the account be compatible with "well-corroborated natural science."87
As we can see, l.iii explicitly denies the adequacy of accounts based in either
Platonic/Idealistic or dualistic ontologies and seemingly leaves the door open to an array
of alternate ontologies. However, when considered in tandem with 3.i and 3.iii, those
requirements that demand compatibility with Darwinism and, more specifically,
contemporary formulations of it, as well as the natural sciences, it is clear that only
those accounts that are based upon a physicalist ontology will be considered adequate.
Given, then, that the problem, as defined by Simons, stipulates that the solution to this
problem must be compatible with physicalism, he, in effect, sets aside (or predetermines
the response to) any ontological problems that may surface while addressing the problem,
and defines the problem as wholly epistemological.
Even from this brief review it is already evident that contemporary mainstream
formulations of the problem of intentionality, and concerns for intentionality in general,
are fundamentally epistemological in nature. The criteria Chisholm and Simons
articulate and the failures that Caston enumerate are criteria for, and failures of, our
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understanding of intentional phenomena. This may be truer of Caston and Simons than it
is for Chisholm. Be that as it may, it is demonstrably the case that the problematic in
which contemporary mainstream philosophers situate the problem of intentionality is one
in which a physicalist paradigm is assumed. Ontological considerations are preempted
because the project, as defined by the problem, is to render intentional phenomena
compatible with a physicalist ontology free of impurities. And this physicalist ontology,
as we shall see, is demonstrably not the sort of ontology underlying Brentano's
Psychology. That said, the problem that I seek to illuminate here is a problem of
ontological import specifically arising out of the ambiguity of Brentano's own
ontological commitments.

§ 4.

The Genetic Problem of

Intentionality

In Prior A. II16 Aristotle tells us that the following is a case of circular reasoning: "if A
should be proved through B, and B through C, though it was natural that C should be
proved through A; for it turns out that those who reason thus are proving A by means of
itself." {Prior A. 65al - 4) This is straightforward enough with respect to argumentation.
Reasoning of the form:
BDA
CDB
ADC
Or, rather,
ADC
CDB
BDA
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is circular. This fallacy has gone by a number of names, however, formal treatments of
the fallacy89 refer to it as the petitio principii (the fallacy of petitioning the principle).
Such a fallacy, however, is not confined to rhetorical argumentation. Aristotle continues
by saying, "This is what those persons do who suppose that they are constructing parallel
lines; for they fail to see that they are assuming facts which it is impossible to
demonstrate unless parallels exist." {Prior A. 65a4 - 6) In this elaboration Aristotle
shows us how such a fallacy might also be manifest in theoretical constructions (like the
model of consciousness Brentano presents in Psychology). As Chisholm explains,
But how can a construction be a petitio principal We must
remember that in geometry the construction of a figure is
equivalent to proving that such figures exist, and depends
upon the proof of prior theorems. °
This explanation of the petitio principii represents Chisholm's summary of the
interpretation of these passages from Aristotle that were agreed upon by Brentano and
Vailati in their personal correspondence. This is also the sort of problem that can be
identified in Bretano's model of consciousness centered upon his postulation of the
intentional inexistence of its object.
In the earliest discussions of Brentano's Psychology, where the domain of
psychology is distinguished from metaphysics on the one hand and the natural sciences
on the other, Brentano rejects what we might today call a purely physicalist account of
consciousness.91 He tells us that,
the facts which the physiologist investigates and those
which the psychologist investigates are most intimately
correlated, despite their great differences in character. We
find physical and mental properties united in one and the
same group. Not only may physical states be aroused by
physical states and mental states by mental, but it is also the
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case that physical states have mental consequences and
mental states have physical consequences.9
This affirmative statement colours everything that follows it and must be taken into
account when interpreting later passages. Where Brentano says things like, "sensations
are aroused by physical stimuli"93 and "it will definitely be the task of the psychologist to
ascertain the first mental phenomena which are aroused by a physical stimulus",94 he
implies the temporal priority of physical stimuli, whereas later analysis suggests a sort of
ontological priority of mental phenomena over the physical. Such priority is further
suggested by the portions of text immediately following those cited above, where
Brentano states: "We have no right, therefore, to believe that the objects of so-called
external perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably do not
exist outside of us." 95 It is also suggested in later chapters, as when he states:
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a
phenomenal and intentional existence.96
This passage is not only a radical departure from Aristotle,97 but it represents a significant
ontological commitment that ultimately leads Brentano to commit the petitio principii.
This passage, in conjunction with our understanding of physical phenomena from
section 2 as being comparable to Lockean secondary qualities, leaves us with a number of
difficult, and perhaps contradictory, postulations all of which involve various modes of
existence and those entities that participate in them. Thus far we have been confronted
with no less than four modes of being: (i) intentional, (ii) phenomenal, (iii) real, and, by
extrapolation, (iv) non-real. As we have just seen, mental phenomena exhibit both real
and intentional being. Further, by virtue of their title, we must presume that mental
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phenomena also exhibit phenomenal being. Physical phenomena, on the other hand,
exhibit only intentional and phenomenal being. However, this stipulation is clearly
meant to imply that physical phenomena do not exhibit real being and are therefore nonreal. To this taxonomy we must add physical stimuli, to which, it would seem, Brentano
is compelled (by Anselm's law) to grant real being given their capacity to 'arouse' mental
phenomena, which, as we've already noted, are themselves real. The resulting taxonomy
can be illustrated as follows:
Table 2.4.1

•
•
•

Intentional
Mental
Phenomena
Physical
Phenomena
Physical Stimuli
qua Physical
Phenomena

•
•
•

Phenomenal
Mental
Phenomena
Physical
Phenomena
Physical Stimuli
qua Physical
Phenomena

•

Real
Mental
Phenomena

Non-Real

•
•

Physical Stimuli

•

Physical
Phenomena
Physical Stimuli
qua Physical
Phenomena

The perfect congruity between the intentional and phenomenal modes of being suggests
their synonymity. This taxonomy must be further truncated given Brentano's career-long
rejection of fictitious objects. In his essay "On Genuine and Fictitious Objects" Brentano
argues,
anyone who says that the non-existence of a centaur has
being, or who answers the question as to whether a centaur
does not exist by saying, "That is so," only wants to say
that he denies centaurs in the modus praesens, and,
consequently, also believes that anyone who denies a
centaur judges correctly. 98
Brentano's point is that he finds it to be non-sensical to attribute some sort of thingliness
to that which is non-real. Arguing explicitly against Meinong, he refuses to include
negative states of affairs in his ontology.
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Qualified in such a way, Brentano's taxonomy is reduced to two modes of being,
(i) the intentional and (ii) the real. The two cannot be understood in opposition to each
other, especially given that he distinguishes clearly only two classes of objects, (a) the
mental and (b) the physical. Further, the mental are said to exhibit both modes of being.
The physical are said to exhibit real being given their potential to 'arouse' mental
phenomena. Later, however, the physical is said to exhibit only intentional being. And
so we are left with the following:
Table 2.4.2

•
•
•

Intentional/ Phenomenal
Mental Phenomena
Physical Phenomena
Physical Stimuli qua
Physical Phenomena

•

Real
Mental Phenomena

•

Physical Stimuli

These contradictory claims concerning the "physical" suggest very strongly that
the term is being used in an equivocal or metaphorical way: In some cases Brentano
seems to use the term "physical" to refer to a category of real (in the common sense of
the term) external objects, while in others—specifically when he speaks of "physical
phenomena"—he uses the term "physical" metaphorically to refer to a sense in which an
inner intentional state can be like an external physical thing. Recognizing this
equivocation allows us to recognize that the distinction between mental and physical
phenomena is indeed an ontological one: it is this distinction that fixes the boundary
between the real and the non-real. This is the only charitable way to read Brentano's
comments with respect to the efficacy of physical stimuli to cause mental phenomena in a
manner that is coherent with his comments with respect to the noetic deficiencies of
physical phenomena?9

The distinction between mental and physical phenomena does

not, however, fix the boundaries of the causal potency of, and between, the now three
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distinct genres (i.e., [1] real physical events/stimuli, [2] real mental phenomena, and [3]

non-real physical phenomena).100
Read with an eye to this ontological connotation we are left with apetitio
principii of the second sort described above. The problem is this: According to
Brentano, certain real physical events are temporally prior to, and a necessary condition
of, but not sufficient for, the emergence of real mental phenomena. This is because, as
Brentano says, consciousness is always consciousness of something and that thing is
some physical phenomenon that exists only intentionally. The circle is completed when
Brentano stipulates that "intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental
phenomena."101 Once we divine the correct serial order of Brentano's various
stipulations it is clear that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of
(C) consciousness—understood as being identical with (Mx) mental phenomena and their
immanent physical phenomena (Px)—are some real physical stimulus (Si) and some real
mental phenomenon (Mi) to provide the immanent objectivity—the specific physical
phenomenon (Pi)—of which consciousness is conscious. In a more formalized notation
these stipulations look like this:
51. (x)(CxDMx)
52. (x)(Px) = (x)(Mx)
53. (x)(Cx) = (3x)(Sx & Px)
We can see from this articulation of the problem that S2 is the stipulation that explicitly
closes the loop between S1 and S3 and, from our previous discussions, we can understand
that S2 is derived directly from Brentano's claim that, "Every mental phenomenon is
characterized by ... the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object".
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With this in

mind the symbolic expression of the interdependency of the various elements of
Brentano's model can be simplified and the interdependency made more explicit: We can
understand that the emergence of consciousness is conditional upon the presence of its
object; the presence of the object is conditioned by its intentional inexistence; further,
such an intentional inexistence occurs only in consciousness, or:
Consciousness
Object
Intentionality

=
=
=

Object
Intentionality
Consciousness

In this sense Brentano has assumed the existence of his subject, a fact that is impossible
to demonstrate unless its existence is given. In so doing he precludes the possibility of an
account of the genesis of consciousness. To be clear, he does not, strictly speaking,
preclude the possibility of genetic psychology as a science that "establish[es] the laws of
their [mental phenomena] succession",103 but the event in which a particular
consciousness originates remains inextricable.
We cannot forget Brentano's point of departure—the point with which Brentano
indicates the proper domain of psychology—namely, that mental phenomena themselves
are immanent to the conscious organism, a real physical object and individual substance.
If, we are to reconcile this observation with the claim that "intentional inexistence is
characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena,"104 according to what sort of being can
we account for intentional existence? No properly Brentanian response to this question
can be devised without recalling Brentano's own epistemology (by which I refer to his
categorization of the sciences discussed at the beginning of section 2) and specifically his
suggestion that the rules and properties common to the domains of both sorts of empirical
sciences (those that treat the physical and those that treat the "properties and laws of the
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soul") are properly pursued under the rubric of metaphysics. Given, then, that the
property of intentional inexistence is manifest in both mental phenomena and the physical
organism, we can understand that the genetic problem of intentionality is, properly
construed, a metaphysical problem. More specifically, it is an ontological problem that
requires an ontological answer.

Conclusion: The Repercussions

of the Genetic Problem of

Intentionality

It would be at least partially redundant for me to elaborate upon the ramifications of the
genetic problem of intentionality illustrated above. This is due to the fact that one of its
major ramifications is, indeed, the conventional problems elaborated in section 3. When
the ontological significance of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena is
overlooked—as when we invoke intentionality to address our more immediate
epistemological concerns—these ambiguities lead us to the sorts of problems expressed
by Chisholm, Anscombe, Caston, et al. The intentional character of mental phenomena
cannot be accounted for by the presence of any elaborate physical mechanisms, or
conglomeration of elaborate mechanisms, so long as the physical substratum is defined
by what Caston calls "rules of entailment". The definition, indeed the identification, of
the physicalist ontological scheme with a set of entailment rules can be characterized, in
the most general of terms, by the Aristotelian language of efficiency and materiality.
That such a definition is operative in such treatments of intentionality is suggested by
Chisholm's conclusion that intentional sentences cannot be translated into physical
language.
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Finally, there is in fact an even more general epistemological problem resulting
from the genetic problem of intentionality. Brentano's ontological commitment to the
primacy of the mental is based, in large part, upon its immediate presence and infallibility
(recall the discussion of "inner perception" in section 2).105 The ontological and
epistemological qualifications Brentano places upon that portion of the mental
phenomenon that represents the immanent object, i.e., the physical phenomenon, have the
effect of rendering the intentional portion of the mental phenomenon the only constituent
of Brentano's ontology that is of any noetic value. The intentional character of the
mental phenomenon becomes the source, the object, and the substrate of knowledge.
Construed as such, intentionality, or, rather, the intentional character of mental
phenomena, represents a manifestation of the petitio principii fallacy in and of itself.
Brentano's resurrection of the notion of the intentional inexistence of the object of
consciousness is, by most accounts, his most influential contribution to modern
philosophy. Despite the conventional problems the notion entails and the genetic
problem I have endeavored to articulate, the notion remains relevant because it is not, at
its core, a conceptual construct. It is an ostensible aspect of mental states that is
identified by Brentano through his descriptive exercise. Setting aside Brentano's claims
with regard to the infallibility of its substance, discussions concerning the intentional
character of consciousness persist today because it represents such an evident and
apparently-indubitable aspect of mental states. It is this same apparently indubitable
character that impresses upon us the urgency to revise properly our understanding of the
ontological foundations of intentionality because, as we have seen, securing these
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foundations is the only way we can ensure the profitability of future efforts to address the
epistemological difficulties it presents.
In Part III shall turn my attention to those aspects of Aristotle's psychology upon
which the dominant understanding of intentionality is based.
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This passage defines what he calls "abstract intellection". This sort of intellection, as is
explicit in the passage, deals with "universals and the essences of things" and represents
the capacity to grasp and manipulate concepts. Further, as we can understand from Duns
Scotus' comments concerning the presence and absence of the object of such intellection,
this sort of activity is susceptible to the failures of entailment described by Caston.
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On the other hand, if the divine power of intellection is a sufficient condition for
cognition, it is possible, as Duns Scotus concludes, to engage in a form of cognition that
is not mediated by the human powers of intellection. Duns Scotus writes, "But there is
another act of understanding, though we do not experience it in ourselves as certainly, but
it is possible. It is knowledge precisely of a present object as present and of an exiting
object as exiting."(Duns Scotus [1975]: 136) This sort of cognition is referred to by Duns
Scotus as "intuitive cognition". Pasnau's preliminary exegesis of this sort of cognition
yields the following conclusions:
that the intellect can (in special cases) operate without
being essentially ordered to any intelligible species. He
believes that an intelligible object might produce an act of
cognition without informing the intellect. In this way, the
intellect could have an immediate vision of external
objects. (Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later
Middle Ages, [New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997]: 42)
On a less esoteric note, these comments by Duns Scotus bear striking resemblance to
those made by Brentano concerning inner perception. It would seem that in Duns Scotus,
as in Brentano, there is a sense in which the objects of experience (to use a more general
term) appear (in a metaphorical sense) to the subject according to the mode of the
subject's experience, in other words, one perceives an object while at the same time he
perceives that he is perceiving an object.
Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: M Nijhoff, 1965):
38-39.
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Brentano (1995): 91.
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Similar reading of intentional inexistence in Brentano can be found in Spiegelberg

(1965): 39-42 and in Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano
(Chicago: Open Court, 1994): 35. Smith's decidedly more condensed exegesis of
intentionality, however, sacrifices an understanding of the problematic nuances of
Brentano's articulation for the sake of a concise statement of the core concept.
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It would be imprudent of me not to make explicit the distinction that has so far only

been implied throughout the present discussions. It is the distinction between practical
and "extra-practical" intention made by Herbert Spiegelberg in his, "'Intention' and
'Intentionality' in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl" in The Context of the
Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: M Nijhoff, 1981). Spiegelberg tells us that
whereas "intention" is commonly understood in the sense of an intention to do
something, or a purpose, extra-practical intention denotes "the mere directedness toward
the willed [or perceived, or thought about] object."(Spiegelberg [1981]: 4) In another
article that I will scrutinize later, Caston defines intentionality, the extra-practical sort, as
"that feature of our mental states in virtue of which they can correctly be said to be o/or
about something or, more generally, possess content."(Caston [1998]: 250) It is
important that I be clear that this sort of intentionality, the extra-practical sort, is that to
which I refer when I use the term "intentionality" or any derivative terms.
This distinction is especially important given the influence of certain works in
which the two sorts of intentionality are conflated. One such work, Dennett's
Consciousness Explained (1991), presents an outright rejection of intentionality because,
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according to the research he cites, the mind's awareness of its object is not fully realized
until some time (a matter of mere milliseconds) after it has signaled for the execution of a
response. On the other hand, Dennett suggests that one's expressions are dictated by an
unknown, and indeed unknowable, number of neurons that perform various interpretive
and expressive functions and engage in a competition for supremacy. Further, the criteria
by which this competition is judged are wholly context-based and subject to perpetual
adaptation. When addressing the problem of just where or what imposes the criteria
according to which interpretations of physical stimuli earn ascension into consciousness,
according to which competing expressions are chosen for voicing, Dennett writes:
What if the word-demons are, in parallel, the
questioners/contestants, and the content-demons are the
answerers/judges? Fully fledged and executed
communicative intentions—Meanings—could emerge from
a quasi-evolutionary process of speech act design that
involves the collaboration, partly serial, partly in parallel,
of various subsystems none of which is capable on its own
of performing—or ordering—a speech act. (Daniel
Dennett, Consciousness Explained [Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1991]: 239)
On these grounds Dennett rejects intentionality outright, in both the practical and the
extra-practical sense.
In this context, however, the phrases "word-demons" and "content-demons",
which refer to two specialized varieties of neurons, suggest the essential intentionality, in
the extra-practical sense, of their referents. The actual objects of these intentions are
irrelevant to the intentional character of these neurons. The intentional nature of neurons
in Dennett's analysis resides not in their actually "having" an object (intentionality in the
Brentanian sense) but in their being, in a manner of speaking, directed towards such
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"having" (i.e., intentional in the Husserlian object-directedness sense). In being
characterized as either "questioners/contestants" or "answerers/judges" the neurons are,
at the same time, characterized as tending towards having a question, or having an answer
which will, of course, be content-full. Even if that content is not fixed or concretized
they remain intentional in their tending. Dennett has not eliminated intentionality; he has
conflated the two senses of the terms and rejected them both upon grounds relevant to
only one—namely, intentionality in the practical sense. Intentionality in the extrapractical sense remains distributed in various forms throughout his model.
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Concept of Intentionality," in Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy Supp. Vol. (1991); Peter Simons, "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of
Intentionality (Natural or Otherwise)," in Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality
ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden: Brill, 2001):l-22; Caston (1998), Victor Caston,
"Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality," in Ancient and
Medieval Theories of Intentionality ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 23-48; and
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Synthese: An InternationalJournalfor Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of
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argumentation; as well as Jeff Mitscherling, Roman Ingarden Ontology and Aesthetics
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1997) especially Chapter 2, which discusses the
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Dennett (1991).
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advancements of his age:
It is well known that our perceptions are mediated by the
so-called afferent nerves. In the past people thought that
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certain nerves served as conductors of each kind of sensory
qualities, such as color, sound, etc. (Brentano [1995]: 83)
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respect to their special objects; for example: colour for vision, scent for smell, and so on.
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Brentano (1995): Appendix IX, 292. He offers further support from Aristotle:
Aristotle is quite correct, therefore, in saying that the "That
is so," by which we indicate our agreement with a
judgement means nothing but that the judgement is true,
and that truth has no being outside of the person judging; in
other words, it exists only in that loose and improper sense,
but not strictly in reality. (Brentano [1995]: Appendix IX,
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To be clear, my suggestion is that we distinguish in Brentano between physical stimuli

or events and physical phenomena.
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Brentano's model might now be understood according to the following analogy:

Imagine a clear glass beaker full of water. The glass can be understood as analogous to a
real mental phenomenon existing in the real world (which, of course, it does). The water,
then, can be understood as the intentional content of the mental phenomenon. Of course,
looking through the water at an object has the effect of the object appearing in the water.
To the extent that the seen object is in the water it can be understood as analogous to
Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence.
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PART II - AISTHESIS

Chapter 3.

THE FIRST ACTUALITY OF AISTHESIS

Introduction
The most intuitive reason for looking to Aristotle's theory of sensation (or "'aisthesis''' as
it is rendered in the Greek) for the conceptual source of Brentano's notion of the
intentional inexistence of the object is that it is through sensation that one comes to
acquire data concerning which we come to have thoughts. Aristotle states this plainly
when he describes aisthesis as the "the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of
things without the matter." {DA 424al8-19)1 This passage insinuates that aisthesis
involves a sort of instantiation of the sensed object comparable to the sort of instantiation
implied by Brentano's phrase "intentional inexistence". As we already know from Part I
(especially Chapter 2, section 4), Brentano does not employ the phrase "intentional
inexistence" to imply any metaphorical, or even diminished, sense of existence. In fact,
as our explication of Brentano's distinction between mental and physical phenomena
revealed, Brentano takes that to which he attributes intentional inexistence to be "real" to
the same extent as any physical object. The causal efficacy Brentano attributes to the
intentional object is equitable to the efficacy of physical stimuli. The efficacy of the
inexisting object is, again, bound up with what I previously described as the cognitive
maturity of the content of mental phenomena: That to which Brentano attributes
intentional inexistence is already something conceived of as an object, it is already
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conceptualized as an object of a certain sort, it is already as a thing affirmed, or denied,
loved or hated, desired or avoided.
Based upon this synopsis of intentional inexistence, Part II will proceed with an
exegesis of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis with the specific intention of drawing those
aspects of the theory that are comparable to Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence.
Ultimately, and in accordance with the overarching thesis of the present study, I will
argue that Aristotle's theory of aisthesis fails on a number of fronts to adequately account
for that which Brentano encapsulates in his notion of intentional inexistence. The above
synopsis alludes to the criteria upon which this judgement is based: Brentano's notion of
intentional inexistence cannot be understood as strictly analogous to aisthesis in Aristotle
because, whereas that to which Brentano attributes intentional inexistence is a thing
conceptualized to the extent that it stands to its subject as an object of a certain sort and
of a certain identity, aisthesis in Aristotle is wholly pre-conceptual providing for its
subject only the raw materials with which the activity of objedification and judgement
might be carried out by the subject's intellectual faculty proper. The exegesis of aisthesis
proper will span two chapters.

§ 1.

The Soul and its Powers

Aisthesis is identified twice in the first book of DA as one of the powers of a living
organism commonly associated with the soul. {DA 405b5-7 and 410b 16-27) And so,
because aisthesis is one of the four vital powers of the soul, Aristotle's discussion
concerning aisthesis begins at DA I I 1 , where the soul is defined as "an actuality of the
first kind [entelecheia heprote] of a natural body having life potentially in it."(DA
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412a27-412b 1) Having defined the soul as the "actuality of the first kind of a natural
body", Aristotle proceeds to elaborate upon the sort of body to which he is here referring.
He tells us that,
[t]he body so described is a body which is organized. The
parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are
organs.. .If, then, we have to give a general formula
applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as an
actuality of the first kind of a natural organized body
[somatos phusikou organikou]. (DA 412b 1-7)
Chen (1956) argues that when Aristotle says that "[t]he soul is the first actuality
[entelechy] of the physical body which is potentially [dunamei] living" (this is Chen's
translation of DA 412a27) Aristotle is affirming that the relationship of the soul to its
body is analogous to the relationship of actuality, in the sense of energeia,5 to potentiality
(dunamis). This leads Chen, along with many before him, to identify the soul with the
form of the body. Chen then tells us that "In consequence of this conception of the soul
the strict unity of the living body is being established."6 Chen concludes that the body
and soul can be understood as one and the same thing "existing] in opposite modes."
We are prepared for this, says Chen, by Aristotle's analysis of substance in Metaphys. Z. 8
Chen's proposal that "entelecheia" be read as synonomous with "energeia" is
specific to the instance of "entelecheia" at DA 412a27. That his conflation of
"entelecheia" with "energeia" is problematic becomes evident when it is applied to the
instance of "entelecheia" at DA 412b6 where the term is employed in the description of
the soul as the "actuality of the first kind of a natural organized body [somatos phusikou
organikou]." (DA 412M-7) This passage has been variously translated by modern
scholars. What is particularly puzzling to all of them is precisely what Aristotle means
by "somatos phusikou organikou" Hicks' 1907 translation offers: "a natural body
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furnished with organs"; Hett (1936) offers: "a natural body possessed of organs"; Van
den Berg (1953)9: "organic physical body"; Hamlyn (1968): "a natural body which has
organs" Apostle (1981): "a natural body which has organs"; and Sachs (2001): "natural,
organized body."10 Considered in relation to any one of these readings, Chen's reading
of "entelecheia" has the effect of suggesting that it is the soul that represents the efficient
cause of the presence of organs, the body's possession of organs, and/or the body's
physical organization. In other words, Chen suggests that it is the soul that makes the
body constituted in such a way. This is at odds with the characterization of the soul that
Chen seems to want to affirm, that being, that the soul is the form of the body in a
schematic sense.
Bos (1999) offers a reading of DA II1 that avoids this problematic attribution of
efficient causation to the soul by offering a more generic translation of the term
"organikon" and, in so doing, suggestiong a subtle distinction between the terms
"entelecheia" and "energeia". Bos argues that the term "organikon" ought better to be
translated by the phrase "serving as a tool or instrument," or simply with the term
"instrumental."11 Bos tells us, "The point of Aristotle's definition is that the soul as the
guiding principle or entelechy cannot do anything without 'a natural body that serves it as
an instrument or tool'."

Bos' reading of "somatosphusikou organikou" offers four

benefits that translations with phrases like "with organs" or "organized" do not: (1) Bos'
reading avoids what might be seen as a redundancy on Aristotle's part; if, as Aristotle
tells us, even the leaves of a plant are instrumental to its subsistence {DA 412a27-412b4),
then it would seem that being a natural {phusikou) body is sufficient for having organs
and the term "organikou", translated as "with organs" would be redundant. (2) Bos'
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reading of "organikou"

accords with the manner in which we refer to the first six books

of the Aristotelian corpus as the Organon, i.e., the Tool. (3) Bos' reading of 412b6-7 and
specifically his translation of the term "organikon", is more consistent with a literal
translation of the term "aisthaitikon" as "instrument of sense". (4) Bos' reading suggests
a distinction between actualization qua "entelecheia" and actualization qua "energeia" in
a way that Chen's and other readings do not and in a way that accords with the
etymology of the two terms.
Although the precise etymology of the term is a hotly debated topic,13 an analysis
of the term "entelecheia" that treats it as the conjunction of the particle "en" meaning
"in" and a derivation of the term "telos" meaning "end" or "purpose" suggests a process
through which its subject becomes purposive in the active sense of being goal-oriented.
The term "energeia", on the other hand, is derived from "energazomai" which is
construced out of the particle "en" and the verb "ergazomai" meaning work or labour.
Liddel and Scott further elaborate that "ergazomai" refers to the manual labour of slaves,
this suggests that the term "energeia" is best applied to the sort of actualization that
comes about by means of some techne or physical mode of construction. The salient
point being that "energeia" can justifiably be associated with actualization of the sort
brought about through efficient causation, or resulting from some kinesis. This is the
sense of the term we find throughout the corpus and throughout DA. "Entelecheia", on
the other hand, can be identified with a mode of actualization related to telotic causation.
It is related in that actualization of this sort does not necessarily represent the imposition
of physical form, rather it represents the imposition of purposiveness. Distinguishing in
this way between "energeia" and "entelecheia" accords with what Aristotle tells us
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earlier in DA I: there he tells us that the definition of each affection of the soul "ought to
correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement [kinesis] of such
and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that
end."" {DA 403a26-28; emphasis added)14 Subtle as it may be, Aristotle here alludes to
both the energeia mode of actualization and the entelecheia mode, an account of both, it
would seem, is necessary for a thorough account of anger. With respect to aisthesis, the
inference that can be drawn from this analysis is that, just like the other vital powers of
which the soul is the first actuality, aisthesis is a purposive power that is manifest in the
soul (understood as form)/body (as matter) composite.

§ 2.

Aisthesis and the Distinction between 1st and 2n

Actualites

Aristotle's discussion of aisthesis proper begins at DA II 5 where he defines the term
aisthesis in the widest possible sense. He writes: "sensation [aisthesis] consists in
[sumbaineif5 a movement [kineisthai] or an affection [paschein] for it is thought to be an
alteration [alloiosis] of quality." {DA 416b33-35) Concerning affections, Aristotle says:
Now some thinkers assert that like is affected [paschein]
only by like; in what sense this is possible and in what
sense impossible, we have explained in our general
discussion of acting and being acted upon. {DA 416b35417a2)16
In his translation Smith notes that this passage makes reference to GCI 7 where Aristotle
tells us what it means to act (poiein) and what it means to be acted upon (paschein).
According to Aristotle, aisthesis seems to involve one thing acting upon another.
Aristotle proceeds by pointing out an ambiguity with respect to terms related to
aisthesis. He says, "It is clear that what is sensitive [to aisthetikon] is so only
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potentially, not actually." (DA 417a6-7)17 The support for this inference lies in the fact
that the sense organs are not self-activating. The eye does not see without some
stimulation to do so. Aristotle then points out that "to ais thanes thai" (the present
infinitive middle form of "aisthanomaf', translated by Smith as "perceive") meaning
"apprehension by the senses", "he aisthesis" (translated by Smith as "sense"), and "to
aistheton" (translated by Smith as "to be a sentient"), meaning the sensing thing, are each
used in two senses: the sense of being potential and the sense of being actual.18 In a
common sense of actuality ("energein," literally "to act")—one that conflates being
"moved" (kineisthai) and being "affected" (pascheiri)—that which is acted upon and that
which acts are, in a way, like, and in another way, unlike. (DA 417a 14-20)
This common-sense understanding of actuality must be set aside, says Aristotle,
for the sake of precision. Aristotle tells us that "we must now distinguish different senses
in which things can be said to be potential or actual: at the moment we are speaking as if
each of these phrases had only one sense." (DA 417a21-22)19 This, as it turns out, is a
prelude to a distinction that is very significant with respect to Aristotle's theory of
aisthesis and with respect to the vital functions of organisms in general—that is, the
distinction between first and second actualities.
Although traces of this distinction can be found throughout the corpus, in DA
Aristotle presents the distinction between first and second actuality by means of an
analogy with knowledge. Aristotle identifies two senses in which one might be called a
potential knower: (a) One can be a potential knower in the sense that he belongs to a
species that possesses the potential for knowledge. Or (b) one can be a potential knower
in the sense that he possesses a certain body of knowledge (like grammar) that can be

67

exercised when called upon. (DA 417a22-25) Aristotle tells us that both cases represent
different sorts of actuality: (a) represents the sort that is actualized through a "change of
quality" (alloiotheis) and/or "repeated transition from one state to its opposite."20 The
other (b) represents the sort of potential that is actualized "by the transition from the
inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise." (DA 417a32-417bl)21
In other words, a change of the first sort occurs when a man, once ignorant of grammar,
becomes knowledgeable of grammar. A change of the second sort occurs when the
grammarian exercises her knowledge of grammar in order to solve some grammar-related
problem. It is through a change (or changes) of the first sort that the sensuous powers are
actualized in the body. This mode of actualization, as we already know, has been
identified by Aristotle with the soul understood as the first actuality of the natural body
having life potentially. (DA 412a27-412bl) It is through a change (or changes) of the
second sort that the sensuous powers are activated and the activity of sensation is
actualized. (DA 417b 16-18) Actualizations of this sort are "second actualities".
Burnyeat's (2002) article is indispensable for the insights it provides into DA II 5
(DA II 5 being, for all intents and purposes, the preface to Aristotle's discussion of
aisthesis). Here Burnyeat begins by enumerating the varieties of alteration (alloioseos)
set out in Phys. V 2 and GCI 7. According to Burnyeat these sorts of alteration amount
to the "loss of a quality and its replacement by another (opposite or intermediate) quality
from the same range."22 Aisthesis, we are told, is not any of these sorts of alteration. (DA
417b2-7) The remainder of DA II 5, says Burnyeat, is devoted to explaining to us just
what sort of alteration aisthesis is. Further, this involves the introduction of a sort of
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alteration that has hitherto never been seen in the corpus. Burnyeat's exegesis uncovers
three sorts of alteration:
(Altl) ordinary alteration is the replacement of one quality
by a contrary quality from the same range;
(Alt2) unordinary alteration is the development of the
disposition which perfects a thing's nature;
(Alt3) extraordinary alteration is one of these dispositions
passing from inactivity to exercise.23
Burnyeat then proceeds to correlate alteration of the second and third sort to the modes of
actualization discussed in his "Is An Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible (a
draft)?" (1992). Alteration of the first sort is common, the sort of change that wood is
subject to through carpentry. Alteration of the second sort is the sort of alteration that
occurs when a man with the potential to learn grammar actually comes to know grammar.
This we now understand as a first actuality. The third sort of alteration identified by
Burnyeat is equitable to what we are presently calling second actualities. According to
Burnyeat, in this third sort of actualization/alteration the potential is preserved (and
indeed reinforced).24
Our discussions concerning the comparative etymology of the two terms
translated into English as "actuality"—namely, "entelecheia" and "energeia"—has
already revealed two senses of actuality. Although it might be inappropriate in certain
contexts to interpret either "entelecheia" or "energeia" as definitively correlated with
first or second actualities respectively, the following passage suggests that in the present
context such a correlation is valid:
What in the case of thinking or understanding leads
from potentiality to actuality [entelecheian] ought not to be
called teaching but something else. That which starting
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with the power to know learns or acquires knowledge
through the agency of one who actually [entelecheia]
knows and has the power of teaching either ought not to be
said 'to be acted upon' at all—or else we must recognize
two senses of alteration, viz. the change to conditions of
privation, and the change to a thing's disposition [hexeis]
and to its nature.
In the case of what is to possess sense, the first
transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes
place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in
respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the
possession of knowledge. Actual [energeian] sensation
corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. But
between the two cases compared there is a difference; the
objects that excite the sensory powers to activity
[energeias], the seen, the heard, & c , are outside. (DA
417b9-21)25
This passage is, in fact, preceded by three additional instances of "entelech-" in his
elaboration upon the nature of first actualities and the sorts of states that correspond to
first actualities. The initial portions of this passage speaks directly to the sort of actuality
that Aristotle characterizes as a first actuality, namely the acquisition of knowledge, by
means of the term "entelecheia". In contrast, the later portions of the text speak to an
actuality of the second sort by means of the term "energeia".
It is also significant that Aristotle's claim that, "the first transition is due to the
action of the male parent and takes place before birth" (DA 417b 16-17) provides further
clarification concerning our understanding of "entelecheia". This claim identifies a
physical activity (I hesitate to use the term "labour") of the sort that one might associate,
in accordance with our previous etymological analysis, with "energeia". In this case,
however, the activity is identified as the origin of a first actuality ("entelecheia"). It is
important, therefore, to understand that what distinguishes the activity that results in a
first actuality from the activity that results in a second actuality is that the first sort of

70

activity results in the manifestation of a self-propelled purposiveness. The practical
import of the qualification to the present discussion is that when we speak to the first
actuality of a vital power we are, in effect, describing the preconditions for the purposive
activity, that is, the activity that is identifiable with second actualities.
The consistent use of "energeia" in the context of second actualities can be seen
in Aristotle's exemplification of the change from ignorance of grammar to knowledge of
grammar, and the later change from the possession to the exercise of grammatical
knowledge, that it is only in discussions of the second sort of change that Aristotle
employs forms of "energeia": "by the transition from the inactive [me energein]
possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise [eis to energein]." (DA 417a32417M)26
DA II Chapters 6 through 11 elaborate upon both the material preconditions (the
first actuality) and the functioning (the second actuality) of the senses. Although
Aristotle's discussions of the two issues are intermingled, it is beneficial for our purposes
to treat each actuality of sensation separately.

§ 3.

The Necessity for a Medium that is Continuous with the Organ

Although the secondary literature focuses almost entirely on the functioning of the
senses, and in so doing, focuses predominantly upon the second actuality of aisthesis,
Aristotle does offer significant elaboration upon what he takes the first actuality of
aisthesis to entail. He does so when he speaks to the material preconditions of sensation,
that is, those material/elemental conditions that must be in place before aisthesis is
possible. Primary among those is the medium through which aisthesis occurs. Sight, for
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example, is the faculty through which colour is sensed. Concerning colour Aristotle tells
us that, "Every colour has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent;
that power constitutes its very nature." (DA 418a31-418b2)27 Furthermore,
Now there clearly is something which is transparent, and by
'transparent' I mean what is visible, and yet not visible in
itself, but rather owing its visibility to the colour of
something else; of this character are air, water, and many
solid bodies. (DA 418b4-6)
According to Apostle, "one does not see the transparent medium; what he sees is color
through a lighted medium," and further, "[transparency as a nature is a certain quality
present in air, water, glass, ether, and other such objects, and it is a necessary attribute of
a medium through which, when lighted, colors are seen."28 Air and/or water—that is,
some transparent medium—is necessary for sight because, as Aristotle explains:
If what has colour is placed in immediate contact with the
eye, it cannot be seen. Colour sets in movement not the
sense organ but what is transparent, e.g. the air, and that,
extending continuously from the object to the organ, sets
the latter in movement. Democritus misrepresents the facts
when he expresses the opinion that if the interspace were
empty one could distinctly see an ant on the vault of the
sky; that is an impossibility. Seeing is due to an affection or
change of what has the perceptive faculty, and it cannot be
affected by the seen colour itself; it remains that it must be
affected by what comes between. Hence it is indispensable
that there be something in between—if there were nothing,
so far from seeing with greater distinctness, we should see
nothing at all. (DA 419al 1-21)29
Here Aristotle provides an empirical argument that aisthesis requires some sort of
medium or conduit. Apostle's explanation concerns the definition of colour as that which
has the power to set a transparent medium in motion, claiming:
If a color is to act on the eye (i.e., to be seen) and hence on
vision, it has to do so in accordance with its definition. But
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if a colored object is in contact with the eyes, its color
cannot act on a transparent medium; hence it cannot be
seen.30
Put more simply, Aristotle tells us at 419a 11-21 that the sensation of colour is not the
function of direct contact between the organs of sense and their object (the organ, in this
case, being the eye and the object being the colour). Rather, as we are told, the sensation
of colour requires the presence of some element that possesses the same susceptibilities
to colour as does the organ acting as a conduit through which the activity of the colour
extends. This necessity, says Aristotle, is demonstrated by our inability to see that which
is in immediate contact with the eye.
The same is true for hearing, smell, and taste. With regard to hearing, in DA II 8
we are told that sound "is heard both in air and in water" (DA 419b 18) and that it occurs
when "the air impinged upon does not retreat before the blow, i.e. is not dissipated by it."
(DA 419M8-22) 32 As is the case with colour, sound inheres in air. Further,
What has the power of producing sound is what has
the power of setting in movement a single mass of air
which is continuous from the impinging body up to the
organ of hearing. The organ of hearing is physically united
with air, and because it is in air, the air inside is moved
concurrently with the air outside. (DA 420a3-5)33
In hearing too, the essential movement occurs in the air. The 'physical' unity of the
organ of hearing with air, however, must be qualified: the clause here translated "The
organ of hearing is physically united with air [akoe de sumphues <estin> aeri]"
expresses continuity between the air within and the air without the ear. The movement
that constitutes the hearing is not, as the translation suggests, a serialized set of
movements traversing one mass of air outside to a second or separate mass of air within

73

the ear, it is a single movement in a continuous mass of air. "Smelling too takes place
through a medium, i.e. through air or water." (DA 421b9)34
What I mean to suggest by this reading is not that the media are themselves
sensitive. Rather, the media must be understood as representing versatile conductors of
the activity of the sense object. This is because, as Aristotle has already told us, the
stimulation of the senses originates from outside (DA 420a3-5), but, at least in the case of
vision and hearing, the sense organ is not stimulated by means of immediate contact with
the object (DA 419al 1). The gap between the object and the sense organ is filled by the
media. (DA 418a31-418b2; 419all-21; 420a3-5; 421b9; and423al5-17) What makes
this conductivity possible is the continuity between the media and the organ. Aristotle
speaks to the elemental composition of each sense organ and explains that each organ is
composed in part of the element, or elements, that mediate the sensation of its object: At
420a3-5 the ear is described as a pocket of air; concerning the organ of smell, Aristotle
writes, "Smells are of what is dry as flavours of what is moist. Consequently the organ of
smell is potentially dry." (DA 422a6-7) Concerning taste, Aristotle writes, "Since what
can be tasted is liquid, the organ for its perception cannot be either actually liquid or
incapable of becoming liquid." (DA 422a33-422b2)35 Finally, of the body more
generally, Aristotle writes, "no living body could be constructed of air or water; it must
be something solid. Consequently it must be composed of earth along with these, which
is just what flesh and its analogue in animals which have no true flesh tend to be." (DA
423al2-13 emphasis added)

Generally speaking, the composition of the body includes

the same elements that mediate sensation, the continuity between the various parts of the
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body and the external media varies in accordance with the proportion of those media that
make up the organs.
Aristotle himself contrasts his views concerning the mediation of the senses with
that of Democritus. Aristotle tells us that whereas Democritus posits a void between the
sensed object and the sense organ, Aristotle accounts for the 'interspaces' by
demonstrating the continuity between the sense organ and the sense object that aisthesis
requires. {DA 419al5-24) This continuity is maintained by the medium—not, however,
as we tend to understand it, qua the conductor of sensuous data, but rather as an extension
of the organ in which sensuous activity is extended throughout. In sight, sound, smell,
and taste, that conduit is air and water. Finally, concerning touch, "the body must be the
medium for the faculty of touch, naturally attached to us, through which the several
perceptions are transmitted." {DA 423al5-17)37 Accordingly, sensitivity to the tangible
does not extend beyond the flesh.

§ 4.

The Material Condition of the Sense Organs

The body, not being transparent like water and air, is a different sort of medium,
concerning which we are told, "no living body could be constructed of air or water; it
must be something solid. Consequently it must be composed of earth along with these,
which is just what flesh and its analogue in animals which have no true flesh tend to be."
{DA 423al2-13)38 What Aristotle tells us is that we sense the tangible—namely, what is
hot or cold, what is hard or soft, wet or dry—because "the sense [of touch] itself being a
sort of mean [mesotes] between the opposites that characterize the objects of perception."
{DA 424a4-5)39 And so, in these passages scattered throughout DA II Aristotle tells us in
75

what the first actuality of aisthesis consists—namely, "a sort of mean between the
opposites that characterize the objects of perception."
Slakey's interpretation of this passage is perhaps the most influential in recent
times because it is this reading that Sorabji (1974) defends in the formulation of his own
reading of aisthesis. Slakey interprets this passage as stating that one's sensitivity to the
tangible qualities is due to the actualization of some moderate state (mesotes)—for
example, not hot nor cold but warm, not wet nor dry but damp, not hard nor soft but
firm—in the material constituents of the organ.40 What is most problematic with
Slakey's understanding of mesotes with regard to the first actuality of aisthesis is that the
precondition for aisthesis it describes is one that is a quality of the sense organ qua
substance, in other words, the receptivity is itself a quality bestowed upon the organ
through the actualization of a certain form in its matter. Slakey's suggestion that the term
'mesotes' refers to a mean state of the sense organ would require that the second actuality
of aisthesis involves a change to that mean state and, as such, the actualization of the
sensible form in the material substratum of the sense organ. Such a change would,
according to the principle underlying the interpretation, render the organ insensitive, or at
least its sensitivity would be diminished when sensation occurred. For Slakey's Aristotle,
then, the first and second actualities of aisthesis involve changes of the same sort, both
corresponding to the acquisition of knowledge and neither of the two corresponding to its
exercise. (DA 417b2-7)
The key to avoiding this problem, that is the problem of insensitivity due to the
second actualization of aisthesis, is suggested by Aristotle's discussion of media,
specifically what is said about the mediation of the sensation of colour: It is the
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transparency of air and water that enable them to conduct the activity of the sensible
object to the sense organ. (DA 418a31-418b2; 419all-21; 420a3-5; 421b9; and423al517) The state of transparency represents a lack (or privation) of a certain quality—
namely, colour—and not the actual possession of a quality that is the mean of two
extremes. Transparency is neutral to any given colour and not the mean between any two
colours. Furthermore, we saw that the continuity that exists between the medium and the
sense organ that enables the activity of the sense object to pass from the outside in,
results from the sense organ being composed, in part, of the mediating element itself. (DA
420a3-5; 422a6-7; 422a33-422b2; and 423al5-17) We can extrapolate from this that it is
the transparency of a certain portion of the eye that accounts for its sensitivity. For this
reason, it is better to understand mesotes as a neutral state (as transparency is with respect
to colour). Further, as the analogy from DA II 5 requires, the neutral state must remain
relatively stable in order to maintain the sensitivity of the organ. (DA 417a22-25) The
stability of the state is as much an antecedent condition for the sensitivity of the organ as
the neutral state itself. Mesotes as a neutral state describes the form that is actualized in
the first sense and not as one that fluctuates through the actualization of aisthesis in the
second sense. For this reason, when Aristotle writes, "Since what can be tasted is liquid,
the organ for its perception cannot be either actually [entelecheia] liquid or incapable of
becoming liquid," (DA 422a33-422b2)41 he employs the term "entelecheia" which, as we
have seen, is indicative in this context of a first actuality and, as such, a relatively stable
state.
Such a reading of mesotes42 is also supported by Aristotle's earlier claim that "if
the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well as the young
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man. The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle."
(DA 408M8-23) Here Aristotle is explicit about what age deteriorates: it is the form of
the sense organ, in other words, it depletes its receptivity to sensible forms by depleting
its neutrality with respect to its sense object. Furthermore, Aristotle's comments at
421b25-29 concerning the differences in the eyes possessed by members of various
species, where we are told that some animals possess firm eyes and so their visual acuity
is lesser than our own, reinforces such a reading of mesotes. We can observe that the
firmness or softness of the sense organ is an aspect of its form. Specifically, it is that
aspect of its form that dictates its sensitivity to its intended sense object.

Conclusion: The First Actuality o/Aisthesis
Ultimately Aristotle articulates two conditions that represent the first actuality
(entelecheid) of aisthesis: (1) the presence of a mediating element that is qualitatively
neutral with respect to the quality that it mediates the sensation of, and (2) that the sense
organs themselves be partially composed of the element that mediate the sensation of
their respective objects. In this way continuity is maintained between the outer
environment of the subject and the sense organs themselves. With regard to the
aisthetikon specifically, the relevant aspect of the organ rendered through the
actualization of its form is its qualitative neutrality with respect to a certain range of
sensible qualities that the actualization of the form manifests. (DA 424a4-5) It is this
range of sensible qualities that, generally speaking, constitute the special object of the
given sense; in sight colour, in smell scent, etc. We will now turn our attention to what
Aristotle says about the activity of the senses, that is, the second actuality of aisthesis.
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Chapter 4.

THE SECOND ACTUALITY OF AISTHESIS

Introduction
Modern commentators tend to offer two basic sorts of interpretations of the second
actuality of aisthesis: (1) one emphasizes Aristotle's claim at DA 417b2-7 that sensation
involves "an alteration in a quite different sense."43 The second (2) tends to emphasize
Aristotle's claim at DA 424al8-19 that "By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter." (DA 424al8-19)44
The first of these passages is found in DA II 5.

§ 1.

Aisthesis as "an alteration in a quite different sense. "

Aristotle's apparent conclusion that the activity of aisthesis involves an alteration of a
quite different sort (than the sorts explicated in GC) is based upon a further clarification
of the distinction discussed earlier concerning the two sorts of actuality. (DA 417a32417b 1) This analysis leads Aristotle to the following disjunction. He says that the
transition that actualizes the sort of potential represented in the exercise of knowledge
after it has been acquired (i.e., the second actuality) is either (i) not an alteration at all, or
(ii) "an alteration in a quite different sense." (DA 417b7)
Aristotle then tells us that one important difference between the potentiality that
aisthesis involves—in other words, the second potentiality that is concomitant with the
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first actuality of aisthesis—and the sort of potentiality actualized through the exercise of
knowledge—which is, again, a second potentiality—is that
the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the
seen, the heard, & c , are outside. The ground of this
difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is
individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul. (DA
417M9-24) 46
This suggests that the activity of the senses is initiated by an external force. This is
further suggested by Aristotle's comment that "man can exercise his knowledge when he
wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself—a sensible object must be
there." (DA 417b24-26)47
DA II 5 concludes with a brief descriptive account of the process of aisthesis.
Aristotle says,
what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the
perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning
of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting
factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is
assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.
(DA 418a3-6)48
This passage provides the key piece of evidence in support of Slakey's interpretation,
introduced in the previous chapter, and the 'literalist' interpretation that results from
Sorabji's appropriation of it.49
Slakey's is a thoroughly materialistic interpretation. Slakey begins by
establishing what he believes to be the nature of the change that aisthesis involves:
"Aristotle here [referring to DA 417b7] seems to speak interchangeably of perception and
of the action by the object of touch on the organ."50 By this Slakey means to establish
that aisthesis is a function of the sort of efficient causation that effects change through the
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immediate contact of one thing with another. Slakey continues by considering what
Aristotle means when he describes aisthesis as a process whereby the sense organ
becomes like its object (DA 417al4-20, 418a3-6, and 423b31). He claims that the key to
this passage is provided in what follows when Aristotle tells us that one cannot sense the
temperature of an object when that temperature is equal to the temperature of the flesh.
By extrapolating these comments to encompass all of the five senses Slakey concludes
the following:
Just as the organ of touch must not be equal in temperature
to the thing perceived as hot so that it can change to hot, so
the organ of sight must be neither white nor black so that it
can change to white or black. Aristotle's reasoning can
only be that perception of white is a process in which the
organ of sight becomes white, and so on for the perception
of the other colours. The same conclusion is extended
mutatis mutandis to the other sense organs.51
According to Slakey, this reading conforms with Aristotle's comments at 425M8-19 that,
in order for one to come to an awareness of his own sensual behaviour, the sense organ
must itself exhibit the sensible qualities of its object. And so Slakey's reading describes
aisthesis as an activity whereby the sensible quality is actualized in the sense organ, the
original state of which is, as we already know, what he describes as a mean state relative
to a range of sensible qualities.
Slakey's interpretation is repeated almost verbatim in Robinson's 1989
monograph:
The power of perceptual discrimination arises from the
differences between the imposed attributes and the
perceptual system's own average value.... Their effective
stimuli are conditions that fall above or below the sense's
own average state. Stimuli that perfectly match the
system's own condition or state are not perceived.52
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Despite its initial suggestion that Robinson is adopting the principle of Slakey's
interpretation to account for sense discrimination, as opposed to sensation, it is clear
when Robinson writes, "[s]timuli that perfectly match the system's own condition or state
are not perceived"53 that he is using the phrases "sense discrimination" and "perception"
interchangeably. If this were not the case, then Robinson might say that stimuli that
perfectly match the system's own condition are indeed perceived, although perhaps
inaccurately, but not clearly discriminated from other conditions of states. Slakey's
interpretation is also very influential for Sorabji.
In "Body and Soul in Aristotle" (1974), Sorabji provides summaries of a number
of historically significant interpretations of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis. He critically
examines the views of Barnes, G.R.T. Ross, W.D. Ross, Brentano, and Slakey, providing
his own interpretations throughout his examination. Sorabji defends Slakey's basic
position claiming that "we ought to take his [Slakey's] suggestion seriously. For we
could well expect Aristotle to be a materialist, seeing that so many of his predecessors
were preoccupied with the physiology of mental acts."54 For Sorabji's Aristotle, aisthesis
and the affections of the soul in general are, without exception, manifest in physical
matter. Accordingly, Sorabji interprets aisthesis as an entirely physical occurrence. This
claim is bolstered by his reading of Meteor. IV 4 where Aristotle tells us that we become
aware of a given quality when we, being in some contrastable state, become, or take on, a
state similar to that which defines the given quality. (Meteor. 3 82a 17) And so, aisthesis
is one and the same with the physical changes undergone by the sense organ. Similarly
materialist interpretations have been offered by Webb (1982), Bynum (1987), and
Everson(1997). 55
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More recently, in his "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's
Theory of Sense-Perception" (1992), Sorabji offers an explicit rehearsal of what has
come to be known as his "literalist" interpretation: "In vision, for example, the eye-jelly
(kore) does not receive particles or other bits of matter from the scene observed. It
simply takes on colour patches (perceptible/orms) to match it."56 In his "Aristotle and
the Problem of Intentionality" Caston (1998) defends a reading similar to that of his
teacher, Sorabji.57
J. L. Ackrill's Aristotle the Philosopher (1981) also employs the language of
physiology when interpreting aisthesis in Aristotle's DA. According to Ackrill, "The
changes inside the body are sometimes spoken of as if they were movements of blood,
and sometimes as if they were movements carried in the blood, and sometimes as if they
were qualitative changes."58 More than this, however, Ackrill does not offer. Rather,
Ackrill concludes that
The two crucial points he is making are that in senseperception there must be a physical and physiological
causal chain from object to primary sense-organ, and that
the change at the end of the chain must be like, or in some
way correspond to, the changes at the earlier stages and at
the beginning.59
Ackrill extends this physiological motif to explain imagination. Imagination, or, rather,
imaginings, are the degraded remnants, or "traces", of sensations that, says Ackrill, are
reactivated by some unspecified stimulus.60 Here again, Ackrill's interpretation is somewhat under-defined. Ackrill says that it is not clear whether such stimuli are electrical or
chemical in nature. Nor is it clear what constitutes a "trace" of a sensation.
Nevertheless, Ackrill tells us that "For the philosopher the first and essential thing is that
there must be some such traces, capable of reactivation."61 The evident assumption is
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that these traces and the stimuli that triggers such reactivations indeed correspond to
some aspect of the creature's physiology. The interpretation we are given by Ackrill is a
precursor to the functionalist reading we find in Putnam and Nussbaum.
Putnam and Nussbaum begin by differentiating between two positions: "it is one
thing to hold that [a] perception cannot be explained 'from the bottom up', quite another
to hold that [b] it is not accompanied by or realized in any material transition."

In other

words, there is, on the one hand, the position that (a) one cannot account for sensation
strictly by appealing to its physical basis. On the other hand, there is the position that (b)
there is no physical basis for sensation. The position they attribute to Aristotle is (a).
According to Putnam and Nussbaum "perception is not the type of change that Aristotle
(strictly speaking) calls kinesis; it is, rather, the actualization of a potential."63 In other
words, Putnam and Nussbaum acknowledge Aristotle's distinction between first and
second actualities. Of course, in Aristotle every change, kinesis or otherwise, involves
the actualization of a potential in some sense. However, in choosing the word 'transition'
to characterize this change they, contra Slakey, seem to imply that the sort of change
involved in aisthesis is that which actualizes a certain power and not one that physically
manifests some form (or quality) in matter.

They claim:

Still, the point is: it does not follow that this transition is
not at every point of necessity accompanied by some
material transition. (Matter has potentialities too, clearly;
and these too can be actualized.) We shall argue that it is;
indeed, with Sorabji, we believe that the most precise way
of characterizing the relationship is that it is a transition
realized in the matter. The psuche does nothing alone; its
doings are the doings of the organic body. Perceiving is an
activity in matter.65
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In Putnam and Nussbaum we are confronted with a thoroughly functionalist reading of
aisthesis according to which the sensible qualities are not actualized in the sense organ
per se. Only the potential for aisthesis is actualized. In other words, according to
Putnam and Nussbaum's Aristotle, aisthesis involves the activation of a capacity that
remains dormant until it is triggered by the proper sensible object. (Putnam and
Nussbaum make the first and second actuality distinction central to their interpretation.)
To be clear, however, like Sorabji, Putnam and Nussbaum take this change to be one that
is realized in the material constituents of the sense organ. However, contra Sorabji,
Putnam and Nussbaum take this change to be a physiological change that is not like, in
any straightforward way, the sort of change discussed in GCI 7. Similar readings can be
found in Irwin (1991) and Cohen (1992).66
In his, "De Anima II 5" (2002), Burnyeat argues that the superficial appeal of the
Slakey and Sorabji reading is that it accounts for aisthesis by appealing to the sort of
change one is accustomed to finding in Aristotle's physical treatises. Such a reading,
however, diminishes the significance of the analogy Aristotle articulates between
knowledge and sensation and the two sorts of change relevant to both: (a) the sort of
change that corresponds to the acquisition of knowledge, and (b) the sort of change
corresponding to the exercise of knowledge. Slakey and Sorabji would have us believe
that both the manifestation of the sensual powers and the activity of the senses involve
changes of the sort that corresponds to (a). On the contrary, Aristotle tells us that, with
respect to aisthesis, the potential represented in (a) is actualized "due to the action of the
male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of
sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge." (DA 417M6-
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18)

In other words, the powers of aisthesis are bestowed upon the organism through a

material change that begins at conception. This, it should be added, is the sort of change
Aristotle refers to at 417al-2 and 417al4-20 and is one of the primary subjects of GC
On the other hand, Aristotle concludes to the affirmative that "sensation corresponds to
the stage of the exercise of knowledge," {DA 417M9)68 or, rather, aisthesis corresponds
to the potential represented in (b) and which we know from 417a32-417bl is actualized
through the transition from the inactive possession of a power to its active exercise.
The physiological readings offered by Ackrill, Putnam and Nussbaum, on the
other hand, admit of sufficient ambiguity with regard to the precise nature of the change
corresponding to the second actualization of aisthesis that they avoid explicitly
contradicting Aristotle's text.

§ 2.

Aisthesis as "the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of
things without the matter. "

Following his account of the individual senses Aristotle characterizes the powers of
aisthesis generally as follows: "By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving
into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter." {DA 424al8-19)69 Aristotle
elaborates this point by means of an analogy with a signet ring impressed into wax. He
tells us that the sense organ receives the form of its object in the same way as "[a] piece
of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the
impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the
sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what
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it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort and according to its form." (DA 424a1924)

Brentano's point of departure is Aristotle's distinction between two types of
affection (DA 417b2): the first type involves the corruption of one contrary in the
actualization of another, as when a green apple ripens in to red: the greenness of the apple
ceases to be when the red takes its place.

The second type of affection occurs "without

any loss of form on the part of the affected subject; this affection merely makes actual
what lay in the subject potentially, it brings to a state of completion what was
unfinished."71 We can begin by observing that the first sort of affection identified by
Brentano does correspond to one of the sorts of actualization distinguished by Aristotle at
DA II5—namely, a second actualization (energeia). An apple being the fruit of a living
organism, its ripening is indeed preceded by a first actualization (entelecheia), the first
actualization of the soul of the apple tree. The second sort of affection Brentano
identifies is similar to the sort of affection Burnyeat later identifies when he writes,
"unordinary alteration is the development of the disposition which perfects a thing's
nature."

As is the case in Burnyeat's analysis, Brentano interprets this second sort of

affection as an actualization of the second sort as well. Brentano specifies that sensation
is entirely a function of the second sort of affection or change and, as such, is a second
actualization. Brentano does note that sensation may be accompanied by an ordinary sort
of actualization of the sort Slakey identifies with the second actuality of sensation. It is
clear, however, that for Brentano this concomitant affection of the ordinary sort
superfluous to the activity of sensation, i.e., it does not represent the second actuality of
aisthesis conditioned by a "first actualization" of the entelecheia sort.73
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Clarence Shute's

The Psychology of Aristotle: An Analysis of the Living Being

(1964) characterizes the senses as pure potentialities. He differentiates between the sense
organs, which are physical components of the living organism, and the powers of
perception, which possess "only potential and not actual existence."75 Here again the
distinction between first and second actualities from DA II 5 is relevant. This is the
distinction Shute seems to be relying upon here: Shute understands the first actuality of
aisthesis strictly in terms of the potentiality it manifests, i.e., the second potentiality that
precedes the second actuality of the exercise of aisthesis. According to Shute: "The
senses themselves do not give rise to sensation. They are powers of the organism to be
stimulated in certain ways, and this stimulation must be present to produce actual
sensing."76 Indeed, Shute removes both the power and the sensation itself from the
organ. According to this reading the sense organs are a means to the exercise of a power
properly attributed to the soul.77 As for our present concern, specifically the second
actuality of aisthesis, Shute's accounts of the mechanisms through which sense objects
enter into relations with their proper sense organs suggests that actual sensation is
instantiated in the relationship between the sense object and the sense organ. Shute's
interpretation shares certain affinities with that of Barnes, especially with respect to their
characterization of the movements involved in sensual behaviour.
Barnes devotes a significant section of his "Aristotle's Concept of Mind" (1972)
to the interpretation of Aristotle's definition of aisthesis. Barnes offers the following
description:
The position appears to be this: when I gaze at a glass of
green Chartreuse, my eyes, or some parts of them, become
green - the perceptible form of Chartreuse - even though
none of the physical parts of the liqueur actually enters my
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eyes. To see something green just is for my eyes to
become green by the action of the green object; and so for
other sense objects and other senses. Thus we have a
purely physiological, and hence strongly physicalist,
analysis of perception.
Barnes attributes this interpretation to Slakey, then states his disagreement with what he
calls the "strongly physicalist" conclusion. Barnes observes that the presence of matter in
a psychic part need not entail the physicality of that part.

With reference to the

reception of the form of an object without its matter, Barnes argues, contrary to the
'literal' readings, that it would be an assumption to hold that the actualization of form in
a sense organ entails the physical actualization of that form. In other words, the receiving
of form without the matter does not necessarily mean that the sense organ becomes
physically like its object. Barnes presents three more arguments against the strongly
physicalist interpretation: (1) such an interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle's
assertion that aisthesis is carried out through the composite of body and soul, (2) such an
interpretation would allow plants to perceive, and (3) it does not explain in what way the
change (alloidsis) that Aristotle says aisthesis involves is somehow special or obscure.
This said, the constructive part of Barnes' interpretation comes to an end when he states
that, "I doubt if anything more positive than this can be elicited from Aristotle's text; but
the negative point, that aisthesis is not a purely physiological change, seems
on

established."

And so, like Shute, Barnes' interpretation is minimal.

Esfeld takes a similar line when speaking of the states organisms enter when they
are actually sensing. He interprets Aristotle as saying that "The received form is
instantiated in the act of perception." And further that "In ordinary perception, it [the
sensible form] does not exist in distinction from that act."81 With regard to the
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ontological matters that Barnes and Shute refrain from addressing explicitly, Esfeld tells
us that the crucial point is that the form/matter schema of the external world is mirrored
in sensation and that "the structure of the thinking and perceiving mind is identical with
the structure of the world."82 Esfeld, evidently, is still reluctant to address the physiology
of sensation. Apostle, on the other hand, takes steps towards filling in these blanks.
Apostle's 1981 commentary on DA presents a reading that is firmly entrenched in
the tradition that interprets sensation in Aristotle as a mode of alteration rather than the
physical instantiation of the sensed object in the sense organ. Apostle employs somewhat
modern language to explicate sensation in Aristotle: "The sentient soul, then, while being
acted upon by the sensible object, is in the process of receiving the sense impression of
the form of that object (without the matter)."83 Apostle elaborates upon the two types of
alteration that he believes Aristotle distinguishes at 417b4-7. Alteration of the first sort
involves the sort of physical change that underlies the interpretations of Slakey, Sorabji
and their like, that is, the physical instantiation of the form of one contrary at the expense
of another. Alteration of the other sort involves the activation of a certain capacity in a
subject, like "when a man with knowledge already acquired begins to use that knowledge,
that knowledge is not destroyed by the contrary but is rather reinforced or becomes more
stable."84 Sensation turns out to be an alteration of the second sort. When Apostle
explicates 424al8-22 with reference to this sort of alteration he is led to connect the
action of the signet ring impressed upon wax, that is the impression itself, to sensation.
In this analogy the wax is most often read as the analogue to the sense organ. For
Apostle, the ring and the wax are not the relevant analogues; it is the action that activates
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a certain power in the wax without destroying it—namely, its ability to receive
impressions—that is most relevant:
The impression of this surface in the wax is not quite the
form of the original surface, for it is concave and not
convex; but there is one-to-one correspondence, so to
say.... Similarly, there is an analogous correspondence
between the form of the sensible object as received in sense
and the same form as existing in that object. 5
Apostle's ingenuity in reading this analogy is the undoing of the interpretation. This is so
because it implies a certain margin of error that, strictly speaking, Aristotle is not willing
to permit. Apostle might respond to this criticism by citing the passage that opens DA,
which explains that the study of psychology is one that may lead to a more
comprehensive body of knowledge in its ability to expose the mechanisms through which
knowledge is acquired. Unfortunately, rather than uncovering the foundations of human
knowledge, the margin of error Apostle proposes may instead serve as the foundations of
skepticism. If one can not know the object of sense as it is in reality, then, strictly
speaking, one cannot know the object. The influence of Apostle's interpretation can be
seen in articles by Andriopoulos (1993), and Dogan (2004).86
In his "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)" (1992)
Burnyeat presents a twofold argument. He argues that, on the one hand, aisthesis is not
equivalent to the sense object's physical affect upon the sense organ (as is suggested by
Slakey, Sorabji, and, again, by Putnam and Nussbaum). On the other hand, Aristotle's
theory of aisthesis is based upon a conception of matter that would not be taken seriously
by contemporary scholars.
Burnyeat too rehearses the distinction between the two sorts of actuality that
Aristotle sets out at 417a22-417bl. According to Burnyeat, Sorabji's reading of aisthesis
91

construes it as a change of the first sort, however, Burnyeat is adamant that aisthesis is a
change of the second. This interpretation leads him to conclude that "the physical
material of which Aristotelian sense-organs are made does not need to undergo any
ordinary physical change to become aware of colour or a smell." This interpretation is
reiterated later when Burnyeat claims that"
The opening of 2. 12 confirms for us, as it seems to me,
that no physiological change is needed for the eye of the
organ of touch to become aware of the appropriate
perceptual objects. The effect on the organ is the
awareness, no more and no less.88
It is the phraseology with which Burnyeat articulates his interpretation that is indicative
of its greatest deficiency. Specifically, I refer here to Burnyeat's talk of aisthesis in terms
of "awareness" and "becoming] aware" bear conotations that are not necessarily
interpolated into the text. Burnyeat goes as far as to write, "One might say that the
physical material of animal bodies in Aristotle's world is already pregnant with
consciousness, needing only to be awakened to red or warmth."

Burnyeat exagerates

Aristotle's anamism with respect to the material constituents of animal bodies to an
extent that puts his reading of aisthesis at odds with what Aristotle says about living
beings and souls in general at DA 12 concerning the difficulties associated with
identifying the soul with one of the elemental constituents of the body and with what is
said in DA I 4, specifically where he writes,
That the soul is a harmony in the sense of the composition
of the parts of the body is a view easily refutable; for there
are many and various compoundings of the parts; of what is
thought or the sensitive or the appetitive faculty the
composition? And what is the composition which
constitutes each of them? It is equally absurd to identify
the soul with the ratio of the mixture; for the mixture of the
elements which makes flesh has a different ratio from that
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which makes bone. The consequence of this view will
therefore be that distributed throughout the whole body
there will be many souls... (DA 408a 11 -18)90
Burnyeat's suggestion that the body is saturated through with a potential awareness is
precisely the sort of view that Aristotle aims at refuting in these early chapters of DA.
Furthermore, it is an overstatement to suggest that Aristotle implies anywhere in
his treatment of sensation that the sense organs themselves possess a certain awareness of
their object. Aristotle speaks of the movement (kinei) stimulated by colour, transmitted
through air or water, making contact with the eye (ep' auten ten opsin) (DA 419al2-15);
Aristotle speaks of movements stimulated by sound and transmitted through a body in air
that is united (sumphues) with the ear (DA 420a3-4); Aristotle speaks of flavours acting
upon (poiei) the sense of taste (DA 422al7); and so on, but never does Aristotle attribute
to the sense organ a sort of consciousness unto itself. In place of Burnyeat's "awareness"
phraseology it is more appropriate, in the context of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis, to
speak of the presence of sense data which is accounted for by Aristotle through the
faculty of aisthesis. The distinction is subtle but integral to a proper understanding of
aisthesis in Aristotle.
The theory of aisthesis that Aristotle lays out for us is fundamentally based upon a
physics of the sensible: Aristotle begins by telling us about the necessary conditions that
must be met before sensation of any sort is possible. This, as we have seen, involves the
presence of a mediating element, on the one hand (DA 418a31-418b2; 419al 1-21; 420a35; 421b9; and 423al5-17), and a properly formed organ, a portion which is partially
composed of the mediating element (DA 420a3-5; 422a6-7; 422a33-422b2; and 423al517). Actual sensation, we are told, involves an affection of the organ by means of some
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movement (kinesis) that is instigated by the sensible qualities of the object and conducted
to the sense organ via the medium (DA 417M9-24; 419al7-19; 419a25-31; and 419M822). Nowhere is the continuity, or homogeneity, between the sense organ and the
medium more clear than when Aristotle speaks to the possibility of a sixth sense in DA III
when he writes,
Now this is so arranged that if more than one kind of
sensible object is perceivable through a single medium, the
possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous with that medium
has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects (for
example, if the sense-organ is made of air, and air is a
medium both of sound and for colour); and if more than
one medium can transmit the same kind of sensible objects,
as e.g. water as well as air can transmit colour, both being
transparent, then the possessor of either alone will be able
to perceive the kind of objects transmissible through both.
(DA 424b22-425a3)91
Here again Aristotle isolates that elemental constituent of the organ that is continuous, or
"homogeneous", with the mediating element that is instrumental to the sensitivities of the
organ.
The most debated aspect of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis in the recent literature (I
refer here to the debates between Burnyeat and his supporters, with Sorabji and his
supporters) is how to properly understand the moment(s) of aisthesis at which point the
activity conducted via the medium meets with the sense organ itself. The key question
for these scholars is this: "how do we properly understand the change that occurs at this
point?" This approach is wrongheaded. Aristotle goes to great pains to elaborate upon
the mechanisms through which the movements stimulated by the sense objects are
conducted to the sense organ, but the assumption up to now has been that once it reaches
the sense organ, the movements originating in the sense object terminate. This
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presumption, however, obviates Aristotle's stipulation that the organs of sense are
themselves partially composed of the mediating element. Contrary to the current
standard view that is explicit in the Slakey/Sorabji interpretation and implied in
Burnyeat's, the continuity that obtains between the medium and the organ of sense allows
us to understand aisthesis as the continuation of the activity stimulated by the sensible
quailities of the sense object literally into the subject. In this way we can understand that,
"a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without
the matter." {DA 424al8-19)92 Passages such as the one found at DA 419al8-20, where
Aristotle critiques the Democritean theory of sensation, emphasize the role of continuity
between the sense organ and the medium in sensation. He tells us that sensation "cannot
be affected by the seen colour itself; it remains that it [the sense] must be affected by
what comes between." {DA 419al8-20)93 Here Aristotle makes it clear that because the
colour is not itself continuous with the sense organ, sensation of the colour is not possible
when it is in immediate contact with the organ. Furthermore, this passage, and those like
it—namely, DA 419M0; 419b20-21; 419b34-420a2; 420a3-5; 421b9-13; 422all-14;
423al0-12; and 424b30-425a3—reveal that it is the movement stimulated by the sense
object and not the sensible quality that is transmitted to the organ. For this reason I
propose that we understand Aristotle's theory of aisthesis as an account of the presence
of sense data in the sensing subject and not, as convention now dictates, as an account of
the reconstitution of the sensed object in the subject.94
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Conclusion: The Second Actuality 0/Aisthesis
Although supporters of the Slakey/Sorabji interpretation may find support in our previous
analysis of the comparative etymologies of the terms "entelecheia" and "energeia" and
the later suggestion that the two terms can be, at least loosely, correlated with the first
and second sorts of actualities respectively; the truth of the matter is that, for our present
purposes, the precise nature of the physiology of sensation is irrelevant. It is irrelevant
for two reasons: The first is that the physiology of aisthesis is irrelevant because none of
the activity properly associated with either the first or the second actualities of
aisthesis—be they physiological in nature or otherwise—involve concept formation nor
does it directly affect the maturation of concepts already held by the subject in a way
comparable to what we see in Brentano's discussions of presentation ("Vorstellung") and
intentional inexistence. Aisthesis is not genetic in the sense that it involves concept
formation per se. As we have seen, Aristotle's theory of aisthesis accounts for nothing
more than the presence of sense data, indeed aisthesis in Aristotle involves nothing more
than the passive reception of sense data. Concerning this the commentators agree:
aisthesis is stimulated by the sensible qualities of substances external to the sensing
subject. Aristotle makes this explicit when he writes:
the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the
seen, the heard, & c , are outside. The ground of this
difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is
individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul. (DA
417M9-24) 95
Given that this is the case—namely, that the 'activity' of the senses is initiated by an
external force—"man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does
not depend upon himself—a sensible object must be there." (DA 417b24-26)96 In other
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words, the transition between the 'activity' and 'inactivity' of the senses is entirely
beyond the control of the sensing subject. Indeed the term "activity" is, in the context of
aisthesis, a misnomer when predicated of the faculty of sense and that in which it is
manifest.
The second reason that the physiology of aisthesis is irrelevant is wholly related
to the nature of the process described by Aristotle. In defining the second actuality of
aisthesis as the transmission of the activity stimulated by the object into the sense organ,
and stipulating that this transmission takes place by means of a medium that is (a)
appropriate to the nature of the quality being sensed, and (b) continuous with the
elemental components of the sense organ, the physiology of aisthesis—understood as a
bodily response to sense data—is rendered irrelevant because the activity that we
associate with sensation is not isolated within the organ. The relevant activity is not one
that originates with the object, terminates at the organ, at which point it stimulates new
activity. Rather the activity is understood as continuing into the sense organ given its
elemental continuity with the medium. This nuance is missed when commentators
presume that aisthesis entails a certain change to the sense organ97 as opposed to
involving, as we have seen, a movement originating in the object and is continuous
through the medium and the like elemental constituents of the sense organ. Such a
reading negates the requirement for an account of change or movement in the sense organ
distinct from an account of the same movement in the sense organ. For this reason,
efforts to translate Aristotle's account of the second actuality of aisthesis into modern
physiological language results in confusion and, ultimately, misrepresents Aristotle's
theory of aisthesis.
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Chapter 5.

THE EXTENSIONS OF AISTHESIS:

THE SENSE THAT

W E ARE SENSING, THE COMMON SENSIBLES, &
PHANTASIA

Introduction
According to Aristotle the susceptibility of aisthesis is not limited to what he calls the
special objects of sense—the colour, sound, scent, taste, and the tangible. It is through
this same faculty that one comes to sense that he is sensing, as well as what Aristotle
refers to as the "common sensibles", which include movement (kinesis), rest (eremia),
number (arithmos), figure (schema), and magnitude (megethos). Also associated with
aisthesis, says Aristotle, is the capacity of phantasia, often translated "imagination".
These extensions of our sensual capacities—(1) the capacity to sense that we are sensing,
(2) the capacity to sense the so-called common sensibles, and (3) the capacity for
phantasia—are also relevant to our investigation into the proper understanding of
intentionality because all three have been implicated in discussions concerning
intentionality among prominent commentators—namely, Brentano, Sorabji, and Caston.
For this reason this chapter will offer an exegesis of these three additional aspects of
Aristotle's theory of aisthesis.
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§ 1.

The Sense That We Are Sensing

In the first few chapters of DA III Aristotle offers arguments for the comprehensiveness
of his account of the senses. Chapter 1 begins by saying, "That there is no sixth sense in
addition to the five enumerated—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—may be established
by the following considerations...." {DA 424b22-24)98 Introduced thus, Aristotle's first
argument is based upon an implied universal disjunction: that all sensible things are
sensed either through direct contact or at a distance through some medium. Once this is
understood the remainder of Aristotle's argument runs as follows: We have sensation of
all things tangible directly through our sense of touch, and touch is a sense we actually
possess. {DA 424b24-28) On the other hand, all things that are sensed at a distance are
sensed through one of the simple elements qua medium. {DA 424b28-30) We are then
told, "Now this is so arranged that if more than one kind of sensible object [toiouton] is
perceivable through a single medium, the possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous
[allelon te genei] with that medium has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects".
(J04 424b31-33)99 Further:
And if more than one medium can transmit the same kind
of sensible objects, as e.g. water as well as air can transmit
colour, both being transparent, then the possessor of either
alone will be able to perceive the kind of objects
transmissible through both. {DA 424b34-425a3)100
Aristotle's argument here is this: because we indeed possess sense organs that are
homogeneous with the simple elements—air and water—and, given that there are no
other simple elements, we can be sure that there is no sense other than the five special
senses accounted for in DA II 7 through I I 1 1 . {DA 425a3-13)
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Given that there is no sense in addition to these five, Aristotle is led to the
following aporia: "Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are sensing or
hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other
than sight." {DA 412M2-13) 101 This aporia is one of Brentano's central concerns when
reading DA.102 To be clear, the question is this: How is it that we see that we are seeing,
hear that we are hearing, or otherwise become aware of our sensuous behaviour if we
possess only five capacities properly called "senses"? Brentano treats this problem at
great length, arguing that the special senses cannot possibly be responsible for this sort of
perception because, among other reasons, it would require either that (a) each sense organ
be conceived of as being sensitive to two sorts of objects, or (b) the sensual behaviour
must be conceived of as manifesting the same qualities as the sense itself. Unhappy with
both these options, Brentano is led to attribute to Aristotle the notion of an "inner sense."
The inner sense is essentially an elaboration upon the capacity, postulated by Aristotle, to
perceive the common sensibles:
Essentially the problem is the same as when we distinguish
between objects that are contraries within one genus. Let A
be the white and B be the sweet, one of which occurs in the
sense of sight, the other in the sense of taste, and let E and
F be to these two sensations as they are to their objects.
Now if E and F are in one sense, namely, in the sense that
perceives sensations, then this sense contains not only the
relation E and F, but also of C and D, hence that of A and
B, i.e, the relation between the white and the sweet whose
distinction was in question. This roughly is the way in
which Aristotle could answer the objections that could be
raised against his doctrine of an inner sense differing from
all external senses, i.e., of a special sense directed towards
the inner movements of the sensitive part itself.103

100

Inner sensation then, senses that we are sensing as a function of its distinction between
the qualities of one genus and those of another, e.g., the distinction that colours differ
categorically from sounds.
On the surface Brentano's suggestion sounds like an outright contradiction to the
conclusion Aristotle just reached concerning the possibility of a sixth sense. However,
Brentano's suggestion is consistent with Aristotle's text so long as the inner sense is not
understood as an entirely distinct and separable capacity. What Brentano refers to as the
inner sense is, in fact, a function of the identity posited by Aristotle between the activity
of the sensed object and the activity of the sensing subject. Aristotle tells us that,
[sjince it is through sense that we are aware that we are
seeing or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are
aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight. But the
sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both
sight and its object, viz. colour: so that either there will be
two senses both percipient of the same sensible object, or
the sense must be percipient of itself. Further, even if the
sense which perceives sight were different from sight, we
must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must
somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so,
we ought to do this in the first case. (DA 425b 12-17)104
What this means with respect to the present discussion is that the sense that we are
sensing is concomitant with the sensation of its special object. To that end the inner
sense can be understood as an abstraction of sensation proper. In other words, the
sensation of the special object need not be accompanied by the inner sense, however, the
inner sense must, on all occasions, be accompanied by the sensation of a special sensible
object.
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§ 2.

Common

Sensibles

Aristotle offers a further argument as to why we need not posit a sixth sense, one that is
specifically concerned with the common sensibles. The common sensible are so named
because they involve "certain kinds of movement which are perceptible both by touch
and by sight." (DA 418al9-20)105 In other words, the common sensibles are so called
because they are commonly sensed by all of the proper sense capacities. The common
sensibles include movement (kinesis), rest (eremia), number (arithmos), figure (schema),
and magnitude (megethos). It is only later explained, in DA III 1, that
all these we perceive by movement, e.g. magnitude by
movement, and therefore also figure (for figure is a species
of magnitude), what is at rest by the absence of movement:
number is perceived by the negation of continuity
[sunechous], and by the special sensibles; for each sense
perceives one class of sensible objects. (DA 425al6-20)106
It would seem, then, that, as in the case of the special sense objects, continuity (of a sort)
is integral to the sensibility of the common sensibles. Those things that Aristotle refers to
as the common sensibles are sensed as a result of variations in our multiple sensual fields.
In other words, the variety of discontinuities within the fields of our five senses conspire
to discern for us figure, magnitude, etc. when a sensible substance is numerically one or
many, when it is in movement, and when it is at rest.
Shute's take on Aristotle's distinction between (1) the special objects of sense,
e.g., colour, or taste, (2) the common sensibles, e.g., movement, or magnitude, and (3) the
indirect objects of the senses, is that we are equally sensitive to all three sorts of objects.

According to Shute, these distinctions in Aristotle prevent him from having to distinguish
between sensation and perception as we might today. Shute treats each of these objects
as objects of sense proper, in other words, as objects that the senses are equally receptive
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to (the eye is no more or less receptive to [1] and [2] than it is to [3]). Each of them
represents an aspect of the sensible form of the object.
These distinctions appear on analysis to present two
characteristics: they represent varying degrees of simplicity
in the sense data, so that when we come to sense the son of
Diares the raw data of sense are considerably complicated
by the various factors of the critical faculty as a whole,
operating in the experience of the individual; but in each
case, simple or complex, the object is particular. It is this
color, white; or this magnitude, three inches by five inches;
or this man, the son of Diares. The white body, or the
object of a given size, or the man himself does not, of
course, get into the eye. That is why Aristotle says that
sensation is the reception of the form without the matter.
But it is always the form of a particular.107
Shute's reading of the common sensibles is similar to that of Sorabji's. Sorabji's reading,
however, aims at addressing a specific problem in Aristotle's epistemology.
In "Intentionality and Physiological Process: Aristotle's Theory of SensePerception," Sorabji suggests that the common sensibles account for the apparent
propositional nature oiaisthesis.

According to Sorabji, it is through the propositional

nature of aisthesis that Aristotle accounts for the apparent intentional structure of sensual
content. Sorabji writes that, according to Aristotle,
One can perceive that the approaching [2] thing is a man
[3] and is white [1], that the white thing [1] is this or
something else [3], whether the white thing [1] is a man or
not [3], what the coloured [1] or sounding [1] thing is [3],
or where [2], that one is perceiving [1/3], walking [1/3],
thinking [1/3], living [1/3], existing, that one is sleeping,
that something is pleasant [3], whether this is bread [3],
whether it is baked [3], 'this is sweet' [3] and 'this is drink'
[3]. 108
Of these twenty-one (sometimes repeated) items that Sorabji claims we sense, sixteen are
clear examples of one of the three sorts of sensible objects identified in DA II 6. Those
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things proceeded by a [1] represent the sensation of a special sense object, a [2] represent
a common sensible, and a [3] represent a thing of the sort Aristotle says we sense
incidentally {kata sumbebekos). The four that are not clearly assignable to one of the
three types of sensible objects are proceeded by a [1/3]. They belong to either the first or
the third class of objects, the ambiguity stemming from the referent of the term "one". It
should be noted that each of the more complex propositions, those that speak to the
nature of the sensed substance—for example, "that something is pleasant", "whether this
is bread", or "whether it is baked"—are clear cases of the third sort of sensible objects.
Aristotle's comments concerning that which is sensed incidentally are brief. He
writes:
The senses perceive each other's special objects
incidentally; not because the percipient sense is this or that
special sense, but because all form a unity: this incidental
perception takes place whenever sense is directed at one
and the same moment to two disparate qualities in one and
the same object, e.g. to the bitterness and the yellowness of
bile, the assertion of the identity of both cannot be the act
of either of the senses; hence the illusion of sense, e.g. the
belief that if a thing is yellow it is bile. {DA 425a30425b4)109
This passage effectively limits the scope of aisthesis to the special objects of sense and
the common sensibles. This is clear from Aristotle's references to identity claims and his
claim that they are not an act ofaisthesis.

Aristotle says that identity claims bear "the

illusion of sense" but, in fact, constitute beliefs which are not formulated as a function of
aisthesis. It should be clear that the sort of predicative powers Sorabji seeks to associate
with the common sensibles, the sort that communicate substantial identity claims, are the
sort of things that Aristotle claims to be part of the illusion of sense and are not sensed
according to the proper meaning of the term "aisthesis". Unfortunately, Aristotle offers
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no further elaboration upon what is sensible kata sumbebekos before he concludes his
discussion concerning aisthesis: "About the principle in virtue of which we say that
animals are percipient, let this discussion suffice." (DA 427al4-16)110 It is apparent then,
first, that the domain of aisthesis, properly construed, is limited to the special sense
objects and the so-called common sensibles. Second, it is apparent that the faculty
according to which we arrive at complex judgemental aspects of the sensed substance,
that which Sorabji claims to be accounted for under the auspices of the common
sensibles, actually falls beyond the scope of aisthesis entirely.

§ 3.

Phantasia

Aristotle adds one more item to his taxonomy of sense-related capacities—namely, the
imagination (phantasia). This capacity is of particular interest to the present study
because Caston (1996) argues that Aristotle introduces phantasia in order to "preempt
charges that he cannot explain the possibility of error" because phantasia "genuinely
does admit of error"111 and to this extent, says Caston, Aristotle employs the notion of
phantasia to addresses the set of problems we now refer to as the "problem of
intentionality". Concerning phantasia, Aristotle writes: "imagination [phantasia] is
different from either perceiving [aistheseos] or discursive thinking [dianoias], though it is
not found without sensation, or judgement [hupolepsis] without it. That this activity is
not the same kind of thinking as judgement is obvious." (DA 427M4-17)112 Brentano
refers to this passage in support of his identification of phantasia with the passive
intellect, one half of the intellectual capacity that will be scrutinized later in Part III.
Gerson, however, argues that this passage is not accurately read as describing phantasia
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as a type of thinking. Gerson cites 403a9 and 432al6-17 in support of his reading,
however, his argument is far from definitive.

Gerson's reading does seem to be

supported by three aspects of Aristotle's discussion of phantasia: (1) Aristotle
distinguishes phantasia from the other cognitive faculties that are (more) clearly
identified as species belonging to the genus noein (DA 427M4; 427b24-26; 427b27-29;
and 428al-5); (2) Aristotle articulates the various dependencies that obtain between
aisthesis, phantasia and the various faculties of noein (DA 427b2-5; 427b27-29; and
429a2-4); and (3) Aristotle does affirm that the brutes might possess phantasia, but
denies that the brutes have mind (me hechein noun). (DA II 3; DA 428a7-l 1; and 428a2122) These aspects of Aristotle's discussion of phantasia suggest that the purpose of DA
III 3 is to distinguish, define, then set aside phantasia in order to clear the way for
Aristotle to address "the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks." (DA
429al0-ll) 1 1 4 As we shall see, although the capacity for falsity (pseudeis) will emerge as
a prominent feature of phantasia, contra Caston, error (apate) is not accounted for by it.
What is clear at this point is that Aristotle has here presented us with a variety of
what he takes to be distinct behaviours related to each other by a complex set of
interdependencies. Here Aristotle suggests the following dependencies:
hupolepsis D (phantasia D aisthesis)
Just how phronesis, episteme, and the emergence of doxa alethes factor into this matrix is
not yet clear but the present context does seem to suggest, in agreement with Gerson, that
phantasia is generally the precondition for all or most of the higher cognitive faculties.
This reading is further suggested when Aristotle's introduction of phantasia here at
427M4 is understood as the function that renders appearances (panta taphainomena).
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I

refer here to 427b2-5 where Aristotle speaks of panta taphainomena and the
ramifications of the 'like by like' thesis. Already by 427b2-5, it is implied thatphantasia
is, if not a sort of thinking (noein), then, with Gerson, we must take it to be integral to
thinking. This reading is reinforced by 427b27-29 where we are told, "Thinking is
different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement" (DA
427b27-29)115 and further reinforced by the etymological analysis Aristotle offers at
429a2-4. At 429a2-4 we are told that "phantasia" is derived from "phaos" (light) from
which we are also given "phaino" and "phainomena".
Concerning phantasia Aristotle tells us that it involves our capacity to "call up a
picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images" (DA 427bl8-20) 116
and this, says Aristotle, is something that falls under our own volition (hotan
boulometha). (DA 427b 17-21) Whether this is a provisional characterization remains to
be seen. Before proceeding to elaborate upon phantasia, however, Aristotle adds that
"when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a
painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene." (DA 427b23-24)117 In other words, in
phantasia, unlike in judgement, we are able to refrain from reacting emotionally. It is at
this point that Caston's suggestion that Aristotle introduces phantasia to "preempt
charges that he cannot explain the possibility of error" because phantasia "genuinely
does admit of error"118 departs from Aristotle's text. What Aristotle has made explicit
here is thatphantasia allows us to refrain from error because we can imagine things that
are false without committing to its truthfulness and, in so doing, incurring error. As
Aristotle proceeds to distinguish phantasia from the other cognitive faculties it becomes
increasingly clear that this reading does indeed cohere with Aristotle's intention.
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Before we return to Aristotle's treatment of phantasia it is important to take note
that, according to what we have already been told, judgement {hupolepsis) includes
knowledge {episteme), opinion (doxa), prudence (phronesis) and their opposite. {DA
427b24-26) This passage has the affect of situating five of the seven functions referred to
thus far within the taxonomy of noein and not aisthesis. Knowledge {episteme), opinion
{doxa), and prudence {phronesis) are sub-species of judgement {hupolepsis), judgement
itself being a species of thinking {noein). Only discursive thinking {dianoias) and
phantasia remain unaccounted for. At this point Aristotle has also effectively articulated
the dependency relationships between six of these seven functions. Given:
hupolepsis D {phantasia D aisthesis)
we can understand that knowledge {episteme), opinion {doxa), prudence {phronesis) and
their opposite are all contingent upon phantasia and, therefore, contingent upon aisthesis.
For now, Aristotle sets aside these varieties of judgement for later discussion.
He proceeds, however, to differentiate phantasia as a distinct faculty by arguing
that if it is understood as "that in virtue of which an image arises for us" and is a "single
faculty or disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate," and "either
in error or not," then it must be distinguished from sensation {aisthesis), opinion {doxa),
science {episteme), and intelligence {nous). {DA 428al-5) 119 That phantasia is not
aisthesis proper is clear from the fact that (a) imagination takes place in the absence of
aisthesis {DA 428a6); (b) if phantasia were the same as aisthesis than it would be found
in all animals possessed of aisthesis, this is held not to be the case {DA 428a7-l 1); (c)
aisthesis is always true, phantasia is most often false {DA 428al 1-12); and (d) in
common parlance we only speak of phantasia when there is some inaccuracy in our

108

impression of an object, when our impression is accurate we speak oiaisthesis. (DA
428al2-15) Phantasia cannot be science (episteme) or intelligence (nous) either because
neither episteme nor nous can be false but phantasia might be. Aristotle's argument that
phantasia is not to be identified with opinion (doxa) involves his demonstration that
phantasia does not involve belief (pistis) as does doxa. According to Aristotle "in the
brutes though we often find imagination we never find belief." (DA 428a21-22)120 These
later two disjunctions between phantasia and nous lend strong support to Gerson's
position.
A full examination of Aristotle's notion of phantasia and its status as a mode of
nous or aisthesis falls beyond the purview of the present study. What is important,
however, is that a closer examination of the disjunction that Aristotle articulates between
phantasia and doxa, reveals even greater difficulties in Caston's suggestion that Aristotle
introduces phantasia to "preempt charges that he cannot explain the possibility of error."
The discrepancy lies in the behaviour that manifests error. It is not, contra Caston,
manifest in phantasia. Aristotle makes this explicit when he tells us that "every opinion
[doxe] is accompanied by belief [pistis], belief by conviction, and conviction [peithoi] by
discourse of reason [logos]: while there are some brutes in which we find imagination,
without discourse of reason. " (DA 428a22-24)121 We are then told, "what we imagine is
sometimes false though our contemporaneous judgement about it is true; e.g. we imagine
the sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the
inhabited part of the earth." (DA 428b2-4)122 The implication of Aristotle's analysis here
is that a person can imagine something that is false yet still hold a judgement of those
matters that is true. This not only tells us that the truth or falsity of the content of one's
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imaginings do not determine the coherence of one's judgements with truth or falsity, it
tells us, contra Caston, that error—understood as the commitment to, or belief in, a
falsehood, i.e., the judgement that what is in fact the case is not so—is not manifest in
phantasia but in something additional to it. Aristotle's deconstruction of opinion into
belief (pistis) and conviction (peithoi) suggests that, properly speaking, error is manifest
in one's conviction that such and such is the case and not in one's imagining that such
and such is the case.
Having distinguished phantasia from pistis and peithoi, Aristotle proceeds with
an attempt to tell us just what phantasia is. Aristotle's explanation of phantasia is
convoluted indeed:
But since when one thing has been set in motion
another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held
to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation,
i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its
content what can be perceived, and since movement may be
produced by actual sensation and that movement is
necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this
movement must be (1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing
apart from sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when
we perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in
which it is found may present various phenomena both
active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or
false. (DA 428M0-17) 123
Aristotle takes it as a given that phantasia is a movement (kinesis) and, in accordance
with his stipulation at 427b6-14 that phantasia is never found in creatures who do not
possess aisthesis, he is led to a number of conclusions. The first we have already
surmised, namely that aisthesis is a precondition for phantasia. The second, however,
represents the first definitive statement of what the capacity for phantasia entails: that is,
the ability to render images to one's self. Aristotle says that these images can be either
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active or passive (poiein kai paschein to echon) and by this he seems to mean that the
percipient subject can effect the composition of these images by their own volition. This
is also suggested when Aristotle tells us that "imagining lies within our own power
whenever we wish" {DA 427M7-18)124 Third, Aristotle concludes that, despite the
infallibility of the sensation of the kath' auto sensibles, these images might be either true
or false {alethe kaipseude). Aristotle's brief discussion concerningphantasia comes to
an end when he writes, "If then imagination presents no other features than those
enumerated and is what we have described, imagination must be a movement resulting
from an actual exercise of a power of sense." {DA 428b30-429a2)125
According to Sorabji (1992), phantasia too is prepositional in nature, and Sorabji
treats this capacity as an extension oiaisthesis. In fact, he translates "phantasia" as
"post-perceptual appearance". A "post-perceptual appearance" is 'propositionaP because
it is
typically an appearance that something is the case, or, as
we would sometimes prefer to say, an appearance as of
something's being the case. I shall call both of these
appearances prepositional, meaning by that no more than
that something is predicated of something. There is not
merely an appearance of whiteness, but of whiteness as
belonging to something or as being located somewhere.126
These last few lines, those in which Aristotle accounts for the presence of falsity in
phantasia {DA 428b30-429a2), leave us with a picture of what the faculty entails that is
different even from what we were led to believe at 428b 10-17, where we are initially
introduced to the essential character ofphantasia. Whereas 428b 10-17 led us to describe
phantasia as a faculty through which we are able to render images unto ourselves by our
own volition, and hence to do so without committing to the veracity of the image
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composed, the text that follows attributes sole responsibility for such falsity to the
sensation of those things that are sensed kata sumbebekos. Volition seems to have
nothing to do with the presence of falsity in phantasia, nor does it seem to have anything
to do with its content (by which I mean the building blocks of the compositions phantasia
composes). The comments at DA 427b 17-18, then, must be read as suggesting that the
role of the volition of the subject with regard to phantasia is limited to its activation. We
are therefore led to the conclusion that phantasia, like aisthesis, is a passive faculty. In
other words, it may be within our control to activate the faculty; the furnishings and
fragments that we find within our imaginations are not within our control.

Conclusion: The Extensions of Aisthesis
In the preceding review we saw how, in the early chapters of DA III, Aristotle extends his
theory of aisthesis to account for those phenomena that his accounts of the first and
second actualities of aisthesis do not. Concerning the capacity according to which we
come to know that we are sensing, we have seen that, although Brentano's
characterization of it as the "inner sense" suggests that it is a distinct capacity in addition
to the five standard senses, it is more accurately understood as a sensation concomitant
with our sensation of the special objects of sense. The sense that we sense is itself
concomitant with the second actuality of aisthesis; it is dependant entirely upon aisthesis
proper, i.e., sensation of the special objects of sense. The common sensibles—including
movement, rest, number, figure, and magnitude—are so called because they are sensed
by the same faculties through which, and at the same time as, we sense the special objects
of sense. Finally, phantasia is the capacity according to which we are able to render
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images unto ourselves. Phantasia, as we have seen, is a power that falls under our own
volition, however, the contents of those images are passively determined by the second
actuality ofaisthesis.
In the following chapter we will assess Aristotle's theory of aisthesis with respect
to the extent to which it provides an adequate basis upon which we might understand
Brentano's notion of the intentional inexistence of mental phenomena.
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Chapter 6.

AISTHESIS AND INTENTIONALITY

Introduction
Brentano claims that Aristotle himself spoke of the mental inexistence of the object of
consciousness when, "In his book on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in
the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the
object which is thought is in the thinking intellect."127 As has been repeated throughout
this study, it is this reference to aisthesis in Aristotle that has prompted scholars to
identify intentionality with Aristotle's theory of aisthesis/sensation and to interpret
intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's description of sensation as receiving the
form of an object without its matter (DA 412a3-6). Contrary to this view, it is my
contention that an understanding of intentionality that is limited to a recapitulation of
Aristotle's theory of sensation will fail to account sufficiently for the nuances of the
concept and will inevitably lead its proponents to the so-called "problems of
intentionality" (problems of the sort described in the second chapter). The purpose of
this chapter is to (1) demonstrate the incongruities between intentionality a la Brentano
and Aristotle's theory of aisthesis, while at the same time to (2) illustrate the connections
between the misunderstandings that arise when we limit our understanding of
intentionality to a recapitulation of aisthesis qua Aristotle and the various problems of
intentionality discussed in Part I.
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This chapter will proceed, in §1, with a brief synopsis of Aristotle's theory of
aisthesis as described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the present study and will then offer, in
§2, a similar synopsis of intentionality based upon the first and second chapters of the
present study. I will then more closely scrutinize Aristotle's theory of aisthesis in two
phases: The first, in §3, will demonstrate the insufficiencies of the proper faculties of
aisthesis to account thoroughly for various aspects of intentionality. The second, in §4,
will demonstrate the insufficiencies of various extensions of aisthesis to account for
intentionality.

§ 1.

Aisthesis

Summarized

Aristotle's explication of aisthesis in DA II revealed two conditions with respect to the
material constitution, that is, the first actuality, of the sense organ: (1) that the sensitivity
of the material constituents of the organ must be continuous with the sensitivities
exhibited by the elemental constituents of the external environment. These sensitivities
are affected by the sensible qualities of the substance in which the qualities inhere. The
elemental constituents of the external environment serve as the media of the activity of
aisthesis, and they are able to do so because the sensitivities of the elemental constituents
of the external environment and the sensitivities of the organ are the same. {DA 419al 121, 420a3-5, 421b9) (2) The sensitivity of the organ is a function of its form, the
actualization of which bestows upon the organ a certain qualitative neutrality with respect
to a particular range of sensible qualities that the given organ is meant to sense. It is this
range of sensible qualities that constitute its special object(s), e.g., colours, sounds,
scents, etc.
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With respect to the second actuality of aisthesis, we concluded that it is better to
read Aristotle's theory of aisthesis as an account of the presence of sense data and that
this presence is a function of the continuity between the mediating element(s) external to
the sensing subject and the elemental constituents of the subject's sense organs. What we
have called the "activity" of the senses is, in fact, a movement caused by the activity of
the object. This movement is transmitted through the medium and into the organ, the
elemental constituents of which, it is homogeneous with. For this reason, we concluded,
that the term "activity" when predicated of that which possesses the capacity for sense, is
so metaphorically and equivocally. Commentators agree that sensation in Aristotle is
something stimulated by the external sensible object. However, owing to Aristotle's
insistence that "man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does
not depend upon himself (DA 417b24-26)

we are led to conclude that the transition

from inactivity to activity of the senses is beyond the control of the sensing subject. It is
wholly involuntary and passive.
Furhermore, it is clear from this account that aisthesis in Aristotle is limited to the
presence of sense data and does not directly involve the creation of concepts or, what we
have referred to as the "concretization" of the sensed object. It is owing to this limitation
that I have concluded that there is no genetic principle proper to aisthesis. In contrast to
the first actuality of aisthesis, which is genetic in the conventional sense discussed in GC
I 7, the second actuality of aisthesis is not genetic. Aristotle says as much when he
writes, "it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being 'altered' when he uses his wisdom."
(DA 417b8-9)129 Aristotle's comments concerning the second actuality of aisthesis—
including (i) "It is clear that what is sensitive [to aisthetikon] is so only potentially, not
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actually," (DA 417a6-7)

and (ii), "sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of

knowledge." (DA 417M9) 131
That said, Aristotle's theory of sensation includes certain extensions to what
qualifies as aisthesis proper. These extensions include (a) the sense that we are sensing,
(b) the so-called common sensibles, and (c) phantasia or imagination. Concerning the
sense through which we come to know that we are sensing, such a sense is concomitant
with our sensation of the special objects of sense (DA 425M2-17); it is dependant entirely
upon aisthesis proper, and can be understood as an immediate inference from the function
of aisthesis. The common sensibles—including movement, rest, number, figure, and
magnitude—are sensed by each of the standard sense capacities equally and at the same
time as we sense the special objects of sense. (DA 425al6-20) Phantasia is the capacity,
says Aristotle, that is
(1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing apart from
sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when we
perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in
which it is found may present various phenomena both
active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or
false. (DA 428M0-17) 1 "
Although the activation of phantasia falls under one's own volition, the contents of
phantastical images are passively determined by the second actuality of aisthesis. The
capacity for imagination seems to be the very sort of capacity we are seeking as a
possible analogue for intentional inexistence in Brentano. The connection is this:
phantasia seems to account for the presence of falsity and error in our judgements and, as
Caston argues, represents Aristotle's answer to the conventional problem of intentionality
discussed earlier. Contrary to this argument, we concluded that error is, in fact, a
function of judgement, i.e., the conviction or belief that what is in fact the case is not (or
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vice versa), and not the function of phantasia. Finally, although we stopped short of
definitively associating phantasia with those capacities that belong to aisthesis proper
Aristotle makes it explicit that phantasia is dependent upon aisthesis for its content. {DA
428b30-429a2) Generally speaking, then, all of the capacities that fall under the rubric of
aisthesis proper operate on a pre-conceptual level.

§ 2.

Intentionality

Revisited

Intentionality of the sort that we are concerned with in the present study is sometimes
referred to as "extra-practical intention". Intention of this sort is described by
Spiegelberg as "the mere directedness toward the willed [or perceived, or thought about]
object."133 Even this characterization of intentionality, however, which is informed by
Spiegelberg's heavy Husserlian influence, diverges from that which we find in Brentano:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content,
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In
presentation something is presented, in judgement
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate
hated, in desire desired and so on.134
The concept of intentionality articulated by Brentano accounts for two fundamental
features of psychological states: (i) their manifestation of a concrete object, i.e., the
"inexistence of an object," and (ii) the meta-character instantiated by the act itself in
which the object is manifest, e.g., "in love loved."135 The later feature is most often
overlooked in treatments of intentionality and its associated problems. It is that which we
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have previously referred to as the "meta-character" of the psychological state. It is also
this feature of psychological states that serves as both the basis of Brentano's
rehabilitation of the science of psychology and the basis of his taxonomy of mental
activities.

§ 3.

The Common Sensibles, Phantasia, and

Intentionality

Given their supposed role in Aristotle's attempts to address those problems we now refer
to as the "problems of intentionality"—suggestions made primarily in Sorabji (1992) and
Caston (1996)—it is necessary that we further scrutinize certain extensions of Aristotle's
theory of aisthesis —specifically the common sensibles and phantasia.
Sorabji's claim concerns the common sensibles and, we may recall, argues that
Aristotle is able to preempt problems of the sort we today associate with intentionality
given the apparent predicative nature of aisthesis and our sensation of the common
sensibles specifically. We can begin by noting that we were led to reject Sorabji's
characterization of aisthesis as predicative primarily because of the inconsistencies
between Aristotle's characterization of the objects of sense proper and those things that
are sensed "indirectly" (kata sumbebekos). All of the predicates that Sorabji claims that
we have the power to sense—e.g., that a thing is a man, that the white thing is this or
something else, that one is sleeping, that something is pleasant, etc.—are in fact things
that Aristotle says we sense indirectly. They are, effectively, things that we infer from
our sensations of that which is sensed directly—what Aristotle calls the special objects of
sense, and the common sensibles.
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Aside from these interpretive difficulties, Sorabji's contention that Aristotle
addresses with his notion of the common sensibles the same problems that Brentano
addresses with intentionality is problematic. According to Sorabji, Aristotle's notion of
the common sensibles represents a certain predicative function. Sorabji suggests that
aisthesis can tell us "that something is pleasant". This is the closest Sorabji comes to
suggesting that aisthesis can account for what we have thus far referred to as the metacharacter of intentionality. However, for Sorabji to account for such perceptions by
appealing to Aristotle's notion of aisthesis is tantamount to a category mistake. It is clear
from our previous discussions of judgement (hupolepsis), that the activity that leads us to
the conclusion "that something is pleasant" is properly characterized as a judgement
(hupolepsis) and not a sensation proper.
Caston (1996) argues that Aristotle introduces the faculty of phantasia in order to
account for the persistence of error given that Aristotle claims that the faculty for the
sensation of the special objects of sense is infallible. (DA 428al0) Based upon this
understanding ofphantasia, Caston argues that it is with this faculty that Aristotle
responds to what we previously referred to as the conventional problems of intentionality.
Contrary to this position, in §3 of Chapter 5, we saw that Aristotle distinguishes between
error on the one hand, and falsity on the other. We saw that phantasia does indeed
permit of falsity meaning that one can imagine things and situations that do not cohere
with the facts. Aristotle makes it clear, however, that one might imagine things that are
false without committing themselves to their truth. This is what Aristotle means when he
says, "when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately
produced, and so too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain
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as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging
scene." (DA 427b21-24)136 Aristotle makes it clear here that one stands in indifference to
that which s/he imagines. Error—understood as the possession of a false opinion
(doxe)—according to Aristotle, requires belief (pistis) and conviction (peithoi) and that
belief and conviction are the product of nous. (DA 428a22-24)

§ 4.

The Comparative Ontologies of the Aistheton and the Inexisting
Object

The most compelling reason to search for a notion other than aisthesis in Aristotle upon
which to base our understanding of intentionality in Brentano remains the fundamentally
pre-conceptual nature of aisthesis. Therein lies the greatest discrepancy between the
object of sense, the aistheton, and the inexisting object: whereas the first represents a
mere quality of a fully formed concrete object, the latter represents a fully concretized
object that embodies a certain identity to its subject. Indeed, the prime motivation for the
formulation of the theory of intentionality was, and remains, the need to account for the
presence of content in mental, as opposed to physical, phenomena; that is, in order to
account for the objects of our thoughts. In Brentano the inexisting object is already
presented as being significant in some way, we have referred to this significance
generally as the meta-character of an intentional state. In order that, to use Brentano's
example, a thing can be experienced as loved we must recognize that it must be perceived
as something and that thing must be of a certain nature which implies a certain identity,
that is, it implies that the thing embody a certain identity for the experiencing subject and
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that the identity embodied is one that arouses love for that subject. This we have referred
to previously as a certain cognitive maturity on the part of the inexisting object.
This understanding is wholly intertwined with the ontological distinction between
mental and physical phenomena both of which represent for Brentano concrete objects.
Following our discussion in Chapter 2, 137 we can appreciate that, for Brentano, the
inexistence of the object is indicative of a significant genetic principle of intentionality.
In fact, such a genetic principle is implied in Brentano's claims that, "[w]e have no right,
therefore, to believe that the objects of so-called external perception really exist as they
appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably do not exist outside of us." 138 And it is further
implied, in his claim that,
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a
phenomenal and intentional existence.139
This genetic principle is indeed the essential feature of intentionality for, according to
Brentano, inexisting objects constitute the class of objects for which we can affirm real
existence.
Such a principle, however, is specifically the sort of genetic principle we have
already denied to Aristotle's theory of aisthesis. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the first
actuality of aisthesis constitutes genesis in the conventional sense discussed in GC17—
namely, the creation that occurs in the union of form and matter the product of which is
the sense organ and not the sensed object. Aristotle tells us that "it is wrong to speak of a
wise man as being 'altered' when he uses his wisdom," (DA 417b8-9)140 and, in so
doing, Aristotle himself denies that aisthesis is genetic in the standard sense. What is
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suggested by our reading of the second actuality of aisthesis as Aristotle's account of the
presence of sense data simpliciter is that the identity of the objects of sense are the pure
qualities themselves and not those qualities as qualities of this or that substance. This
means that the object of aisthesis is precisely the opposite sort of object that is
represented by Brentano as that which enjoys intentional inexistence, the object of
aisthesis does not exhibit anything near the sort of cognitive maturity that the inexisting
object does.

Conclusion: Aisthesis and

Intentionality

The stated purpose of this chapter is to illustrate, contrary to the currently received view,
that aisthesis in Aristotle is not analogous to intentionality in Brentano. Referring to our
previous discussions concerning intentionality in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part I, we can recall
that Brentano's initial motivation for devising his model of consciousness was to
rehabilitate the discipline of psychology by establishing its legitimacy among the
empirical sciences, and to do so contrary to the criticisms of Auguste Comte. One of the
central notions in this rehabilitation is the intentional inexistence of the content of
cognitive activity. This essential characteristic of mental phenomena is made apparent
through what Brentano called inner perception. This much is explained in Part I of the
present study. Here we find an apparent likeness between certain aspects of Aristotle's
psychology and Brentano's, for it is clear that what Brentano refers to as inner perception
is an appropriation of the immediate awareness of sensual activity that Aristotle accounts
for through the identity of the activity of the aisthetikon and the aistheton. However,
intentionality in Brentano is not identical with the capacity for inner perception; it is,
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rather, one of its objects. The intentional character of cognitive acts is that which is made
apparent to us through our immediate awareness of our sensual activity. This is
Brentano's innovation, not that cognitive activity bears this structure (for, as we know
from Part I, this too is an observation Brentano credits to Aristotle and his medieval
commentators) but that such a structure is present to observation and thus available to
serve as the foundation of an empirical science.
The dissimilarities between intentionality and aisthesis are especially apparent at
numerous points in the present explication. We saw the first of these dissimilarities at the
end of DA II 5, when, having arrived at the conclusion that aisthesis represents the sort of
power corresponding to the capacity to exercise acquired knowledge, Aristotle points out
that the two sorts of power differ in that one, the power to exercise knowledge, falls
under our volition, whereas our sensual powers do not. On the other hand, the contentfullness represented by intentionality, we recall, is that which Sorabji claimed was
accounted for by the apparent propositional nature of aisthesis, specifically our capacity
to sense the common sensibles. Upon scrutiny, the apparent likenesses between aisthesis
and intentionality did not obtain for, according to Aristotle, the identity of the bearer of
sensible qualities is not something that is sensible kath' auto. Substantial identity claims,
we are told in DA II 6, are the sort of things that belong to the third sort of sensible
objects, those that are sensed incidentally (kata sumbebekos). It is also with respect to
such claims that we are prone to error. Our capacities to sense what is sensible kath'
auto, however, are, as Aristotle tells us, infallible. Given the conclusion we were led to
concerning the third sort of sensible objects—namely, that the domain of aisthesis does
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not extend beyond our power to sense what is sensible kath' auto—we are again
confronted with a dissimilarity between the two notions.
The most compelling reason to dismiss the analogy between aisthesis and
intentionality relates to the ontological concerns for the foundations of consciousness that
emerge out of the petitio principii that is latent in Brentano's model. To reiterate:
because (a) consciousness is conditional upon the presence of its object, (b) the presence
of the object is conditioned by its intentional inexistence, and (c) such an intentional
inexistence occurs only in consciousness, we are led to a circularity that pre-empts our
capacity to account for the genesis of consciousness. Further, given that the ontic
foundation of consciousness in general is bound to its intentional character, if aisthesis
were sufficiently analogous to intentionality, we would expect aisthesis to also possess or
be identified with some sort of power capable of affecting the genesis of cognitive
activity. However, no such genetic powers are correlated with aisthesis. Granted, as
most scholars of Aristotle's psychology agree, aisthesis is that which furnishes the
organism with the worldly contents of its cognitive activity. This furnishing-with-content
is one serial event in a process that we are told is initiated by the endowment of some
body with a soul. This event, according to DA 417M6-18, occurs at conception. Indeed,
the possibility that aisthesis might account for this sort of creative activity is clearly
excluded by the thoroughly passive character attributed to aisthesis. Any understanding
of intentionality, then, that is strictly based upon the apparent analogy between it and
Aristotle's notion of aisthesis is inevitably deficient.
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NOTES TO PART II

1

2

3

cua6r|afs EOTI TO BEKTIKOV TGOV aia6r)TG0V EIBCOV dveu Tfjs OXris (DA 424al8-19)
Brentano(1995):88.
816 fi yvxA EOTIV EVTEXEXEICC f| TTpcoTri acouaxos cpuaiKou BuvduEi ^corjv

E'XOVTOS.

(DA 412a27-412bl)

TOIOUTOV

Be 6 ocv fj opyaviKov. ( o p y a v a BE KCU TCC TCOV cpuTcov HEprj, dXXa

iravTEXcos airXa, oTov TO cpuXXov TTEpiKapTriou aKETraaiia, TO BE TfEpiKdpTfiov
KapTrou- ai BE pi^ai TCO OTOUCCTI dvdXoyov- diacpco y a p E'XKEI TTJV Tpo<pr|v.) EI 8r|
TI KOIVOV

ETfl Tfdoris yuxfis BET Xsysiv, Eirj av EVTEXEXEICC f] TTpcoTri oconaTos

9uaiKou opyaviKou. (DA 412bl-7)
It is important that I distinguish between "energeia", often translated "actuality", and
"entelecheia" which is also often translated as "actuality". The two terms are not
synonymous in the way that these common translations suggest. "Energeia" literally
means "actuality" in the sense that only through "energeia" do things come into
existence. That is why the term "energeia" is properly juxtaposed against the term
"dunamis" meaning "potentiality", i.e., not existing (yet). Although the etymology of the
term "entelecheia" is often disputed, the LSG suggests that the word is composed of the
two terms "enteles", meaning complete or full, and "hechein". This etymological
analysis suggests that the term "entelecheia" might better be understood as "that which
imparts telos", rather than "actuality". A better singular term for translating
"entelecheia" might be "activation", in that the "entelecheia" activates its subject by
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imparting telos to it. "EntelecheicT sets its subject on a purposeful course. Sachs
correctly recognizes the error in translating "entelecheia" as "actuality," however, his
translation of the term with the phrase "being-at-work-staying-itself' is questionable. It
is questionable first, because it does not fully distinguish between "entelecheia" and
"energeia", which he translates with the phrase "being-at-work", and second, because the
meaning of the phrase "being-at-work-staying-itself is itself obscure.
6

Chen (1956): 59.

7

Chen (1956): 59.

8

Chen points specifically to Metaphys. 1035b 14-22 which reads:
And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of a
living being) is their substance according to the formula,
i.e. the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind (at
least we shall define each part, if we define it well, not
without reference to its function, and this cannot belong to
it without perception), so that the parts of soul are prior,
either all or some of them, to the concrete 'animal', and so
too with each individual animal; and the body and parts are
posterior to this, the essential substance, and it is not the
substance but the concrete thing that is divided into these
parts as its matter. To the concrete thing these are in a
sense prior, but in a sense they are not. {Metaphys.
1035M4-22)

9

Van den berg, I.J.M. Aristoteles verhandeling over de zeil. quoted in Bos (2005).

10

In German Theiler (1959) offers: "des naturlichen mit Organen ausgestatteten

Korpers." In French Bodeus (1993) offers: "un corps naturel pourvu d'organes." We can
also anticipate yet another rendition of the phrase from Shields' forthcoming translation
and commentary.
11

Bos (1999): 43.
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Bos (1999): 43. Bos elaborates by suggesting that by using the phrase "somatos
physikou" Aristotle means to identify an elementary body (a body composed of the
elements) and suggests, as I am about to do, that 412al 1 distinguishes between living and
non-living natural bodies, the difference being that non-living bodies are informed matter
simpliciter—Bos refers to them as "elemental bodies"—and living natural bodies are
bodies that are actualized in a particular way that involves the pneuma, or medium. Bos
refers here to the medium that Aristotle implicates in his accounts of the various senses (a
matter that I will speak to in later sections of this chapter). What Bos seems to imply is
that in cases of form/matter composition that result in non-living bodies, the elements are
implicated only as constitutive parts, whereas form/matter compositions that result in
living bodies implicate not only the elements as constitutive parts but also certain
elements as pneuma. Given then, that the term "pneuma" also refers to elemental
materials—namely, air and water—Bos' account offers little by way of elucidation with
respect to the difference between the composition of non-living and living bodies except
to say that the latter implicate elemental materials in some extended way.
13

See, e.g., George A. Blair, "The Meaning of'Energeia'' and 'Entelecheid' in Aristotle,"

in International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (March 1967): 101-117; Daniel Graham,
"The Etymology of Entelecheia," in American Journal of Philology 110 (1989): 73-80;
and William Charlton, "Aristotle and the Uses of Actuality," in Proceedings of the
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1989): 1-22.
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COOTE

oi opoi TOIOUTOI oTov "TO 6py(^Eo8ai Kivriaij T15 TOU TOIOUBI acbiaaTos r\

lupous r| BuvdiiEcos UTTO TOOBE EVEKO TO08E", Kai 81a T a u r a fiSri cpuoixou TO
0EGopfjaai TTEpi ^uxfis, TI Trdoris f\ Trjs TOIOUTTIS. (DA 403a26-28)
15

Slakey's preferred rendering of "sumbainei" is "consists in" (we find this rendering in

both Hett's [1936] and Hicks' [1976] translations) rather than "depends on" (as it is
rendered in Smith's [1984] translation) for he reads Aristotle as saying that aisthesis is
the change spoken of here. This, he claims, is supported by 417b20-21, where we are
told that our senses are spurred into activity by external objects. As we shall see in what
follows, I agree with Slakey that aisthesis 'consists in' a sort of alteration, however, I
disagree considerably with respect to the sort of alteration that aisthesis consists in.
16

cpoco! 8E TIVEJ KOU TO oiaoiov UTTO TOU oiaoiou Trdaxeiv. TOUTO BE TTCOS BuvaTov

f] OCBUVCCTOV, EiprjKaiaEV EV TOT$ KOC06AOU Xoyois TTEpi TOU TTOIETV KCCI TTOCOXEIV. (DA
416b35-417a2)
17

BfjXov ouv OTi TO aioSriTiKov OUK EOTIV EvepyEia, dXXa Buvdnei novov. (DA

417a6-7)
18

ETTEIBTI BE TO

aioBdvEaBai XEyoyEV Bixcos (TO TE y a p Buvduei OKOOOV KOU opcov

aKouEiv Kai opdv XsyonEV, K&V TUXTJ KOSEGBOV, Kai TO riBri Evspyouv), Sixcoj dv
XdyoiTo Kai fi aia8r)ais, r\ UEV COS Buvdwei, fi 8E COS EVEpyEia. ouoicos 8E Kai TO
aiaSriTov, TO TE Buvdnei 6v Kai TO EVEpysia. (DA 417a9-14)

129

5iccipET£ov 8E KO\ TTEpl 8uvdu.Eco$ Kai EVTEXEXEIOS:- VUV y a p d-rcXcbs EXsyouEv
TTEpi aurcbv. (DA 417a21-22)
20

TroXXotKis ££ EvavTiaj u.ETa(3aXcbv E^ECOC;. (417a31-32)

21

6 5' EK TOU E'XEIV Tt\v dpiBjiriTiKriv [Smith notes here that he is reading "a'ia0r|Gis",

whereas Ross prints "dpi0u.r}TiKr]v"] f\ rrjv ypau.y.aTiKr|v, [xf\ EVEpysTv 8E, £15 TO
Evepyetv. (DA 417a32-417bl)
Myles Burnyeat, "De Anima II 5," in Phronesis: A journal of Ancient Philosophy 47
no. 1 (2002): 29.
23

Burnyeat (2002): 65.

24

Burnyeat (2002): 74.

25

TO

|4EV ouv E'IS EVTEXEXEIOV dyEiv EK 8uvd|jEi OVT05 [KOTO] TO voouv Kai

<ppovouv ou BiBaoKaXiav dXX' ETEpav ETrcovuuiav E'XEIU SiKaiou- TO 8' EK 8uvduEi
OVT05 navSdvov Kai Xanfidvov ETnoTT|u.T")v UTTO TOU EVTEXEXEIOC OVTOJ Kai
8i8aoKaXiKou f)Toi OU8E TrdoxEiv cpaTEOv, [cboiTEp Eipryrai,] r] 8uo Tpotrous slvai
dXXoicbaEcos, Trjv TE ETTI TCCS oTEpryriKas 8ia0EO£is u.ETa(3oXr}v Kai Trjv ETTI T O $
E^EIS

xai Triv <puaiv. TOU 8' aia0riTiKou fi uiv TrpcoTTi u.ETa(3oXri yivETai UTTO TOU

yevvcovTos, OTOV 8e yevvr)0fj, exei r)8r), coaTrep £TriaTrnar]v, Kai TO aia0dv£a0ai.
TO KOT'

EVEpyEiav 8E onoicos XsyETai Tab OECOPETV- 8iacpEpEi 8E, OTI TOU uiv T O

Tfoir|TiKd Trjs Evspysiaj E^COBEV, TO opaTov Kai TO aKouaTov, 6y.oicos SE Kai T O
Xomd TCOV aio0riTcov. (DA 417b9-21)
130

6 8' EK xoO ex^iv Tr\v dpi0u.r|TiKifiv [Smith notes here that he is reading "aia0r|ais",
whereas Ross prints ''dpi0ur)TiKr]v"] f\ TT\V ypauuaTiKiiv, [xr\ EvspyEtv 8E, els TO
EVEpysTv. (DA 417a32-417bl)
27

Trav 8E xpcoucc KIVTITIKOV EOTI TOU KOT' evepysiav 8iaq>avous, Kai TOUT' EOTIV

auTou fi <puai$- (DA 418a31-418b2)
28

29

Apostle (1981): 117.
OTIHETOV 8E TOUTOU

cpavEpov- sav y a p T15 0ri TO E'XOV xpcoiaa ETT' OUTTIV Tr|v

oyiv, OUK o^ETai- dXXa TO UEV xpcoua KIVET TO 8iaq>avEs, oTov TOV aEpa, OTTO
TOUTOU

Ss OUVEXOUS OVT05 KIVETTOI TO aia0r)Tripiov. ou y a p KaXcos TOUTO Xsysi

AriiiOKpiTog, OIOUEVOS, si ysvoiTO KEVOV TO UETa£u, 6 p a a 0 a i ocv dKpi|3cbs «a\ E!
(aupiari^ EV Tqb oupavcp eny TOUTO y a p d8uvaTov EOTIV. TraaxovToj y a p TI TOU
aia0r)TiKou yivETai TO 6pdv- UTT' OUTOU UEV OUV TOU opconEVOU xpcouaTOs
d8uvaTov- XsiTTETai 8r) UTTO TOU u.ETa£u, COOT' dvayKaTov TI slvai UETO^U- KEVOU
8E

ysvonEvou oux OTI aKpi(3db5, dXX' oXcos OU6EV 6cp0iioETai. (DA 419al 1-21)

30

Apostle (1981): 119.

31

ETI CCKOUETOI EV dspi, KCCV USOTI.

(DA 419bl8) "KCCV u8aTi" is one of Ross'

emendations; other texts read, "Kai," or "Kai EV."
32

TOUTO 8E

yivETai OTOV UTroyivr) TrXriyEis 6 drip «ai [\f] 8iaxu0rj. (DA 419M8-22)

131

v|xxpir™<6v uiv ouv TO KIVTJTIKOV EVOS dspos auvexEicx U£XPlS dKofis. ocKofj 8e
auiicpuris <EOTIV> drip- Bid 8E TO EV dspi ETVCJI, KIVOUUEVOU TOU E£GO 6 etaco
KivEiTai. (ZX4 420a3-5)
34

35

EOTI 8E

Kai fi oocppriois Bid TOU u.ETa£u, oTov dspos r] u8aTO$- (DA 421b9)

EOTI BE KOIVOV

0 9 % Kai yeuoEcos TO TTOTOV. ETTEI 8' uypov TO yEucrrov, dvdyKri

Kai TO aiaBryrripiov OUTOG UTITE uypov ETVCCI EVTEAEXEI'O: U.TITE dBuvaTov
uypa(vEa0ai- (DA 422a33-422b2)
36

E£

dspog |iEV y d p r] UBOTOC; dBuvaTov ouaTfjvai TO E'U^UXOV acou.a- BsTydp TI

OTEpsov Elvai- (DA 423al2-13)
37

COOTE

dvayKaTov TO acoua Elvai TO u.ETa£u TOU dTTTiKoG TrpoaTTEcpuKos, 8i' ou

yivovTai ai aio6r|OEi5 TTXEIOUS ouaai. (DA 423al5-17)
38

E£

dspos uiv y d p r] 08aTO$ dBuvaTov auaTf]vai TO EUA|A/XOV acbua- BsTydp TI

aTEpedv elvai- (DA 423al2-13)
39

cos Tfjs aioOrioEcos oTov UEOOTTITOS ivog ouoris Trig EV TOTS aia0r|ToTg

EvavTicboEcos- (DA 424a4-5)
40

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 1.
EOTI BE KOIVOV

dcpfis Kai yEUOECos TO TTOTOV. ETTEI 8' uypov TO ysuoTov, dvdyKri

Kai TO aia0r)Tripiov OUTOU u.r)TE uypov ETVOI EVTEAsxEia MTITE dBuvaTov
uypaivsaOai- (DA 422a33-422b2)

132

"Mesotes" occurs twice in DA: once at 424a4 and again at 43 lal 1. Occurrences of
"mesotes" and its cognates can be found scattered throughout the remaining corpus, with
the highest concentration in the Nicomachean Ethics (1233b34, 1234a4, 1234al4,
1106b27,1106b34,1107a2, 1107a7,1125b26,1127a41, 129a4,1133b32, and numerous
others.).
43

OTTEp f\ OUK e'oTiv aAAoioua8at...rj eVepov yevoj dXXoicoaecos. (DA 417b2-7)

Everson offers a similar categorization of the trends in the interpretation of aisthesis:
What I have called the '"literal" reading, Everson calls the 'literal' interpretation without
the quotation marks. What I have called the '"an alteration in a quite different sense'"
interpretation Everson calls the 'spiritual' interpretation. Aside from these nominal
differences our two categories include the same sorts of interpretations. My choice to
enclose the term 'literal' in quotes is based upon my preference to call the literal
translation that which most closely communicates the intent of the text. At this point in
my investigation I am not yet prepared to render the judgement that the one is indeed the
literal translation. My choice to avoid the term 'spiritual' is based upon the absence of
the term in those interpretations that are not properly construed under the rubric of the
'"literal" reading' and in those interpretations that Everson lists under the rubric of the
'spiritual reading'. I also hope to avoid the judgement of metaphysical dubiousness that
is often associated with the word 'spiritual'. See Stephen Everson, Aristotle on
Perception (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997).
44

iaev cuaGriais EGTI TO BEKTIKOV TCOV aia0r]Tcov siBcbv CCVEU TT\S uAris.... (DA

424al8-19)
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r] ETepov ysvos dXXoicboEco$. (DA 417b7)
46

8iaq>EpEi 8E, OTI TOU HEV TCC TroiriTiKa Trjs EVEpyEiag E£CO0EV, TO opaxov Kai TO

CXKOUOTOV,

onoi'cos 5E KOI x a Xoma TCOV aia0r|Tcov. aiTiov 8' OTI TCOV Ka9'

EKaaTov f| Kaf EvspyEiav aTa0r)ais, f\ 8' ETncmr)|ar| TCOV Ka06Xou- TauTa 8' EV
auTfj Tfcbs EOTI Trj yuxfi- (DA 417b 19-24)
47

816 vofjaai UEV ETT' OUTGO, OTTOTCCV fiouXr]Tai, aiaSdvEoSai 8' OUK ETT' auTcp-

dvayKatov y a p uTrdpXEiv TO aio0r|T6v. (DA 417b24-26)
48

TO

8' aia0riTiK6v 8uvd|jEi EOTIV OTOV TO aia0r|T6v r]8r| EVTEXEXEICX, Ka0ctTfEp

etprrrai. Trdaxei uev ouv oux onoiov 6v, TTETTOVOOS 8' couoicoTcci Kai EOTIV OTOV
EKEIVO.
49

(DA 418a3-6)

See Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," in Philosophical Review 70

(October 1961): especially page 474; see also Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul in
Aristotle", in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 49 (January
1974) and Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's
Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima eds. M. Nussbaum and
A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
50

Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," in Philosophical Review 70

(October 1961): 472.
51

Slakey (1961): 474.

52

Daniel N. Robinson, Aristotle's Psychology, (New York: Columbia University Press,

1989): 65.
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55

Robinson (1989): 65.

54

Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul in Aristotle" in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal

Institute of Philosophy 49 (January 1974): 53.
55

See Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of

Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A new Look at
Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-178;
and Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
56

Sorabji (1992): 209.

57

See Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 3.

58

J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981): 66.

59

Ackrill(1981):66.

60

Ackrill (1981): 67.

61

Ackrill (1981): 67.

62

Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind," in Essays on

Aristotle's De Anima. eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992): 36. (I have excluded a note in parentheses that states, "the next section will show
that Putnam now dissociates himself from functionalism for reasons that bring him even
closer to Aristotle".)
63

Nussbaum and Putnam (1992): 36.

64

Nussbaum and Putnam (1992): 36-37.

65

Nussbaum and Putnam (1992): 37.

135

See T. H. Irwin, "Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind," in Psychology: Companions to
Ancient Thought Vol. 2, Stephan Everson ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1991), and S.
Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima,
eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
67

TOU

5E
68

69

8' aia0r|TiKOu f| nev TrpcoTri UETa(3oAf] yiveTOu UTTO TOU yevvcovToj, o r a v

yEvvri8rj, E'XEI f\br\, cocnrEp ETTiaTTiuriv, Kai TO aia6dvEa8ai. (DA 417M6-18)
TO KCXT'

EvspyEtav 8e 6|ao(cos Xeyexai TCO 9ecopeTv. (DA 417M9)

aio0r|ais EOTI TO BEKTIKOV TCOV aioBriTcbv EI8COV CXVEU Tfjj uXris. (DA 424al8-19)
Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active

Intellect, with an Appendix Concerning the Activity of Aristotle's God, Rolf George trans.
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1977): 54.
71

Brentano (1977): 54.

72

Burnyeat (2002): 65.

73

Brentano (1977): 54-55.

74

This Shute should not to be mistaken for Richard Shute, author of On the History of the

Process by Which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their Present Form (1888).
75

Clarence Shute, The Psychology of Aristotle: An Analysis of the Living Being (New

York: Russell and Russell, 1964): 86.
76

Shute (1964): 86.

77

Shute (1964): 86.

78

Jonathan Barnes "Aristotle's Concept of Mind," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 72 (1972): 38.
136

/y

Barnes (1972): 36.

80

Barnes (1972): 38.

81

Both quotes are from Micheal Esfeld, "Aristotle's Direct Realism in De Anima," in

Review of Metaphysics 54 no. 2 (December 2000): 330.
82

Esfeld (2000): 334.

83

Hippocrates Apostle, Aristotle's On The Soul, (Grinnell: Peripatetic Press, 1981): 115,

note 28.
84

Apostle (1981): 113, note 17.

85

Apostle (1981): 130, note 1.

Q£

See D.Z. Andriopoulos, "Aristotle on Perception," in Philosophical Inquiry:
International Quarterly 15 no. 3-4 (Summer-Fall 1993): 85-98, and Aysel Dogan,
"Aristotle on Conceptual Awareness of Sensory Experiences," in Philosophical Inquiry:
International Quarterly 26 no. 4 (Fall 2004): 27-44.
87

Myles Burnyeat, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)" in

Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992): 19.
88

Burnyeat [1992): 22.

89

Burnyeat (1992): 19. Burnyeat is led by this sentiment to argue that because this

notion of matter is incompatible with the sort that has evolved in response to the
metaphysical and epistemological problems arising out of the Cartesian model of the
mind/body, Burnyeat concludes that Aristotle's theory of aisthesis is not credible.

137

TToAAcci TE y a p ai auvOEGEis TCOV u.Epcov Kai TroAAaxcos- Tivos ouv f\ TTCOS
uTroAa(Mv TOV VOUV XPH ouvSeaiv eTvai, rj KCCI TO aiaGriTiKov r\ 6PEKTIK6V;6|JO(OOS
dTOTrov Kai TO TOV Aoyov Tfis UI^ECOS sTvai TT]V yuxnv- ou y a p TOV ai/Tov EXEI

8E

Aoyov fi ui^is TCOV OTOIXEIOOV Ka0' rjv a a p £ Kai Ka0' r)v OOTOUV. aun(3r|aETai ouv
TToAAds TE y u x d s E'XEIV Kai KOTO Trav TO acona, EITTEP TrdvTa UEV EK TCOV
OToixeicov HEiaiyiaevcov, 6 8E Tfjs U(£ECOS Aoyos dpuovia Kai v^uxn- (DA 408al 1-18)
91

E'XEI

5' OUTCOS COOT' EI UEV 5i' EV05 TTAE(CO aia0r)Td ETEpa OVTO dAAiiAcov Top

yevEi, dvdyKri TOV E'XOVTO TO TOIOUTOV aia0rpT|piov dy.q>oTv aia0r|TiK6v sTvai
(oTov EI E£ dEpog EOTI TO aia6r)TTipiov, Kai EOTIV 6 drip Kai yocpou Kai xpdag), EI
8E TTAE(CO TOU

TO

KOtl

OTIP

Kai

uScop (du.9co y a p 8ia<pavfj), Kai 6

ETEpov auT&bv E'XCOV |i6vov aiaOTiaETai TOU 81' djjcpoTv, TCOV 8E a n ACOV EK 8UO

TOUTCOV
92

auTou, oTov x P o a 5

aia8riTr|pia novov EOTIV. (DA 424b22-425a3)

aio8riais EOTI TO 8EKTIKOV TCOV aia6r|Tcbv E'ISCOV dvEU Tfjs OAris. (DA 424al8-19)

It is interesting to note that in his translation of this passage, Smith seems to make
explicit the sense that sensation involves a process whereby the sensible qualities are
internalized where the text is not necessarily read in such a way.
93

UTT'

auTou MEV ouv TOU opcouEvou xpcouaTos d 8 u v a T o v AsiTTETai 8r) UTTO TOU

H£Ta£u, COOT' dvayKaTov TI sTvai UETO^U- (DA 419al8-20)
94

One might even extrapolate from the preceding analysis that, without its matter, the

form of an object is its activity.
138

Biacpepei Se, 6TI TOU \ikv TO Troir)TiKa rf\s Evspyslas e^co8ev, TO opaTov Kai TO
dtKouarou, oiaoicos 8E Kai T O Xoura TCOV aia0r]Tcbv. aiTiov 8' OTI TCOV KO0'
EKaaTov f| KOT' Evepyeiav aio0r|ois, fi 8' ETrioTrnar) TCOV KCC06XOU- T a u i a 8' EV
auTfj Trco5 EOTI Trj yuxfl- {DA 417b 19-24)
96

816 vofjaai uiv ETT' OUTGO, OTroTav (3ouXr)Tai, aiaGdveaSai 8' OUK eir' auTcp-

dvayKaTov y a p UTrdpxEiv TO aia0r)Tov. {DA 417b24-26)
97

98

This is a prejudice that is likely an artifact of the prevailing physicalist paradigm.
"OTI

8' OUK ECTTIV aioQr\ais ETEpa Trocpd TOCJ TTEVTE (Xsyco 8E TOUTOS oyiv,

OCKOTIV, oocpprioiv,
99

COOT' EI HEV 8i'

TOV
100

ysuoiv, d(pr|v), EK TCOV8E TTIOTEUOEIEV dv TI$. (DA 424b22-24)

EV05 TTXEICO aia0r|Td ETEpa OVTOC dXXr)Xcov Tcp yivsi, dvdyKri

s'xovTa TO TOIOUTOV aia6r|Tr]piov du.cpoTv aia8r)TiK6v ETVOI. (DA 424b31-33)

EI 8E TTXE{CO TOU

auTou, oTov XP° a S

Kai

"HP

Kai

u8cop (du.9co y a p 8ia9avrj),

Kai 6 TO ETEpov auTcov E'XCOV uovov aia6riaETai TOU 81' ducpoTv. (DA 424b34425a3)
101

'ETTEI

8' aio0av6iiE0a OTI 6pco|i£v Kai dKouo|j£v, dvdyKr] r] TT) oysi

aia0dvEO0ai OTI o p a , r] ETEpa. (DA 425b 12-13)
102

Brentano(1977):58.

103

Brentano (1977): 63-64.

104

'ETTEI 8' aio0av6nE0a OTI 6pcby.EV Kai OKOUOUEV, dvdyKri r\ Trj O^EI

aia0dv£a0ai OTI o p a , r] ETEpa. aXX' fi auTr) Ecrrai TTJS oyEcog Kai TOU
139

UTTOKEIUEVOU XPCOUCCTOS, COOTE f] 8uO TOU aUTOU EOOVTai f\ CXVTT] ai/TfJS. ETl 5' El

Kai ETepa Eirj r\ Trjs oyecos aiaGriaij, r] E15 diTEipov ETOIV f\ auTr) TI$ ecrrai auT%COOT' ETTl TfJS TTpCOTTlS TOUTO TTOir)TEOV. (DA 425bl2-17)
105

106

TOC

y a p TOICCGTCC OUSEHIOIS EOTIV 181a, dXXd Koivd Trdaaij. (DA 418al9-20)

TauTcc y a p n a v T a [Kivriasi] aio6avouE0a, oTov uEyE0o$ KIVTIOEI (COOTE Kai

axfjiaa- nEyE0o$ y a p TI TO axrjua), TO 8' fipEiaoOv TCO [XT\ KtvElaBai, 6 8' dpi0nos
Trj dTTocpdoEi TOU OUVEXOOS, <a\ T0T5 '181015 (EKaaTTi y a p EV aia0dvETai aiaGriois)(DA 425al6-20)
107

Shute (1964): 99.

108

Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Process: Aristotle's Theory of

Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 197. I have added the digits in square brackets
for the sake of the point I am about to make.
109

TO 8' dXXr|Xcov 181a KaTd aun(3E(3r|K6$ aiaSdvovTai ai aia0r|aEis, oux f\

ai/Tai, dXX' fj uia, oTav a\ia ysvriTai n aio0riois ETTI TOU auToO, otov x ° ^ n s 6 T I
TfiKpd Kai £av0r) (ou y a p 8r] ETEpag yE TO E'ITTETV OTI diacpco EV)- 816 Kai
dTraTaTai, Kai £dv rj E,avQ6v, xoXnv OIETOI slvai. (DA 425a30-425b4)
110

TTEpi HEV o u v Tris dpxrJS ?} cpanev T O ^cpov cciaBriTiKov elvai, Sicop(o6co TOV

Tporrov TOUTOV. (DA 427al4-16)
ni

Caston(1996):22.

140

cpavTaoia y a p ETEpov Kai aia0r|aEcos Kai 8iavoias, ai/Tti TE OU yiyvETai OCVEU
aia9riaEcos, Kai dvsu TOUTTIS OUK EOTIV UTTOXTI^IS. OTI 5' OUK EOTIV f] auTri
[voriais] Kai UTToXriyis, cpavEpov. (DA 427b 14-17)
113

Lloyd Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima," Phronesis: A Journal

of Ancient Philosophy 49, no. 4 (2004): 354. Gerson cites 403a9 and 432al6-17 in
support of his reading.
114

TOU uopiou TOU xfis yuxfis co yivcooKEi TE fi yuxn Kai cppovsT. (DA 429al0-ll)

115

m p i 8E TOU VOETV, ETTEI ETEpov TOU aio0dvEo0ai, TOUTOU 8E TO uiv cpavTaoia

BOKET ETVOI TO 8E
116

uTf6Xr)vf IS. (DA 427b27-29)

Trpo omadTcov y a p EOTI TI Troir|oao0ai, COOTTEP oi EV TOT$ iavr)u.oviKoTs

TIBEUEVOI
117

Kai EiBcoXoTfoiouvTES. (DA 427bl8-20)

KaTa 8E TT)V 9 a v T a a i a v cboauTcog E'XOUEV COOTTEP av E'I 6ECOU.EVOI EV ypaq>f) Ta

BEIVO

ri 0appaXea. (DA 427b23-24)

118

Caston(1996):22.

119

si 8rj EOTIV fi cpavTaoia Ka0' fiv XsyoiiEV cpdvTaaud TI TIMTV yiyvEoOai Kai nf] E'I

TI

KaTa u.ETacpopdv Xsyoiaev, < a p a > |a(a TIS EOTI TOUTCOV 8uva|ii$ r] k'^15 Ka9' a ;

KpIvouEV Kai dXri0Euo|i£v f\ y£u86|jE0a;ToiauTai 8' EIGIV aTo0r|ais, 86i§a,
ETTiaTrmri, V0O5. (DA 428al-5)
120

TCOV 8E

0ripicov OU0EVI uirapxEi TROTIS, cpavTaoia 8E TTOXXOTS. (DA 428a21-22)
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zn
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TO KCCT'

Evepyeiav 8E oiaoicoj XEyETai TCO SECOPETV. (DA 417bl9)

Kcu TauTriv 6(joiav dvdyKri elvai TTJ aiaOriaEi, Eir) dv CIUTTI fi Ki'vriais OUTE dveu

aiaBrjaEcos EVSEXOMEVTI OUTE \xf] aiaSavonsvois uTrdpxEiv, KCCI TTOXXCC KOCT' auTr)V
KCCI TTOIETV

Kai TrdaxEiv TO E'XOV, KCCI ETVOCI KCCI dXr|0fi KCCI vyEuSfj. (DA 428bl0-17)
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Spiegelberg(1981):4.

134

Brentano(1995):88.
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It is this second facet of psychological states that Husserl seeks to bracket in the

performance of reduction and the systematic of doing so defines his phenomenological
method. It would be a grave misunderstanding of Husserl's science to construe his
notion of intentionality, as does Spiegelberg, as "the mere directedness toward the willed
object" for to do so is to undermine the work of the methodology Husserl prescribes. The
"mere directedness toward the willed object" may indeed be the ultimate object of
phenomenological investigation, however, it is not revealed, says Husserl, until the final
and controversial phenomenological reduction is performed.
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8E

ETI 8E OTCCV

|i£v 8o£daco|j£v BEIVOV TI f\ (po^Epov, EU0US aunTrdaxonEV, 6|ao(cos

Kav 8appaXEOv- KctTa 8E TT\V cpavTaaiav cbaauTcos EXOUEV cbcrrrEp dv E'I

GECOHEVOI EV ypacprj TO: 8EIVCC X\

GappaXsa. (DA 427b21-24)

Recall that it is with this distinction that Brentano fixes the boundary between the real
and the non-real.
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Brentano (1995): 10.
Brentano (1995): 92.
5io ou KccAcbs E'XEI Aeysiv TO (ppovouv, 6TCCV 9povrj, dXXoiouo8ai. (DA 417b8-9)
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PART III - NOUS

Chapter 7.

THE FIRST ACTUALITY OF NOUS

Introduction
Up to this point we have spoken of "nous" in Aristotle in a way that may lead the reader
to believe that the term refers to a single concept that is found in discussions of a single
subject matter—namely, psychology. In fact the term is implicated in discussions
throughout Aristotle's corpus in the varying contexts of psychology, ethics, cosmology,
to name just a few. For this reason it is important that I explicitly define the scope of the
forthcoming conversation concerning nous to the domain of psychology. The present
chapter and the next will address the following two questions respectively:
(1) How are we to properly understand the manner according to which the intellectual
faculties, referred to in the context of DA by the term "nous", are manifest in the
thinking subject? In other words, what constitutes the first actuality of nous in
Aristotle's psychology?
(2) How are we to properly understand the functioning of the intellectual faculties,
i.e., to explain what, according to Aristotle, the activity of thinking involves? In
other words, what constitutes the second actuality of nous in Aristotle's
psychology?

By limiting the scope of the discussion upon these two questions we are able to focus our
attentions primarily upon occurrences of the term "nous" in DA as opposed to those
found in GA, Metaphys., NE, and elsewhere.
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Like aisthesis, nous is identified throughout DA as one of the vital powers of the
soul. This means that, as in the case of aisthesis, the definition of the soul at the outset of
DA II as "an actuality of the first kind [entelecheia heprote] of a natural body having life
potentially in it" {DA 412a27-412bl)1 bares a certain significance to nous. Nous too is,
according to this definition, subject to a first and a second actualization whereby the
intellectual powers are first instantiated in the potentially thinking subject, and second
activated through some process that results in actual thought. This chapter will treat the
first mode of the actualization of nous and will illustrate how the first actuality of nous,
that is, the instantiation of the intellectual powers, differs significantly from the
instantiation of the sensual powers.

§ 1.

De Anima /

Aristotle's treatment of aisthesis is, for the most part, contained within the later chapters
of DA II. Aristotle's treatment ofnous, however, is prefaced by numerous preliminary
statements that are scattered throughout the treatise. These statements aim at preparing
his reader for the unique challenges presented by nous and thought. It is important that
we review these comments and to consider them in relation to Aristotle's distinction
between first and second actualities even though many of the statements are made before
Aristotle makes this distinction explicit.
The first such comment is found in the introductory chapter of DA:
A further problem presented by the affections of soul is
this: are they all affections of the complex of body and
soul, or is there anyone among them peculiar to the soul by
itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we
consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in
which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving
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the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation
generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but
if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be
impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a
condition of its existence. (DA 403a3-10)2
Here Aristotle suggests that the first actuality of intellect might not involve a change in a
body or an otherwise material manifestation, and so it might be an affection "peculiar to
the soul by itself." In his commentary, Apostle clarifies what it means to be an affection
peculiar to the soul. He writes, "[a]n attribute [or affection] proper to the soul would be a
property of the soul not requiring a body for existence."3 That said, Apostle continues, if
such an attribute could be identified, Aristotle could conclude that the soul is separable
from the body.4 Contrary to the position that the soul is separable from the body, Apostle
is quick to argue that if thinking presupposes sensation or imagination, then nous cannot
be peculiar to the soul. This position, however, is specious, for it conflates the first and
second actualities of nous. Apostle suggests that if the activity of nous, that is, its second
actuality, presupposes the second actuality of aisthesis and/or phantasia, then the first
actuality of nous must involve the body. This is clearly a faulty inference given that
nothing, as of yet, dictates that the first actuality of nous is in any way contingent upon
those additional conditions that might be required before the second actuality of nous
comes to fruition. Again, at this early point in the treatise the distinction between first
and second actualities has not yet been made explicit. For this reason, we must refrain
from concluding anything concrete with respect to the first and second actualities oinous
and be satisfied to read the passage as an allusion to a significant problem not yet
addressed.
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Similarly, Brentano reads doctrine into the early portions of DA prematurely:
These passages include DA 1 1 : "of these some [properties of the soul] are taught to be
affections proper to the soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal
owing to the presence within it of soul." (DA 402a9-10)5; DA I 3: "It is a mistake to say
that the soul is a spatial magnitude" (DA 407a2-3)6; and DA I 5:
we should expect each part of the soul to hold together a
part of the body. But this seems an impossibility; it is
difficult even to imagine what sort of bodily part mind
[nous] will hold together, or how it will do this. (DA
411M4-19) 7
Brentano reads these passages as indicative of certain exigency of thought, namely, that
the part of the soul that is responsible for intellectual activity must be unmixed, because
"if it were mixed with the body it would have certain physical properties that would make
it incapable of apprehending the contrary forms; it would be warm or cold, and would in
one case be prevented from knowing cold, in the other, from knowing warmth."8 This
may indeed turn out to be the case, however, this early in the treatise, neither Brentano
nor Aristotle is in a position to defend doctrine. It is significant, though, that Brentano
refers here to comments Aristotle made earlier (in DA I 2) concerning Anaxagoras and
his treatment of nous and soul (psyche).
Of Anaxagoras, Aristotle tells us that he
distinguishes] between soul [psyche] and thought [noun],
but in practice he treats them as a single substance, except
that it is thought that he specially posits as the principle of
all things; at any rate what he says is that thought of all that
is is simple unmixed, and pure. He assigns both
characteristics, knowing and origination of movement, to
the same principle when he says that it was thought that set
the whole in movement. (DA 405al3-19) 9
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Aristotle's only criticism of this view is that Anaxagoras fails to distinguish clearly
between "soul" (psyche), and "mind" (nous) and to clarify their specific role in his
ontology. (DA 404M-6 and 405al4-18) 10 For the present purposes it is sufficient to note
that Brentano's reading suggests agreement between Aristotle and Anaxagoras regarding
the nature of nous, and that this nature is intimately connected with the exigencies of its
function.
According to Gerson too, the attributes of nous identified here, and again in DA I
4, represent Aristotle's earliest descriptions of nous. Intellect is said to be a "sort of
substance," that it "comes to be in us," that it is "indestructible" (aphthitos), and that it is
"unaffected" (apathes).n This claim deserves some merit given that, as we shall see,
these same attributes are attributed to nous at various points throughout DA.

§ 2.

De Anima //

As we have already noted, the definition of soul at DA II 1—"an actuality of the first kind
[entelecheia heprote] of a natural body having life potentially in it" (DA 412a27412bl) 12 —is as relevant to nous as it is to aisthesis, for it specifies that soul is the first
actuality of the vital powers. Thought being one of the vital powers, this definition
connects nous to the distinction Aristotle makes in DA II 5 between first and second
actualities.
Aside from these general statements about the soul only two other comments are
made in DA II that are directly relevant to the first actuality of nous. (Certain other
comments that are relevant to the second actuality of nous will be examined in the
following chapter.) In a passage reminiscent of the comments from DA I quoted above,
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Aristotle states: "We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems
to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable;
it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers." (DA 413b2429)13 According to Apostle, this passage stipulates that "intellect seems to differ from the
other kinds of soul in genus and not in species; for it is indestructible, which differs
generically from what is destructible."14 The other kinds of soul Apostle refers to here
are the nutritive and/or the sensual—as opposed to the intellectual. Apostle rightly points
out that this passage is not a definitive statement of doctrine and that "the word 'seems'
in the text indicates that the problem has not yet been solved."15 The taxonomy of souls
Apostle alludes to is one that Aristotle introduces in DA II2 and elaborates in DA II3.
Of intellectual souls Aristotle writes:
Lastly, certain living beings—a small minority—possess
calculation [logismon] and thought [dianoian], for (among
mortal beings) those which possess calculation have all the
other powers above mentioned, while the converse does not
hold-indeed some live by imagination alone, while others
have not even imagination. The mind that knows with
immediate intuition presents a different problem. (DA
415a7-12)16
Given that Aristotle here stipulates that calculation and thought are not found without the
nutritive or sensual faculties, one might be led to conclude, contra DA 413b24-29, that
nous is not separable from the other affections of the soul. That said, the passage says
nothing about nous specifically or explicitly and, again, such a conclusion might entail an
equivocation of the first and second actualities of nous, for at this point nothing definitive
has yet been stipulated with regard to the first actuality of nous nor the precondition for
its activity. It is not until DA III 4 that the connections between the first and second
actualities of nous begin to emerge.
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§3.

DeAnima /// 4

Aristotle's discussion of nous proper begins at DA III 4:
Turning now to the part of the soul with which the
soul knows and thinks (whether this is separable from the
others in definition only, or spatially as well) we have to
inquire (1) what differentiates this part, and (2) how
thinking can take place. (DA 429al0-13) 17
With this passage Aristotle demarcates the two general concerns with regard to nous that
inform the present part of our investigation: (1) concerns the first actuality of nous and is
the primary focus of DA III 4 and 5. (2) Concerns the activity of nous, its second
actuality, and is the primary focus of DA III 6 and 7. Commentators tend to lose sight of
this subtlety; first, because the two matters are intimately related, as Aristotle has warned
throughout the treatise, and second, because Aristotle's discussions in DA III 4 and 5 do
oscillate between the two issues.
With particular regard to (1) specifically, having characterized thinking as an
activity that is, in some way, similar to sensing, Aristotle claims that:
The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while
impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that
is, must be potentially identical in character with its object
without being the object. Mind must be related to what is
thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible. (DA 429al5-18) 18
Here Aristotle is ostensibly characterizing the activity of thinking, however, he does so
with the clear intention of drawing from this characterization certain conclusions with
regard to the first actuality of nous:
Therefore, since everything is a possible object of
thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate
[krate], that is, to know [gnorize], must be pure from all
admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature
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is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the

sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that
of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is
called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks
and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.
For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended
with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g.
warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive
faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the
soul 'the place of forms', though (1) this description holds
only of the intellective soul, and (2) even this is the forms
only potentially, not actually. (DA 429al8-29) 19
In this passage Aristotle introduces what has come to be known as the "passive intellect".
This is to be distinguished from the "active intellect" introduced later in DA III 5. For the
time being it is sufficient to understand that Aristotle is often said to bifurcate nous into
the passive and the active. Because Aristotle here defines the intellect as something with
"no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity", it is believed that he is
here distinguishing a passive faculty. Brentano, for example, argues that for Aristotle
thought is an affection and that he is here describing a faculty that receives intelligible
forms. This faculty must be construed as pure potentiality, thereby necessitating an
active principle that is yet to be defined.20
This reading seems to coincide with these later comments:
Once the mind has become each set of its possible
objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used of
one who is actually a man of science (this happens when he
is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its
condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense
from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of
knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then
able to think itself. (DA 429b5-9)21
Here Aristotle speaks of an intellect that becomes its objects in a way suggestive of a
certain passivity. Aristotle also reiterates the distinction he made at the outset of his
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discussion concerning aisthesis in DA II 5 when he says that having become a man of
science his "condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the
potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery."
Caston, too, maintains that the intellect spoken of here is distinct from that which we will
find later in DA III 5. The difference between Caston's view and that of Brentano is, as
we shall see, that Caston identifies the intellect discussed here in DA III 4 with the
common human sort of intellect, whereas the intellect of DA III 5 he identifies with the
divine.22
One of the major difficulties with reading these passages as identifying a distinct
passive intellectual faculty is that Aristotle prefaces this characterization of nous by
saying that "mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate [krate], that is, to know
[gnorize]" must be unmixed. The notion that intellect is defined by its passivity seems to
run contrary to this assertion. It is clear that Aristotle has precluded the possibility that
nous is receptive to its object in the same way that aisthesis is—that is, as a function of
the actualization of a state of qualitative neutrality—for even a state of qualitative
neutrality would constitute a sort of nature and, according to Aristotle, a hindrance to its
intellectual potential. Gerson offers a similar reading.
Gerson reads DA 429b5-9 as an argument, on Aristotle's part, that intellect must
be non-bodily. This is because if intellect were to be bodily, then it too must have form.23
The actualization of form in the material constituents of this hypothetical bodily intellect
would mean that the potency of intellect is limited. In a manner of speaking, the
maximum potency of our hypothetical bodily intellect would be equal to infinite potency
less the 'volume' of potency expended in the actualization of its bodily form. This is
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unacceptable to Aristotle because such a limitation itself entails the possibility for
something to transcend intellect. This would be contrary to Aristotle's insistence that
nothing is beyond the scope of what intellect is capable of thinking. This too, explains
why the intellect is unmixed (amige) and unaffected (apathes). Both implicate form in
some way: to be mixed suggests impurity in form; to be affected means to have been, or
to be susceptible to, change in form.
Gerson's analysis suggests that "immaterial", "unmixed", "unaffected", and
"separable" all seem to be, in some way, synonymous with the essence Aristotle seeks to
articulate. DA III 4 offers one further argument for the separability of nous from the
body:
Again in the case of abstract objects what is straight
is analogous to what is snub-nosed; for it necessarily
implies a continuum as its matter: its constitutive essence is
different, if we may distinguish between straightness and
what is straight: let us take it to be two-ness. It must be
apprehended, therefore, by a different power or by the same
power in a different state. To sum up, in so far as the
realities it knows are capable of being separated from their
matter, so it is also with the powers of mind. (DA 429b1822)24
Aristotle's argument here seems to rest upon the idea that because the objects of the
intellect—that is, the things the intellect comes to know—are separable from the matter
in which they are manifest, so too must the intellect be separable from its body. The
remainder of DA III 4 addresses a certain aporia that may arise out of Aristotle's
treatment of nous, one that implies a certain skepticism with regard to our capacity to
have knowledge concerning the intellect.
DA 429b 18-22 is, however, a point of departure for Brentano's treatment of nous.
Brentano begins his treatment by explaining what he takes to be Aristotle's reasons for
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positing a cognitive capacity over and above our sensory capacities. Brentano's reading
claims that although our senses are receptive of colours and scents and all of the other
objects of sense they are not receptive of the notion of colour or scent in general. Nor are
our senses sensitive to concepts such as number or substance. Because we do indeed
possess information of this sort, there must be some faculty capable of receiving and
processing it.25 On the other hand, our sensory and intellectual faculties are similar in
many respects: Both faculties discriminate, both distinguish things, and both direct our
desires and actions.26 Given these similarities we must also suppose that intellect "is
without affection, but capable of receiving the intelligible forms, just as sense is capable
of receiving the sensible forms."27 According to Brentano it is our capacity to have and
manipulate concepts and not merely our capacity to sense the qualities of things that
compels Aristotle to conceive of intellect as a distinct faculty. This suggestion is
reinforced by Aristotle's characterization of the soul as the "place of the forms" at DA
429a27-29.
Brentano also reads DA III 4 as stipulating that the intellectual part of the soul is
immaterial. Brentano says, "He [Aristotle] agrees with Plato in taking the intellectual
soul for something spiritual.. .the intellect is for him a faculty of the soul alone, not a
faculty of the ensouled body, and he holds its acts to be activities purely of the soul."28 In
defense of this position Brentano makes reference to no less than twenty-two separate
passages scattered throughout DA and numerous others from Metaph., NE, DS, Parts, and
GC.29 Brentano argues that "if it [nous] were mixed with the body it would have certain
physical properties that would make it incapable of apprehending the contrary forms; it
would be warm or cold, and would in one case be prevented from knowing cold, in the
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other, from knowing warmth."30 We will see similar analysis invoking the exigencies of
thought later in Gerson's treatment of nous. Gerson's reading of DA III 4, however,
cannot be separated from his reading of DA III 5.

§4.

DeAnima///5

DA III 5 is perhaps the most esoteric and contentious piece of text in the entire
Aristotelian corpus. It is here that Aristotle makes his sole explicit reference to the socalled "active intellect" mentioned previously. I quote DA III 5 here in its entirety:
Since in every class of things, as in nature as a
whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is
potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a
cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them
all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its
material), these distinct elements must likewise be found
within the soul.
And in fact mind as we have described it is what it
is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another
which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a
sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes
potential colours into actual colours. Mind in this sense of
it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its
essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to
the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which
it forms).
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the
individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual
knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior
even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at
another not. When mind is set free from its present
conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more:
this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however,
remember its former activity because, while mind in this
sense is impassible, mind as passive [ho de pathetikos
nous] is destructible), and without it nothing thinks. {DA
430al0-25) 31
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Here we see a reiteration of the attributes inherited from Anaxagoras—"separable,
impassible, unmixed"—and an explicit reference to "mind as passive".
Generally speaking, modern scholars recognize four basic strategies for the
approach to the first actuality of nous:
(1) The first, maintain a distinction between the passive bodily intellect and the active
intellect that is separable (as opposed to separate) from the knowing subject yet able
to effect the actualization of knowledge in the subject.32
(2) The second strategy is to introduce certain innovations into the interpretation of the
phrase "full actuality" with regard to nous.3i
(3) A third strategy is to disregard DA III 5 altogether as a hiccup in Aristotle's otherwise
conventional naturalism. This is what I will call the divine substance/"Platonic
holdover" strategy, as those who adopt this strategy often describe the active intellect
in one or both of these ways.34
(4) The fourth strategy interprets the active and the passive intellects as two aspects of a
single intellect.35
The remainder of this section will review each of these approaches by offering precis of
its prominent modern proponents.

§ 4.1.

INTELLECT QUA SEPARABLE VS. SEPARATE

The controversy concerning the proper interpretation of nous re-emerges in the modern
era in a polemic between Eduard Zeller and Franz Brentano.36 Zeller follows Alexander
(second century AD) and Pompanazzi (early sixteenth century AD) in his interpretation
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of the nature of the soul and its composite parts. In his Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics (1897),37 he writes:
As he came to conceive of body and soul as essentially
united, and to define the soul as the entelechy of the body,
and as, further, he became convinced that every soul
requires its own proper organ, and must remain wholly
inoperative without it, he was necessarily led, not only to
regard the pilgrimage of the soul in the other world as a
myth, but also to question the doctrines of pre-existence
and immortality as they were held by Plato. Inasmuch as
the soul is dependent upon the body for its existence and
activity, it must come into existence and perish with it.38
Brentano's response to this position in his The Psychology of Aristotle (1867) sparked a
polemic between the two scholars the central issue of which was the proper interpretation
of nous?9
Brentano's interpretation of DA III 5 begins with a summary of the conclusions
Aristotle has already reached by this point in the treatise. According to Brentano, one of
these conclusions is that "Aristotle's theory of knowledge leaves no room for a second
faculty of intellectual cognition in man. But they [past interpreters] have shown us at the
same time the need for another mental power without which our thinking would be as
little possible as an effect without a cause."40 Furthermore,
this power cannot immediately generate thoughts in our
intellect, because, firstly, this would dissolve the
connection that exists between sensory representation and
concept; and secondly, because the intellectual part would
have to think continually; and finally, because, as in the
sensitive part so also in the intellectual, the influence that
makes it into something that actually thinks must initially
come from some other thing.41

159

In other words, the realization of intelligible form can only be effected by a power that is
distinct from, yet similar to, the sensory apparatus of the subject and occupied with
perpetual activity.
The active intellect plays that role in Brentano's reading of Aristotle's
psychology. As we have already seen, according to Brentano's reading, DA III 4
establishes that thought is an affection and that there is a certain faculty that receives
intelligible forms. Accordingly, that faculty must be construed as pure potentiality
necessitating the evocation of an active principle.42 Brentano reads the opening passage
of DA III 5 as a reiteration of the principle that necessitates the postulation of the active
intellect and, in so doing, links the passive to the active intellect.43 This principle
stipulates that wherever there is change there is matter that receives the change and an
active principle that affects the change, likewise in thought.44
Furthermore, Brentano takes 430a 10 as stipulating that this active principle must
be something that is in the soul.45 The active intellect is, as Aristotle claims, separable
from the passive intellect. However, as Brentano reads it, it is so only in an abstract
way—that is, the active intellect is separable from the passive in thought but not in
being.46 Brentano believes that this unity is reinforced by Aristotle's use of the term
'hexis' to describe the condition of the active intellect—namely, its persistence as pure
actuality—in the subject. Regardless of the scope of applications for which 'hexis' might
be employed, Brentano tells us that "it can be used only for forms that are in a subject,
whether they be substantial forms of a corporeal matter, or accidental forms, but never for
a pure substantial actuality."47 This analysis influences Brentano's reading of 408b 18
where Aristotle suggests that nous seems to enter the subject from without like a sort of
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substance. It also leads him to conclude that the active intellect cannot be identified with
the divine.
Despite this rejection of a divine characterization of the active intellect Brentano
proceeds to make comments that detract from its weight by suggesting that, in the present
discussions, Aristotle is, in fact, employing multiple senses of the term "nous". Brentano
writes:
Aristotle likes to use one and the same word in many
different senses... Aristotle also uses the expression nous in
several senses... But it is no accident that the different
meanings are designated by the same word; rather, they
have a certain connection with each other, and for the nous
poietikos this connection can be made clear in two ways. It
can be explained on the basis of the fact that the nous
poietikos belongs to the intellectual part of the soul... We
have seen above that in some passages where Aristotle
speaks of the faculty of desire he calls it nous as well, and it
is not improbable that he did so because the will belongs to
the intellectual part and is united with the intellect in the
same subject.48
Brentano, then, reads DA III 5 as presenting one of a number of senses in which the term
"nous" is used. The inference being that DA is comprised of a number of discreet
discussions of "nous" each of which is separable, that is, distinguishable, in the abstract.
In DA III 5, says Brentano, "nous" is used to describe that aspect of intellectual activity
that represents the active principle, a principle that is required by Aristotle's ontology in
general.

§ 4.2.

INTELLECT QUA DEGREES OF ACTUALITY

Wedin's analysis of DA III 5 begins with a comment on the common translation of nous
poietikos, "the standard translation of 'nous poietikos'' as 'active mind' is, I suggest, off
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the mark doctrinally as well as linguistically (here 'creative mind' fares much better)."49
And so, Wedin distinguishes between the creative or productive mind on the one hand
and the receptive mind on the other. The difference, however, is not a difference between
one discrete part and another. It is, rather, a distinction between moments of the selfsame
subject. Wedin writes, "the expression 'nous duname? gives us a way of talking about
what a subject is capable of, noetically speaking."50 What Wedin here refers to as
"receptive mind", what is more commonly referred to as the affected intellect (nous
pathetikos), is reduced to a state of the cognitive apparatus of the physical material
subject. Further, "Receptive and productive minds are mechanisms rung in to explain
how that capability is exercised."51 Accordingly, productive mind, what is more
commonly referred to as the active intellect (nous poietikos), represents the cognitive
apparatus of the physical material subject engaged in its proper activity. Here we see
how Wedin, as a representative of a particular tradition, posits varying degrees of
actuality to escape from certain interpretive difficulties presented by nous in DA. The
productive and the receptive minds become, in Wedin's own words, "lower-level
subsystems" of the physical material organism, each represent varying modes of
actuality.
Wedin's interpretation of DA III 5 shares certain affinities with Brentano's in that
they both interpret nous in a way that maintains an abstract distinction between passive
and active nous. Wedin's reading is to be distinguished by his serialization of the two as
moments in a singular process through which the actualization of nous occurs. Wedin's
reading is problematic, however, because of the implicit priority (temporal) it gives to
passive nous over active nous. Wedin's reading suggests that passive nous precedes the
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active contrary to Aristotle's explicit stipulations to the contrary, not where he says that
"the active is superior to the passive factor", but where he tells us that without nous qua
active, nothing thinks.

§ 4.3.

INTELLECT QUA DIVINE SUBSTANCE

Victor Caston is a contemporary representative of what I have called the "dismissible
intellect/Platonic holdover" tradition. Traces of this approach to nous and to DA III 5 can
be found in Zeller (mentioned above), Pomponazzi, Avicenna, and Alexander of
Aphrodisias before him. In keeping with this tradition, Caston's thesis is that the socalled active intellect "is nothing but its essence, which is just actuality, and it functions
without interruption for eternity - characteristics ascribed only to God, who is unique."52
More specifically, Caston argues that the active intellect belongs to a species of divine
intellect distinct from the human species.
In his "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal" (1999) Caston writes:
"God moves our intellects as he moves the heavenly spheres, that is, 'as beloved': he
constitutes the complete actualization towards which all of our intellectual striving is
directed, in emulation of his perfect state."53 Further, "Aristotle regards such final
causation as an efficient cause, but not in a way that would make it part of what we would
call the causal processes or mechanisms of human psychology."54
Caston's analysis begins by noticing that the very proposition that there are two
intellects as opposed to a single intellect is an oddity in the treatment at large: although
Aristotle acknowledges that distinct sense objects (colour, taste, scents, etc.) correspond
to distinct sense organs, he clearly takes the capacity for sensation to be singular.55
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Similarly, Aristotle speaks of a variety of intellectual exercises—the understanding of
essences, propositions, calculations, etc.—which are presumably, says Caston, functions
of a single capacity.56 However, despite Aristotle's tendency to consolidate similar
activities under single capacities, at the end of DA III 5 he concludes that there are two
distinct intellects, one of which—the intellect that becomes all things—plays what is, in
Caston's opinion, a well delineated role in human cognitive activity, while the other—the
so-called active intellect—is enigmatically disenfranchised.57
Caston's interpretation that this second intellect is an intellect of a different sort
than that possessed by the human soul is based upon his analysis of the argument
structure of DA III 5. Caston argues that the opening passages of the chapter—where
Aristotle tells us that "Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two
factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class,
(2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all.. ."58—represent a
universal affirmative such that what is affirmed of natural things is also affirmed of souls
in general. Specifically, Caston argues that the "hosper" of 430al0 suggests that the 'en'
at 430a 10 and 430a 14 are to be understood in the taxonomical sense according to which a
thing is said to belong in a genus or species.59 Based upon this taxonomical reading we
can, says Caston, conclude that the genus of soul is comprised of two species, one
corresponding to matter Qiule) and another corresponding to activity (poietikori) or cause
(aitiori). This is so for the genus of soul just as it is the case for every genus of natural
things. This reading is, says Caston, further reinforced by what he takes to be
taxonomical language: Aristotle uses terms like 'genos' and idiaphora\ meaning 'kind'
or 'genus' and 'differentia' respectively.60
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Caston proceeds then to elaborate on the sense in which the divine active intellect
is separate (choristheis) from the human passive intellect. Referring to prior passages in
DA where Aristotle employs the aorist tense (specifically, 413b32 - 414a3, and 414a29 bl), Caston argues that the aorist conjugation of the verb "chorizein", meaning "to
separate", that occurs at 430a22 is not properly construed as referring to a temporal
moment. Instead, Caston reads "choristheis" as referring to a conceptual, specifically
taxonomical, sort of separation and not a moment of separation before which time the
intellects were somehow joined.61 Accordingly, Caston reads the concluding sentence of
DA III 5 as referring to the divine species of intellect that is made up of a single member.
Caston's last argument to support his reading of DA III 5 takes the form of a
comparison between characteristics attributed to the divine intellect in the chapter and
those attributed to God in Metaphys. XII 7 - 9 . Caston observes that each of the
following characteristics are attributed to God in Metaphys. XII 7 - 9 in a comparable
way:62 (1) separate (choristos, 430al7), (2) impassible {apathes, 430al8), (3) unmixed
{amiges, 430al8), (4) in its essence actuality (te ousia on energeia, 430al8), (5) more
honorable {timioteron, 430al8), (6) the same as the object of thought {to auto ... to
pragmati, 430a20), (7) prior in time to capacity in general {chrono protera ...olds,
430a21), (8) uninterruptedly thinking {ouch hote men voei hote d' ou noei, 430a22), (9)
solely what it is {monon touth' hoper esti, 430a22 - 23), (10) alone immortal and eternal
{monon athanaton kai aidion, 430a23), and finally, (11) the necessary condition of all
thought {aneu toutou outhen noei, 430a25). Based upon this comparison, the linguistic
analysis summarized above, and the analysis of Aristotle's argumentative form, Caston
claims that "the only reasonable conclusion is that the second intellect and the Divine
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Intellect are identical."63 Based upon these premises Caston modestly proposes that the
active intellect is divine intellect and the final cause of all intellectual activity.

§ 4.4.

INTELLECT QUA UNIFIED

Gerson's "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima" (2004) situates Aristotle's
reference to the active intellect in a larger discussion addressing the antecedent conditions
for intellectual activity. Gerson's reading defines nous as both the material (pathetikos)
and the efficient (poietikos) cause of thought. His reading of nous identifies the
composite-body (the form/matter composite) as the subject of psychic states. Nous, as it
turns out, is something that the living subject, the individual substance (qua composite),
has (hos hexis tis). Its potency (and its activity) is realized in the interaction of one
specially endowed form/matter composite with some other form/matter composite. In
other words Gerson's account of nous aims at defining what constitutes, for Aristotle, the
necessary conditions for intellectual activity, the state of affairs in which intellectual
activity arises.
Gerson identifies eight main points in DA III 5. The first point is Aristotle's
reiteration of his general schema for ontological analysis (430al0-14 see Metaphys.
1032al7-20). The second point is the crux of the problem that Aristotle has been trying
to resolve since DA III 3.64 We are told that these problems are sometimes addressed by
postulating two separate intellects. However, as Gerson reads him, Aristotle argues that
this need not be the case.65 The third point is that the intellect under discussion now is the
same as that described in DA III 4.66 The fourth point is an affirmation of the identity
between the knower and the known (DA 430al9-20). 67 The fifth point is a reiteration of
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the distinction between actual thinking that requires images and the activity of intellect
qua separate.68 The implication of this distinction responds to the first problem that
Aristotle seeks to resolve. In DA III 4 intellect is discussed in so far as it exists in the
composite individual, under these conditions the intellect is, for all intents and purposes,
mixed and affected, but only in so far as its activity engages images. Intellect, construed
as separate from the body, is the subject of DA III 5. As such the intellect is unmixed and
unaffected. It is also, says Aristotle, immortal (athanaton). Gerson is adamant that the
immortality of human intellect (and not merely the active part of it) must be taken
seriously.69 This is because, as Aristotle is endeavoring to illustrate, thought itself is
conditioned by the activity of intellect. This is the conclusion of DA III 5. The sixth
point is a further elaboration of the third. The seventh point is that, although the activity
of intellect is continuous, its continuity does not involve memory. This is because
memory is bodily and fades with the body.70 The eighth and final point is that, without
the continuous activity of the intellect, nothing thinks.71
We can now fully appreciate what nous is for Gerson, what it means for it to be
"the place of forms", and the efficient causal role nous plays in intellectual activity. Nous,
it turns out, is the locus of the content and activity of thought. If the passive and contentfull aspect of intellect were to be divorced from the active, both the activity of thought
and the substance of the activity (its meaningfulness) would be impossible. This is
because the interaction of one with the other requires their simultaneous co-existence in a
single subject. Accordingly, the presence and potency of nous is the efficient cause of
the subject/object relationship—in its absence only object/object relations obtain. The
sensible forms of tangible objects are not the forms that are actualized in the intellect and
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not that with which intellect comes to be identical through its activity. The activity of the
intellect is the actualization of the intelligible object in itself.72 Knowledge arises in the
intellect through its creation and becoming in this literal, but still qualified, sense. Our
knowledge of the intellect itself is possible given its immediate awareness of its own
activity.

Conclusion: The First Actuality o/Nous
It is clear from the preceding precis that all of the above interpretations emphasize a
particular mode of causation and, in most cases, they do so explicitly. Brentano cites
passages predominantly drawn from DA I (402a9, 403a3, 407a2, 41 lbl4, and 413a4) and
429a27-29 and 430al0 to firmly fix nous to the "spiritual part", the form, of the body.
Caston's reading of nous is ancillary to, and conditioned by, his reading of DA III 3 and,
more specifically, of Aristotle's notion ofphantasia. The passages crucial to his reading
of nous are 432a24, 432b4-7, and 433al4-17, where Aristotle's treatments of various
faculties of the soul demonstrate a preference for economy over multiplicity. Caston
points to these passages to support his contention that Aristotle would not, and did not,
bifurcate nous. Wedin's reading of nous in DA is fundamentally an attempt to reconcile
the characteristics of nous found in 429al3 through 430a5 by positing serialized moments
in the actualization of nous. Finally, Gerson's reading of nous is drawn from passages
throughout the whole of DA, however, his reading is fundamentally based upon 408a34b29, 412a27-bl, 413a4-9, and 413b24-27, with which he establishes the initial set of the
nested composites—form/matter, soul/body, intellect/soul—that occupies the core of his
interpretation and his account of the first actuality of nous.
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Despite their variability, all of these readings have in common their
acknowledgment, in one way or another, of the multiplicity of the senses with which the
term "nous" is used throughout DA. Each of these readings exploits this commonly
acknowledged ambiguity in different ways: whereas Brentano claims that Aristotle's
predication of separability, impassibility, and purity testify to the immateriality of passive
nous which can be distinguished, in an abstract sense, from the active, Caston argues that
those same predications are applicable to the divine. Wedin is relatively silent on the
issue of these predicates. Even Gerson acknowledges a passive and an active sense of
nous; his innovation is to suggest that both senses are manifest in a single subject. None
of these readings, however, observes that these characteristics—separate (choristos),
impassible (apathes), and unmixed (amiges)—characterize the exigency of nous
generally, both its passivity and its activity. In DA III 4 we are told that, on the one hand,
mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate [krate], that
is, to know [gnorize], must be pure from all admixture; for
the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance
and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can
have no nature of its own, other than that of having a
certain capacity. (DA 429al8-24) 73
Given this characterization of nous, the soul can rightly be called the "place of the forms"
but it is only potentially the place of the forms. (DA 429a27) In DA III 5, on the other
hand, where Aristotle speaks of nous in the sense of actuality, we find what is otherwise
the same characterization of nous: "Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible,
unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity." (DA 430al7-18) 74 The conclusion we
are led to is this: It must be the case that, in some sense of the term, the first actuality of
nous is not concomitant with the "actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life
potentially in it" (DA 412a27-412bl),75 for the identity of the first actuality of nous with
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the first actuality of the body would preclude the characterization of nous (qua passive
and qua active) as separate, impassible, and unmixed. Furthermore, that sense of the
term, the one that suggests that nous is indeed an attribute "peculiar to the soul", is
relevant to human intellectual activity. It must be remembered that the definition of the
soul offered at DA II1 is a general (koinotatos) one, not a universal one. (DA 412a5-6) It
does not preclude the understanding of nous proposed here because it never definitively
included it. This is clear when Aristotle says
We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to
think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul,
differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone
is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic
powers. (DA 413b24-29)76
What this means is that, notwithstanding his preceding definition of soul, nous may still
fall beyond its purview.
The capacity for thought is, as we have said, the first actuality of nous. That said,
Aristotle tells us that nous represents a perpetual actuality of the sort analogous to a
capacity possessed—nous is said to have "no nature of its own, other than that of having
a certain capacity"—in other words, there is no point at which the actuality represented
by nous ever exists in potentiality. Using the technical language of first and second
actualities, according to which a first actuality arises out of a first potentiality, and is
synonymous with a second potentiality, there is no first potentiality that precedes the first
actuality of nous—for "this alone is immortal and eternal."
Here the fundamental difference between the first actuality ofaisthesis and nous
is revealed: Whereas the first actuality of aisthesis involves the actualization of certain
conditions—namely, as we have seen, the presense of a medium and the actualization of
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an organ that is partially composed of elements that are homogeneous with the medium—
the first actuality of nous is, in all ways, independent of physical conditions.
Furthermore, the activity of aisthesis is one that is triggered by the presence of some
other object that affects the second actuality of aisthesis. The first actuality of nous, on
the other hand, constitutes a certain activity in and of itself, "since it is in its essential
nature activity." The first actuality of aisthesis, on the other hand, is not an activity but a
state. But the activity Aristotle associates with the first actuality of nous cannot be
understood as thought proper: Aristotle tells us that "without it [referring to the first
actuality of nous] nothing thinks," it is not possible for the activity of nous to be identical
with the activity for which it is the antecedent condition. What DA III 4 and 5 tells us is
that the first actuality of nous constitutes a primitive mode of activity that is the
antecedent condition for intellectual activity (the second actuality of nous). In contrast,
Aristotle associates the activity of aisthesis with its second actuality. Such activity is
aisthesis; whereas both the first and second actualities of nous entail activity of a ceratin
sort only one of which—the later—constitute the intellectual activities of dianoia,
hupolepsis, phronesis and all the species of thinking (noein).
In further contrast to aisthesis generally, activity associated with the first actuality
of nous is generative in nature: "it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things", it "is
what it is by virtue of making all things" and is comparable to "a sort of positive state like
light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours." This reading of
nous in Aristotle's psychology—understood as a primitive and persistent mode of

activity—is not only probative with respect to its role in intellectual activity, it alludes to
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a potential for a comprehensive understanding of the many occurrences of the term
throughout Aristotle's corpus.
Despite the apparent similarities between my interpretation of nous and that
offered by Gerson, my interpretation differs from Gerson's in that it does not necessarily
imply a wholesale rejection of the other interpretations discussed above. Given that my
interpretation is based upon Aristotle's distinction between first and second actualities, I
am able to unite nous in a way that accounts for both its active and its passive senses
without privileging one over the other. It is my intention that if my interpretation were to
be applied in certain contexts, it might not only affirm the validity of readings like those
offered by Caston, but also, in different contexts, affirm the validity of readings like those
offered by Brentano or Wedin. The following chapter will examine Aristotle's treatment
of the second actuality of nous, that is, intellectual activity. This discussion will indeed
be one far more sympathetic to both Brentano and Wedin than the preceding discussion.
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Chapter 8.

THE SECOND ACTUALITY OF NOUS

Introduction
As has been suggested in previous chapters, Aristotle makes numerous preparatory and
sometimes tangential comments concerning the nature of intellectual activity before
taking up the matter directly in DA III 6 and 7. It is not until this late point in DA that
Aristotle offers an explanation of the second actuality of nous. His most likely
justification for this delay is the complexity of the subject and, more specifically, as we
have seen, the difficulty with articulating the antecedent conditions for intellectual
activity—that is, the first actuality of nous. For this reason, this discussion will again
survey the earlier portions of text, this time aiming at teasing out of them that which is
relevant specifically to the second actuality of nous. Despite their significance in
Aristotle's account of thinking, surprisingly little contemporary literature treats DA III 6
and 7. For this reason the later portions of this chapter will rely heavily upon Apostle's
1981 commentary and a few other secondary sources. This chapter will proceed to
examine DA III 6 and 7 to discover the fundamental differences between thinking and
sensation. This chapter will conclude that thinking, unlike sensation, is essentially both
genetic and active.
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§1.

D e A n i m a / & II

To begin with, we recall from the previous chapter that Aristotle says the following near
to the very beginning of DA at 403a3-10:
A further problem presented by the affections of soul is
this: are they all affections of the complex of body and
soul, or is there anyone among them peculiar to the soul by
itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we
consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in
which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving
the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation
generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but
if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be
impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a
condition of its existence. (DA 403a3-10)77
Previously we read this passage as a suggestion on Aristotle's part that the first actuality
of nous might not involve any sort of material manifestation, and that it might be
"peculiar to the soul by itself." Concerning his reading of this passage, we accused
Apostle, who affirms that thinking presupposes sensation and imagination, of
equivocating when he concludes, based upon this affirmation, that nous cannot be
peculiar to the soul. At this point, having distinguished between the activity concomitant
with the first actuality of nous and intellectual activity proper, Apostle's equivocation
becomes even more apparent. However, more importantly to our present concerns, we
can appreciate how we can affirm, on the one hand, that the first actuality of nous is
separate from the body, and, on the other, affirm that the second actuality of nous might
presuppose the second actuality of aisthesis and/or phantasia. In other words, the second
actuality of nous may indeed involve the body.
This seems to be what Aristotle affirms, or at least is open to, when he concludes
DA 11 with the suggestion that "It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities

174

or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul." (DA
408b 11-13)78 According to Gerson, when Aristotle describes the soul as the first actuality
of a potentially living body at DA II 1, it is the composite body—in other words the
form/matter composite that makes up the body—that is, he says, subject to the efficacy of
the soul.79 Further, according to Gerson, just as the soul alone is not the subject of pain,
the intellect alone is not the subject of thought. Rather, the subject of thought is that
which has intellect, i.e. soul.80 Finally, given that the soul is described as the subject of
thought "in so far as it has intellect," (DA 408b26-27) Gerson reads such a qualification
as an early indication by Aristotle of the causal, or at least explanatory, efficacy of
intellect.81 Gerson's suggestion here is clearly similar to my own. Gerson too points to
DA 408b 11-13 to support his claim. The suggestion being that the activity of thinking—
the second actuality of nous—involves the second actuality of aisthesis (this might also
implicate phantasia) and the activity we have associated with the first actuality of nous.
We begin to see confirmations of this reading in DA III 4 and 5.

§2.

De Anhna III 4 & 5

Aristotle's earliest direct statement concerning the nature of the second actuality ofnous
takes the form of a disjunction. He tells us at DA III 4 that "If thinking is like perceiving,
it must be either [1] a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being
thought, or [2] a process different from but analogous to that." (DA 429al3-15)82 Here
Aristotle is ambiguous, and, perhaps, intentionally so. (1) might refer to: (a) the possible
object of thought, e.g., when I think about the computer in front of me, it is acting upon
my cognitive faculty and causing me to think about it; or (b) more precisely the
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intelligible form of the object of thought; or (c) the activity concomitant with the first
actuality of nous, which, as Aristotle argues in the concluding portions of DA III 4, "is
capable of being thought". In other words, when Aristotle tells us that (1) thinking might
be a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, he can
be interpreted as affirming one of the following:
la. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the possible object of
thought.
Or,
lb. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the the intelligible
form of the object of thought.
Or,
lc. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the activity
concomitant with the first actuality of nous.
When, on the other hand, Aristotle tells us that (2) thinking might other wise be a process
different from but analogous to a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is
capable of being thought, he can be interpreted as affirming one of the following:
2a. Thinking is a process different from but analogous to a process in which the
soul is acted upon by the possible object of thought.
Or,
2b. Thinking is a process different from but analogous to a process in which the
soul is acted upon by the the intelligible form of the object of thought.
Or,
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2c. Thinking is a process different from but analogous to a process in which the
soul is acted upon by the activity concomitant with the first actuality of nous.
The double entendre of the phrase "what is capable of being thought [paschein ti an eie
hupo tou noetou]" is revealed in the concluding portions of DA III 4 where Aristotle says
that, "Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are [kai autos de
noetos estin hosper ta noeta]. For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what
thinks and what is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and its object are
identical." {DA 430a2-6)83 As it turns out, 2 is a red herring: Thinking is a process that is
different from but analogous to the second actuality of aisthesis but in making such a
suggestion, Aristotle implies that only (la) and (lb) are acceptable construals of (1). To
the contrary, I believe that by the conclusion of DA III 7, Aristotle will have affirmed
(la), (lb), (lc), and, their collective equivalent, (2).
Brentano's attempts to interpret DA III 4, in a manner that is coherent with (lb),
are in fact complementary to the reading articulated so far. Brentano poses the question:
how is it that nous comprehends intelligible forms without, at the same time, becoming
"mixed" and, in so doing, limiting its potency? His answer is that intellectual activity
does not involve a corruption of the sort that results from the conventional84 actualization
of form in matter, i.e., the sort of corruption that occurs when one thing becomes another
thing. As Brentano explains: "It [intellectual activity] is an actual change; not a
corruption but a perfection of its natural condition."85 Thought, like sensation, according
to this reading, is not a learned capacity. The subject is capable of thought from birth. It
is, however, something that is perfected through exercise. Brentano tells us that "Only
when it has achieved potential [habituelle] knowledge, which happens either through
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learning or through one's own discovery, can it actually comprehend thoughts within
itself whenever it wants to and without outside help."86 In this way nous is able to
comprehend everything in such a manner that nothing, not even the faculty itself,
transcends the potentiality of nous. Engaging in intellectual activity has the effect of
broadening the scope of the faculty and refining its capacities for discrimination. For this
reason too, says Brentano, Aristotle is not led to postulate a second distinct intellectual
faculty (for the purpose, for example, of acquiring knowledge of intellect itself).
Brentano's reading employs explicitly the language of intelligible forms that are
suggested by (lb). He proceeds to describe a process analogous to sensation as (2)
suggests, but it is a process only analogous in terms of how the object of thought interacts
with the thinking subject. Brentano's reading suggests that, as is the case in sensation, it
is the object's form actualized in some secondary way that is engaged in the process of
thinking. Brentano's Aristotle says that the two powers differ in that one—namely,
thought—is perfected through practice. Brentano speaks of potential knowledge, but
what is here translated as "potential" is the German "habituelle" which, in this context,
might better be understood more literally as "habitual", for the view that Brentano seems
to want to attribute to Aristotle is that through practice one's intellectual powers are
enhanced and their ability for conceptualization increases. In other words, for Brentano's
Aristotle, one's intellectual prowess is habituated.
Although, as we have seen, Wedin's reading of DA III 4 offers little by way of an
understanding of the first actuality of nous, his reading does, however, strive towards a
thorough account of its second actuality. Wedin87 maintains that DA III 4 identifies seven
distinctive 'marks' of nous: (1) "Thinking is something like being affected", (2) "One can
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think what one wishes",88 (3) "Actual thinking is produced by the object of thought", (4)
"Mind is nothing actual until it thinks", (5) "Mind is the same as its object", (6) "Mind
thinks itself',89 and (7) "Whenever one actually thinks (that is, when one's mind is the
same as the object of thought), then the mind thinks itself."90 Items (1) through (4)
convey a commitment to the underlying physicality of nous: Items (1) through (4)
stipulate that mental states are caused by physical states. Items (5) through (7) ensures
that intellectual activity is a possible object of intellectual activity itself in a way that, as
we shall see, is not suggestive of some mental event independent of a physical event. As
we can see from these seven items Wedin is reading nous strictly as a subjective activity
and without regard for its status as potentially separable. Accordingly, to Wedin DA III 4
speaks to the functions of nous only, and not to the functional organization of the mind—
as a cognitive theory demands.

§3.

DeAnima/tftf

As we have seen, all of the comments and suggestions concerning the second actuality of
nous made throughout DA I, II, and in the early chapters of III, are preparatory for his
proper treatment of the matter beginning at DA III 6. Aristotle begins by stipulating the
following:
The thinking then of the simple objects of thought is
found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where
the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find
a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity.
(DA 430a26-28)91
Here Aristotle seems to identify two levels of intellectual activity: one in which truth and
falsity are not applicable, and a second in which truth and falsity are applicable. The
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second, Aristotle tells us, is primarily distinguishable by the fact that it involves
synthesis, that is, "a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity." That
thinking involves synthesis suggests that it involves a genetic principle of the sort denied
to aisthesis. Aristotle says as much when he tells us that "falsehood always involves a
synthesis; for even if you assert that what is white is not white you have included not
white in a synthesis." {DA 430b 1-3)92
Furthermore, Aristotle is explicit with regard to the agent of the synthesis out of
which falsity might arise:
It is possible also to call all these cases division as well as
combination. However that may be, there is not only the
true or false assertion that Cleon is white but also the true
or false assertion that he was or will be white. In each and
every case that which unifies is mind. {DA 430b3-6)93
A striking contrast can be drawn here between the second actuality of aisthesis and the
second actuality of nous, whereas aisthesis is the affect of the sense object in an active
capacity and its encounter with the sense organ in a passive capacity, the second actuality
of nous seems to be the result of the activity of nous, that is, the activity that nous is
constantly engaged in as a function of its first actuality.
As Aristotle returns to the apprehension of "simple objects", the scope of the
genetic principle active in the positing of synthesis is expanded. Aristotle does so when
he exemplifies an object, a line, that is sensed as a common sensible—namely, a
magnitude—to explain the delimitation of the object of thought, the implication being
that this is a function of the second actuality of nous. This expansion is articulated in two
steps. First we are told:
Since the word 'simple' has two senses, i.e. may
mean either 'not capable of being divided' or 'not actually
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divided', there is nothing to prevent mind from knowing
what is undivided, e.g. when it apprehends a length (which
is actually undivided) and that in an undivided time; for the
time is divided or undivided in the same manner as the line.
(DA 430b6-10)94
Here Aristotle begins to broach the mereology of thought: Aristotle explains that a
thought is co-extensive with its object. Aristotle explains what he means further when he
writes:
It is not possible, then, to tell what part of the line it was
apprehending in each half of the time: the object has no
actual parts until it has been divided: if in thought you think
each half separately, then by the same act you divide the
time also, the half-lines becoming as it were new wholes of
length. But if you think it as a whole consisting of these
two possible parts, then also you think it in a time which
corresponds to both parts together. (DA 430M0-14)95
What is being said here is that object, in thought, is not expansive in the sense that this or
that part (of the object) is thought in this or that moment (or part) of thinking. Aristotle
seems to suggest that thoughts are atomic wholes, they are unbroken and unbreakable.
Thoughts are, and thinking is, serialized—i.e., one thought may precede or follow
another. However, the thought of a line is indivisible. As Apostle notes:
If the intellect thinks each half [of a line] separately, then it
thinks not the line as a whole but two separate parts and at
different times; and if the parts are so thought, this is as if
the intellect were thinking two different whole lines in two
separate intervals and not one line.96
What this means is that, even prior to any sort of synthetic postulation, the second
actuality of nous involves the objectification of the object of thought. That is, the activity
of thinking itself defines and delimits its object. Indeed, the second actuality of nous is
constitutive of the object of thought. This position stands in juxtaposition to that offered
by Plato in the Timaeus and refuted by Aristotle in DA I.
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DA III 6 concludes with a discussion of the apprehension by nous of the absence
of things that we might expect to be present. Aristotle writes:
Points and similar instances of things that divide,
themselves being indivisible, are realized in consciousness
in the same manner as privations.
A similar account may be given of all other cases,
e.g. how evil or black is cognized; they are cognized, in a
sense, by means of their contraries. (DA 430b20a-23)97
Apostle explains this passage as follows: "Just as blindness is known and defined in
terms of vision, (for it is the absence of vision in that whose nature is to have vision),
toothless in terms of absence of teeth, and darkness in terms of light....The same applies
to the knowledge of evil and of other privations, for they are known by the knowledge of
their contraries."98

§4.

DeAnima///7

Whereas in DA III 6 Aristotle is subtle with respect to the role of sensation in the second
actuality of nous—referring to an object of the common sense in order to make a point
concerning the genetic nature of intellectual activity—in DA III 7 he is more explicit
about the role of sensation. After reiterating the priority of potential knowledge, the same
point made earlier in DA III 5, Aristotle states that "[t]o perceive then is like bare
asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a sort of
affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object." (DA 421a8-10)99 Here again,
Aristotle posits characteristics of intellectual activity quite distinct from those attributed
to the second actuality of aisthesis. Here, in a general way, Aristotle speaks to what we
have previously, in the context of intentionality, referred to as the meta-character of
psychological states. Here Aristotle situates the sort of aversion or attraction to a sensed
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object generally within the soul. He then tells us that "the faculty of appetite and
avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of senseperception; but their being is different." (DA 431al2-14)100 This is misleading because
shortly thereafter Aristotle clarifies, "[t]o the thinking soul images serve as if they were
contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or
pursues them)." (DA 431al4-16 emphasis added)101 It is significant that Aristotle here
speaks of "dianoetike psyche" and, in so doing, distinguishes the discursive from the
objectifying mode of thinking. Apostle seems to concur. As he explains, "it is the
thinking soul which judges that P is or is not Q, that asserts or denies P of Q, and that
pursues what it asserts to be good but avoids what it asserts to be bad."102
What complicates this point is that it is made in conjunction with Aristotle's
expression of the dependence of intellectual activity upon the activity of the senses. This
dependence begins to emerge in DA 431al2-14, quoted above, and is made explicit in the
assertion: "That is why the soul never thinks without an image." (DA 431al6-17)103
Aristotle elaborates upon the intersection of the second actuality of ais thesis with the
second actuality of nous:
The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the
images, and as in the former case what is to be pursued or
avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation
and it is engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or
avoidance. E.g. perceiving by sense that the beacon is fire,
it recognizes in virtue of the general faculty of sense that it
signifies an enemy, because it sees it moving; but
sometimes by means of the images or thoughts which are
within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it calculates and
deliberates what is to come by reference to what is present;
and when it makes a pronouncement, as in the case of
sensation it pronounces the object to be pleasant or painful,
in this case it avoids or pursues; and so generally in cases
ofaction.(Xl4 431b2-10)104
183

Here Aristotle offers a far more elaborate example than that of the line offered in DA III
6, DA 431b2-10 offers a serialized account of the integration of aisthesis with intellectual
activity. Aristotle makes it clear that what is sensed through the second actuality of
aisthesis is endowed with meaning through the second actuality of nous, the activity of
which culminates in its pronouncement that the object is either pleasant or painful, and
subsequently, that it should be pursued or avoided. Apostle concurs with this reading:
"judgements and deliberations require thoughts, and thoughts are impossible without
images (for the thinking part thinks its objects in images); so images alone are not
sufficient."105

Conclusion: The Second Actuality

o/Nous

Aristotle's account of intellectual activity qua the second actuality of nous brings to the
fore a number of stark contrasts with sensation, i.e., the second actuality of aisthesis. The
first and most significant distinction that we made, however, was between the activity of
nous according to its first actuality (DA III 5) and the activity of nous according to its
second actuality (what is alluded to throughout DA and is more thoroughly explicated in
DA III 6 and 7). Throughout DA I, II, and in DA III 4 specifically, we saw it suggested
that the activity of thinking—the second actuality of nous—involves the second actuality
of aisthesis (and possibly phantasid) in conjunction with the activity concomitant with
the first actuality of nous.
DA III 6 and 7 explore the relationship between sensation and thinking first by
assigning to them specific roles. In DA III 6 Aristotle bifurcates the second actuality of
nous by identifying two levels of intellectual activity, both of which represent the
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exercise of a genetic principle. One such level of intellectual activity involves synthesis,
that is, "a putting together of objects of thought in a sort of unity." Prior to the synthetic
postulation spoken of here, the second actuality of nous involves the objectification of the
object of thought, that is, the constitution of the object in its activity. This genetic
character, we recall, is explicitly denied to aisthesis mDA II 5, where he says that "man
can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon
himself—a sensible object must be there". (DA 417b24-26)106 In DA III 7 the disparity
between sensation and thinking is made even more explicit when Aristotle attributes to
thought a meta-character of the sort spoken of previously in relation to
psychological/intentional states. Aristotle situates the sort of aversion or attraction to a
sensed object within the soul and in the effect of the second actuality of nous. (DA
431al2-14)
Ultimately, Aristotle's account of the second actuality of nous culminates in a
serialized account of the integrated activities of the second actualities of aisthesis and
nous. Aristotle makes it clear that what is sensed is sensed indifferently and is endowed
with meaning only through the second actuality of nous (the discriminatory powers of
sensation are limited to the discrimination between qualities of the object proper and not
its subjective, or judged qualities). This activity culminates in the pronouncement, by
intellect, that the object is either pleasant or painful and that it should be pursued or
avoided. Accordingly, in his accounts of the first and second actualities of aisthesis and
nous Aristotle offers a comprehensive account of cognitive activity and its preconditions.
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Chapter 9.

Nous

AND THE ORIGIN OF INTENTIONALITY

Introduction
We are finally prepared to draw the comparison between nous in Aristotle and Brentano's
theory of intentionality in order that we might come to a better understanding of
intentionality based upon its proper analogue, nous. This concluding chapter will
proceed with a brief summary of the conclusions concerning nous that we have arrived at
in the preceding three chapters. It will then begin to enumerate the integral points of
similarity between the two notions. We shall begin our comparison by addressing the
commonly accepted primary function of intentionality in psychological states—namely,
the constitution of the object of thought. We will, again, witness that, like intentionality,
it is nous that is constitutive of the object of thought. I will then discuss what we have
previously referred to as the "meta-character" of psychological acts and how both nous
and intentionality account for this phenomenon in their respective psychologies. Further,
we shall see that both nous and intentionality represent a certain genetic principle that, in
both Aristotle and Brentano, is a fundamental to thinking. With these three explicit and
fundamental similarities accounted for, I will then proceed, by extrapolation, to suggest
one further similarity with respect to a characteristic of nous that Aristotle makes explicit
and that, with further study, may prove to be implicit in Brentano's formulation of his
theory of intentionality—namely, I will suggest that both nous and intentionality exhibit a
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certain primitivity. The revised understanding of intentionality that I will defend

emphasizes the ontological significance of the concept in order to address both the
conventional problem of intentionality and the fundamentally ontological genetic
problem of intentionality.

§ 1.

Nous Summarized

In the previous three chapters we explored nous in the context of Aristotle's DA and we
did so according to the three senses of the term found throughout the treatise: (1) "nous"
according to its first actuality, (2) "nous'''' according to its second actuality, and (3) "nous"
with respect to its causal relationship to the soul.

§ 1.1.

NOUS ACCORDING TO ITS FIRST ACTUALITY

As we saw in Chapter 7, nous is characterized generally—that is, with respect to both its
passivity and its activity—as separate (choristos), impassible (apathes), and unmixed
(amiges). DA III 4 tells us that these characteristics are integral to the omnipotence of
thought (i.e., it can think anything) and the exigencies of its function. (DA 429al8-24)
Accordingly, the soul can be called the "place of the forms" but it is so only in
potentiality. (DA 429a27)
According to DA III 5, with respect to nous in the sense of actuality, "Mind in this
sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity."
(DA 430al9-22) We are therefore led to conclude that the first actuality of nous is
distinct from the soul qua "an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life
potentially in it". (DA 412a27-412bl)107 This is because such an identity would preclude
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the separability, impassibility, and purity of nous. Aristotle tells us that nous represents a
perpetual actuality of the sort analogous to a capacity possessed. Consequently, nous,
according to its first actuality, never exists in potentiality, for "this alone is immortal and
eternal."
Whereas the activity of aisthesis is one that is triggered passively by the sense
object, nous constitutes a certain activity in and of itself, "since it is in its essential nature
activity." This activity, however, is not thought proper. We know this because Aristotle
tells us that "without it nothing thinks", and so, unless Aristotle is committing a blatant
petitio principii, the activity of nous cannot but be the antecedent condition of thought
and not thought proper. The inference we are led to by Aristotle's claims in DA III 4 and
5—i.e. that the first actuality of nous is not preceded by a state of potentiality taken in
conjunction with its status as an antecedent condition for thinking—is that the first
actuality of nous constitutes a primitive mode of activity. By this I mean, as Aristotle
tells us, that the first actuality of nous is preceded by no state of potentiality. The
implication of Aristotle's suggestion is that the activity he associates with the first
actuality of nous is—as are the basic elements of earth, air, and water—a simple, or
primitive, constituent of the world. Furthermore, such an activity is genetic in nature: "it
is what it is by virtue of becoming all things", it "is what it is by virtue of making all
things", and it is comparable to "a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light
makes potential colours into actual colours."

188

§ 1.2.

Nous ACCORDING TO ITS SECOND ACTUALITY

In our discussions concerning the second actuality of nous it was settled that, unlike in its
first actuality, the second actuality of nous—that is, thought—is contingent upon the
second actuality of aisthesis (and possibly phantasia)—that is, sensation and
imagination—as well as, of course, the activity associated with the first actuality of nous.
DA III 6 identifies two levels of intellectual activity: the synthetic, on the one hand, and
the objectifying, on the other. Both represent the exercise of a genetic principle. The
synthetic mode of the second actuality of nous, for example, involves "a putting together
of objects of thought in a sort of unity." However, before such synthetic postulations can
occur the object must be constituted through a prior activity associated with the second
actuality of nous. This genetic character is denied to aisthesis in DA II 5. DA III 7
widens the chasm between sensation and thinking when Aristotle attributes to thought
that which we have come to refer to as a sort of meta-character, speaking of the sort of
aversions or attractions to sensed objects that are affected by the second actuality of nous.
(ZX4 431al2-14)
Having reviewed our treatment of nous in Aristotle's psychology, we can now
proceed to compare it with Brentano's notion of intentionality.

§ 2.

The Constitution of the Object of Mental States

Throughout Part I it was repeated that the single most important distinction made by
Brentano in the articulation of his psychology was the distinction between mental and
physical phenomena. According to Brentano, "All the data of our consciousness are
divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of mental
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phenomena."108 Significantly, Brentano articulates this distinction as one that delineates
two sorts of "data of our consciousness." As it turns out, this subtlety will lead to later
complications with respect to (a) the epistemological entailment of
psychological/intentional states, (b) the ontological status of the object of thought, and (c)
the genesis of consciousness itself. For now, however, it is important to note that what
distinguishes the mental from the physical phenomena is their possession of content. To
be precise, Brentano tells us:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content,
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way.109
What Brentano here tells us is that mental phenomena are distinctively content-full and
that they are so because, in a literal sense, some content exists within them. Brentano
makes this explicit in those portions of his text that speak to the priority he affords to
mental phenomena. He says, "We have no right, therefore, to believe that the objects of
so-called external perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably
do not exist outside of us."110 He subsequently reaffirms his position with respect to the
ontological status of mental phenomena:
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a
phenomenal and intentional existence.111
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For Brentano, intentionality is in fact constitutive of the object of thought and should be
understood as the ontic basis of mental contents. In other words, the object of any
specific mental phenomenon exists in the intention of the mental phenomenon.
Aristotle's psychology too involves an act through which the object of thought is
constituted as such. In DA III 6 we are told:
there is nothing to prevent mind from knowing what is
undivided, e.g. when it apprehends a length (which is
actually undivided) and that in an undivided time; for the
time is divided or undivided in the same manner as the line.
(DA 430b7-10)112
As we discussed in Chapter 8, the second actuality of nous is the activity of thinking.
Thought is serial in nature and each moment of thought is constitutive of, and coextensive with, its object. By this, as was explained, Aristotle meant that neither thought
nor its object are expansive (thoughts are not magnitudes as Plato suggests). Rather,
thoughts are serialized atomic wholes that define and delimit their object. Accordingly,
the second actuality of nous involves the objedification of the object of thought. And so,
just like intentionality in Brentano, the second actuality of nous in Aristotle's psychology
is that in which the object of thought is constituted.

§ 3.

Nous and the Meta-Character

of

Intentionality

Chapter 2 offered an explication of the conventional problem of intentionality based upon
analyses of the problem offered by Chisholm, Caston, and Simons. We observed that,
specifically with regard to the analyses of Chisholm and Caston, the conventional
problems of intentionality can be traced to the meta-character of the intentional act. By
this we refer to the subjective character of the psychological act that varies from act to
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act, from one instance of thought (used in a most general sense) to the next. Brentano
suggests a few of the potential characters a psychological act might take when he says,
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same
way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate
hated, in desire desired and so on.113
Here the various possible meta-characters that the intentional/psychological act might
take include the presentational character of a presentation, the judgemental character of a
judgement, the loving of an instance of love, the hating in an instance of hate, and the
desiring in an instance of desire. In all such cases these terms can be understood
adjectively, as describing the way in which the object of thought is given in the mental
phenomena in which it exists."4 This list is by no means comprehensive, but, a certain
meta-character can be identified for each and every mental phenomenon. Even when the
subject is indifferent to the object, we might say that the meta-character of such an
intentional act is its indifferent character.
In Aristotle, this character, as we have already observed, is accounted for in the
second actuality of nous. This is clear when Aristotle states that "[t]o perceive then is
like bare asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes
a sort of affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object." {DA 421a8-10)115
Here Aristotle seems to have influenced Brentano in that he too, speaks of a certain metacharacter of psychological states and does so in two broad categories: aversions, and
attractions. In this passage Aristotle identifies one's aversion or attraction to a sensed
object generally within the soul. Shortly thereafter he clarifies in which part of the soul
that aversion or attraction originates: "[t]o the thinking soul images serve as if they were
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contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or
pursues them)." (DA 431al4-16)116 Here again, we are confronted with a similarity
between Brentano's theory of intentionality and nous in Aristotle.

§ 4.

The Primitivity o/Nous and Intentionality:

The Genesis of

Consciousness
In Chapter 2 our deconstruction of the ontology articulated, both explicitly and implicitly,
in Brentano's Psychology revealed apetitio principii of the sort that theoretical
constructions are susceptible to. The manifestation of this fallacy results from Brentano's
claims that certain real physical events are temporally prior to the emergence of real
mental phenomena. This is because, as Brentano says, consciousness is always
consciousness of something. However, the thing of which we are conscious is some
physical phenomenon that exists only in the act of intention. A circularity arises when
Brentano says, "intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental
phenomena."117 Put more succinctly, the emergence of consciousness is conditional upon
the presence of its object; the presence of the object is conditioned by its intentional
inexistence; and intentional inexistence occurs only in consciousness. We depicted this
interdependency as follows:
Consciousness = Object
Object = Intentionality
Intentionality = Consciousness
This analysis reveals the single greatest deficiency of Brentano's psychology—
specifically, its inability to account for the genesis of consciousness.
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No such problem arises in Aristotle's psychology. Or does it? Recall that in our
discussion concerning the second actuality of nous we distinguished between the activity
associated with it, thinking proper, from the activity that is associated with the first
actuality of nous. In line with comments made in DA III 5, the perpetual activity of the
first actuality of nous was said to be one of the antecedent conditions for thought but not
identical to thought. This interpretation is most explicitly supported by the statement
concluding DA III 5 that "without [nous in the sense of its first actuality] nothing thinks."
Furthermore, this suggests that to interpret the activity of the first actuality of nous as
thought in the proper sense is tantamount to attributing to Aristotle apetitioprincipii.
fact, it is tantamount to attributing to Aristotle apetitioprincipii

In

of the same sort we

identified in Brentano's psychology in Chapter 2.
Again, in order to escape this fallacy the activity of the first actuality of nous was
interpreted as the antecedent condition of thought proper and, as was noted in Chapter 8,
this interpretation brings to bear a further implication with respect to the essential
character of nous: DA III 4 and 5 stipulate that the first actuality of nous is not itself
preceded by a state of potentiality. This means that the sort of activity associated with
the first actuality of nous constitutes a primitive mode of activity, in other words, it is, in
a sense, elemental to the extent that, like earth, air, water, and fire, it is a constitutive
principle of certain real things. Aristotle indeed defines the first actuality of nous in
terms of these three essential characteristics: (1) its purity (amiges), (2) its primitivity—
"it is in its essential nature activity", "this alone is immortal and eternal.. .and without it
nothing thinks"—, and (3) its genetic character—"it is what it is by virtue of becoming all
things", it "is what it is by virtue of making all things", and it is comparable to "a sort of
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positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours."
It is according to these three essential characteristics that Aristotle accounts for both the
exigencies, and the genesis, of the second actuality of nous, i.e., thinking.
It is explicit in Brentano's Psychology that intentionality shares with nous at least
the third characteristic listed above—namely, its genetic character. Indeed, Brentano is
clearly willing to accept interaction between the mental and physical realms. He says,
Not only may physical states be aroused by physical states
and mental states by mental, but it is also the case that
physical states have mental consequences and mental states
have physical consequences.118
This passage does retain the ambiguity with respect to Brentano's usage of the qualifier
"physical", however, the potential effectiveness of the mental remains clear. The genetic
character of intentionality in Brentano's psychology is most prominent in that it
represents the ontic foundation of the object of thought. In a literal sense, it is that in
which it is, hence Brentano's use of the compound terminology "intentional inexistence"
and the suggestion of containment in the phrase "includes something as object within
itself."119 The genetic character of intentionality underpins his insistence upon the
elevated reality of the mental over the physical:
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a
phenomenal and intentional existence.120
This passage is, in fact, reminiscent of Aristotle's claim in DA III 5 concerning the
elevated status of nous: "for always the active is superior [timioteron] to the passive
factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms." (DA 430al8-19)121 The parallel
is clear: Brentano affords intentionality the same elevated status because it is that in
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which the object is constituted. This genetic principle is extended in conjunction with the

causal dependencies that he draws out when he writes, "the term 'consciousness,' since it
refers to an object which consciousness is consciousness of, seems to be appropriate to
characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e.,
the property of intentional inexistence of an object",122 and when he continues by saying,
"[a]ll mental phenomena are states of consciousness."123 These passages extend the
genetic role of intentionality by affirming that it is also constitutive of consciousness
itself. Such a conclusion, however, raises the question: In what is intentionality itself
constituted? As we have discussed at length in Chapter 2, the only explicit answer to this
question Brentano offers leads to a circularity and the petitio principii that defines what
we have called the genetic problem of intentionality.
On the other hand, I contend that the similarities already established between nous
and intentionality are sufficient to substantiate the extrapolation of the primitivity of nous
in Aristotle to Brentano's notion of intentionality. The primitivity of intentionality can
ground the genesis of consciousness in the same mode of activity as Aristotle grounds
thought and suggests a strong analogy between nous in Aristotle and intentionality in
Brentano. And so an understanding of intentionality as a concept analogous to nous in
Aristotle escapes the petitio principii latent in Brentano's formulation of intentional
inexistence—or, rather, intentionality—and overcomes the genetic problem of
intentionality.
But what does it mean for intentionality to be primitive rather than an attribute of
consciousness? First and foremost it does preclude us from understanding intentionality
as a mere attribute of consciousness. Quite to the contrary, it suggests that consciousness
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is an instance of intentional activity just as thinking, according to Aristotle, is an instance
of the activity of nous (according to its first actuality). Articulated in Aristotle's
terminology, consciousness is a second actuality of intentionality. Understanding
intentionality as a first actuality analogous to the first actuality of nous in Aristotle
affords it the same causal efficacy: it defines intentionality as the final and efficient cause
of consciousness to the extent that intentionality represents the antecedent condition for
consciousness.

Conclusion: Origin of

Intentionality

In our first chapter we witnessed the probable analogy between Brentano's notion of
intentionality as described in his Psychology and Aristotle's notion of mind, that is nous,
as read by Gerson (2001). Towards a more thorough substantiation of the analogy
suggested in the first chapter, Chapter 2 proceeded with an investigation into the nature
of intentionality and the problems that have come to be associated with intentionality
since its re-emergence in Brentano. Chapter 2 accounted for two essential features of
intentionality in Brentano: (1) its manifestation of a concrete object, i.e., the "inexistence
of an object," and (2) the meta-character of the act in which the object of thought is
manifest, e.g., "in judgement something...affirmed or denied."124 Furthermore, Chapter 2
explained the conventional problem of intentionality as the inability to account for the
indifference of intentional states with respect to their epistemic entailments, i.e., the fact
that in thought what is posited is, or can be, entirely fictitious.
Part II sought to establish thoroughly the differences between Aristotle's theory of
sensation (aisthesis) and Brentano's theory of intentionality. Chapter 3 revealed what
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Aristotle held to be the two conditions with respect to the constitution of the sense organs
that constitute the first actuality of aisthesis: (1) The material constituents of the organ
must be contiguous with the sensitivities exhibited by elemental constituents of the
external environment. The elemental constituents of the external environment are able to
mediate sensual activity because of the common sensitivities of the elemental
constituents of the external environment and the sensitivities of the organ. {DA 419al 121, 420a3-5, 421b9) The second condition is (2) the qualitative neutrality with respect to
a certain range of sensible qualities that the actualization of the form of the sense organ
manifests within them. {DA 424a4-5)
In Chapter 4 we saw how Aristotle characterizes the second actuality of aisthesis
as an entirely passive condition. {DA 417b24-26) It follows from its passivity that there
is no generative principle proper to the act of sensing. It was concluded that Aristotle's
identification of sensation with a second actuality is a clear endorsement of the
physiological readings promoted by Shute, Barnes, Apostle, and Burnyeat and an explicit
rejection of the so-called literalist reading offered by Sorabji who follows Slakey.
Whereas their readings suggest that the activity of aisthesis involves the literal
actualization of a sensible quality in the sense organ, Aristotle's characterization of
sensation as a second actuality requires that it is not a change of the sort that is, in any
straightforward sense, manifest in matter. This distinction sets it apart from the
conventional sort of change discussed in GC17.
In our survey of the extensions of aisthesis that occupied Chapter 5 we saw how,
in the early chapters of DA III, Aristotle extends his theory of aisthesis to account for
three things not accounted for by aisthesis proper: (1) how it is that we come to know that
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we are sensing, (2) the common sensibles—including movement, rest, number, figure,
and magnitude, and (3) phantasia, the capacity according to which we are able to render
images unto ourselves.
Chapter 6 brought together the findings of the previous three chapters to illustrate
the differences between aisthesis and intentionality. Upon scrutiny, it is clear that
aisthesis and intentionality differ in two important respects: (1) according to Aristotle, the
identity of the bearer of sensible qualities is not something that is sensed according to the
second actuality of aisthesis, (2) given that the ontic foundation of consciousness is
bound to its intentional character, its analogue in DA must also possess, or be identified
with, some sort of power capable of affecting the genesis of cognitive activity. This sort
of genetic character is clearly excluded by the thoroughly passive character attributed to
aisthesis. For this reason we concluded that any understanding of intentionality that is
strictly based upon the apparent similarities between it and Aristotle's notion of aisthesis
is inevitably deficient.
Part III began the constructive portion of the study. In parallel with Part II,
Chapters 7 and 8 explicated the first and second actualities of nous respectively. Nous,
according to its first actuality, is not preceded by a state of potentiality. It represents a
state of perpetual actuality having "no nature of its own, other than that of having a
certain capacity." It is an activity that constitutes the essential antecedent condition for
thinking but it is not thinking itself. Thinking proper is the activity concomitant with the
second actuality of nous.
The similarities between nous and intentionality that are revealed in our exegeses
substantiate the overarching thesis of this study that nous in Arisotle, and not aisthesis, is
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the closer analogue to intentionality in Brentano. Brentano defines mental acts as those
that exhibit the intentional inexistence of their object. This, as has been explained, is
analogous to Aristotle's claim that the second actuality of nous involves the
objectification of the object of thought. A further similarity emerges with respect to the
second actuality of the respective concepts, that is, their meta-character.
Aristotle also seems to have influenced Brentano in that he, too, speaks to the
meta-character of psychological states in two broad categories: aversions and attractions.
At DA 421a8-10 Aristotle identifies one's aversion or attraction to a sensed object with
nous. This runs parallel to Brentano's identification of, for example, the presentational
character of intentional acts that involve presentation, or the judgemental character of
intentional acts that involve judgement. These essential similarities with respect to the
character of nous and intentionality led us to extrapolate that just as Aristotle's analyses
in DA III 4 and 5 require that nous, according to its first actuality, is a primitive
component of his ontology, Brentano too suggests the primitivity of intentionality in the
dependencies that obtain among the various elements of the model of consciousness he
articulates in his Psychology.
Of course, the suggestion that intentionality is primitive in the same sense as the
first actuality of nous in Aristotle is no small claim. Substantiating such a claim would
require far more reasearch, analysis, and a complete study unto itself. This suggestion,
however, is not entirely novel: in his "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" (2004)
Mitscherling proposes what he refers to as a new Copernican revolution which involves,

with reference to the Brentanian model of consciousness referred to throughout this
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study, the inversion of the positions of consciousness and intentionality such that
consciousness could be construed as an instance of "intentional being".125
This suggestion, the suggestion that intentionality is a primitive component of
Brentano's implicit ontology, is the suggestion we are led to by the great preponderance
of similarities between nous in Aristotle and intentionality. An exploration of this idea is,
I believe, an appropriate extention of the present study. This is the trajectory I hope to
pursue in my further studies: I believe that this idea has the potential to affirm not merely
a certain causal efficacy with respect to intentionality, but it represents a reversal wherein
consciousness itself is in fact understood as the effect, and not, as convention would have
it, the cause of intentionality. This suggestion has the potential to account for, or at least
substantiate the possibility for, an account of the genesis of consciousness within a realist
paradigm—the sort that is, for the most part, uncontroversially attributed to Aristotle
himself—that seems to elude modern scholars to this date. The substantiation of the
analogy between Aristotle's theory of nous—a theory that, I contend, is obfuscated more
by the prejudices of its modern reader than the obscurities of its articulation—with
Brentano's theory of intentionality—a theory that incorporates what is, by and large, an
undeniable, but up to now inscrutable, quality of psychological states—opens an avenue
for investigation into the nature of consciousness closed to us for over two millennia, and
it does so in a way that has proven effective in changing paradigms throughout history—
namely, by putting forth a simple suggestion. The suggestion of this study is this: Just as
Aristotle tells us the genetic principle active in thinking exists prior to thinking itself and
is, for lack of a better term, primitive, so too does the genetic principle active in
consciousness exist prior to consciousness itself, and so too is it primitive. Intentionality
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is not, as we conventionally understand it, a quality of consciousness. Quite to the
contrary, consciousness is a manifestation of intentionality, just as the soul and its bodily
activities, which include thought, is a manifestation of the first actuality of nous.
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NOTES TO PART III

1

8id fi vyuxii EOTIV EVTEXEXEIO ti TrpcoTTi acbuaTos cpuaiKou 5uvd[iEi Ccofiv

E'XOVTO5.
2

(DA 412a27-412bl)

airopiccv 5' E'XEI Kai x a Trd0r) Tfjs yuxfis. TTOTEPOV EOTI TrdvTa Koivd Kai TOU

E'XOVTO$

rj EOTI TI Kai xrjs y u x % iSiov auTrjs- TOUTO y a p Xa^eTv uiv dvayKaTov,

ou pd8iov 8E. cpaivETai 8E TCOV HEV TTXEicrrcov OU8EV dvsu TOU acbuaTos udaxEiv
OU8E TTOIETV, OTOV

EOIKEV

opyl^EaBai, GappsTv, ETTISUHETV, OXCOS aia9dvEo9ai, (jdXiaTa 8'

ISicp TO VOETV- E'I 8' EOTI Kai TOUTO cpavTaaia T15 f] [if] dvEu (pavTaoias, 2

OUK EV8EXOIT'

dv OU8E TOUT' dvsu acouaTos elvai. (DA 403a3-10)

3

Apostle (1981): 69 note 26.

4

Apostle (1981): 69 note 26.

5

cov Tot uiv i8ia TXCXQT\ Tfjj H^XHS Eivai SOKET, T O 8E 8I' EKEIVTIV Kai T0T5 £cpoi$

u-rrdpxEiv. (DA 402a9-10)
TrpcoTov uiv ouv ou KOXGOS TO XsyEiv Triv 4>uxriv uiysGoj ETVOI- (DA 407a2-3)
7

dTfopiioEiE 8' dv TIS Kai TTEpi TCOV u.opicov auTrjs, TI'V' E'XEI 8uvau.1v EKOOTOV EV

Top acbu.aTi. E'I y a p r\ 8Xr| yuxil Trdv TO acona OUVEXEI, Trpoar|KEi Kai TCOV u.opicov
EKOOTOV OUVEXEIV TI TOU

acou.aTO$. TOUTO 8' EOIKEV dBuvoTcp- TfoTov y a p MOpiov

fi TTcbj 6 V0O57 OUVEXEI, XOCXETTOV Kai irXdaai. (DA 41 lbl4-19)
It is reasonably clear from the sum of the other passages Brentano cites that his
ontological presupposition is that the human subject contains a spiritual part. The
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substance of his argument is essentially that nous corresponds to no other part of the
human subject and must, therefore, correspond to the spiritual part of the subject.
Recognition of this presupposition explains how Brentano might construe DA 403 a3—
where Aristotle suggests that nous might be the only part of the soul that is difficult to
correlate with a part of the body—as stipulating that nous is immaterial. That this is
indeed Brentano's presupposition is further reinforced by 413a4: "From this it clear that
the soul is inseparable from its body.... Yet some may be separable because they are not
the actualities of any body at all." It ought to be fairly clear that Brentano is arguing
according to a process of elimination: if nous is a part of the soul, and if the soul is, in
some way, attached to the subject, and if nous is not attached to the subject's physical
body, then it must be attached, in some way, to the spiritual part of the subject. In
Brentano's own words, "Here it is very definite that a certain part of the soul is not
entelechy of the body, hence is spiritual." (Brentano [1977]: 76.)
8

Brentano (1977): 77.

9

A v a ^ a y o p a g 5' EOIKE HEV ETEpov AsyEiv yuxriv TE KOCI VOUV, COOTTEP EITTOHEV Kai

TfpoTEpov, x p r i T a i 5' ducpoTv cos Uia cpuaei, TX\T\V apxriv ye TOV VOUV TIOETOI
ndXiaTa TrdvTcov- novov youv <pr|a\v GCUTOV TCOV OVTCOV ccrrXouv sTvai Kai dniyfj
TE Kai KaBapov. aTfo8i5coai 8' diacpco Trj auTrj dpxri, TO TE yivcoaKEiv Kai TO
KIVETV. Xiycov
10

vouv Kivfiaai TO Trdv. (DA 405al3-19)

DA 404b 1-6 reads as follows:
What Anaxagoras says about them is more obscure; in
many places he tells us that the cause of beauty and order is
mind, elsewhere that it is soul; it is found, he says, in all
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animals, great and small, high and low, but mind (in the
sense of intelligence) appears not to belong alike to all
animals, and indeed not even to all human beings.
[Ava^ocyopocs 8' rjvrov 8iaaa<pET TfEpi auTcbvTroAAaxou uiv y a p TO a r n o v TOU KaXcbs Kai 6p0cbs
TOV vouv XdyEi, ETepcoSi 8E TOV VOUV ETVCCI TOUTOV Trj
^uxtj- EV d-rraai y a p uirapxEiv CXUTOV TOT$ £cpoi$, Kai
lasyaXois Kai u.u<poTs, Kai TIUJOIS Kai aTiu.oTEpois- ou
9aivsTai 8' 6 ys KOTO (ppovriorv Xsyousvos vous 10
Traaiv ouoicos UTrdpxEiv T0T5 £cpois, dXX' ° U 8 E T0T5
av0pcbTfois Traaiv. ] (DA 404b 1-6)
n

Gerson(2004):351.

12

816 f] W^xA EOTIV EVTEXEXEICX f] TTpcoTT] acby.aTos cpuaiKoO 8uvd|iEi £cof]v

E'XOVTOS.
13

(DA 412a27-412bl)

TTEpi 8E TOU VOU Kai Tfjs 8Ecopr|TiKfjs 8uvdu.Eco5 OU8EV TTCO (pavspov, dXX' EOIKE

yuxris yEvos ETEpov slvai, Kai TOUTO UOVOV Ev8exEa0ai xcopi^eaSai, KaSaTrsp TO
d'['8iov TOU cpBapTou.^ Ta 8E Xonrd uopia Tris yuxfis cpavspov EK TOUTCOV OTI
OUK EOTI

xcopiaTa, KaSdiTEp TIVE5 9001V- (DA 413b24-29)

14

Apostle (1981): 102 note 16.

15

Apostle (1981): 102 note 16. Apostle is cheeky enough here to suggest that the

solution can be found in DA III 5.
TEXEUTOTOV 8E KOI EXOXIOTO

Xoyiau.6v Kai Sidvoiav- 0T5 uiv y a p UTr-dpxei

Aoyiands T&OV 90apTcav, TOUTOV Kai T O Aorrrd TrdvTa, oTs B' EKE(VCOV EKOOTOV,
ou Tfdai Xoyiau.6$, dXXd T0T5 UEV OU8E (pavTaaia, T O 8E TOUTTI laovrj £cbaiv. TTEpi
8E TOU 0EcopriTiKOU vou ETEpos X6yo$. (DA 415a7-12)
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TTspi 8E TOU uopiou TOU T % yuxfjs cp yivcboKEi TE r| yuxr] Kai (ppovst, E'ITE
XcopiaxoC OVTOS SITE [iT] xcopiaroO KOTO neyeSos dXXa K a r a Xoyov, OKETTTEOV
T(V' EXEI
18

8iacpopdv, Kai TTCOS TTOTE yivETai TO VOETV. (DA 429al0-13)

dcrraGes d p a 8ET elvai, SEKTIKOV 8E TOU EI8OUS Kai 8uvdu.Ei TOIOUTOV dXXa [XT]

TOUTO,

Kai onoicos E'XEIV, COOTTEP TO aia0r|TiK6v Trpog Ta aio0r|Td, OUTGO TOV

vouv Trpog TCX vor)Td. (DA 429al5-18)
19

dvdyKri d p a , ETTEI TfdvTa VOET, dniyfj sTvai, COOTTEP cpriaiv A v a £ a y o p a $ , Yva

KpaTrj, TOUTO 8' EOTIV Yva yvcopi^ri (irapEncpaivonEvov y a p KCOXUEI TO
dXXoTpiov Kai dvTicppdTTEi)- COOTE MTl8' auTou Elvai cpuaiv u.r]8Eu.iav dXX' fi
TauTr|v, OTI 8uvaT05. 6 d p a KOXOUHEVOS Trjs yuxrij voGs (Xsyco 8E vouv cp
8iavoEiTai Kai UTroXauPdvEi fi yuxri) OUOEV EOTIV EVspyEia TCOV OVTCOV irpiv
VOETV-

816 OU8E (iEulxSai EuXoyov OUTOV TCO acbuaTi- TT0165 T15 y a p dv yiyvoiTo,

f\ yuxpos f\ 8EPU05, Kdv opyavov TI EITI, COOTTEP TCO aia6riTiKcp- vuv 8' OUGEV
EOTIV.

Kai EU 8r] oi XsyovTEj TT)V y u x ^ v sTvai TOTTOV EI8COV, TTXTT.V OTI OUTE 6Xr|

dXX' f] voriTiKTi, OUTE EVTEXEXEICT dXXa 8uvdnEi t a EIOY|. (DA 429al8-29)
20

Brentano (1977): 108.

21

OTav 8' OUTC05 EKaoTa yEvr|Tai cos ° ETriaTrmcov XsyETai 6 KOT' EvspyEiav

(TOUTO 8E

aunPaivsi OTOV 8uvr|Tai EVEpyEiv 81' OUTOU), EOTI \xev Kai TOTE 8uvdu.Ei
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TTCOS, ou

VOEIV.
22

23

urjv 6uo(cos Kai Trpiv HOGETV r] EupeTv- Kai OUTOS 81' OUTOO TOTE SuvaTai

(DA 429b5-9)

Caston(1999):200.
See above (page 2) and Gerson (2004): 358. See also Metaphys. 1032al7-20 and DA

430al0-14.
24

TTOCAIV 5'

em TCOV EV dcpaipEOEi OVTCOV TO EU8U COS TO aiuov- METCX OUVEXOUS

y a p - TO 8E TI T^V ETVOCI, E'I EOTIV ETEpov TO EUBET elvai Kai TO EU8U, d\Xo- EOTCO y a p
8ud$. ETEpcp otpa f\ ETepcos E'XOVTI Kpivsi. 6Xco$ d p a co<; xtopioTa TCX TrpdyiaaTa
Tris uXriS. OUTGO Kai TOC TTEpi TOV vouv. (DA 429b 18-22)
25

Brentano(1977):74-75.

26

Brentano(1977):75.

27

Brentano(1977):75.

28

Brentano (1977): 76.

29

Brentano (1977): 76 cf. 21.

30

Brentano (1977): 77.

31

'ElTEl 8' [cOOTTEp] EV dTTdOTJ Tfj (pUOEl EOTl [Tl] TO |iEV uAr| EKaOTCp yEVEl (TOUTO

8e 6 TrdvTa Suvdnei EKeTva), ETEpov 8e TO aiTiov Kai TroirjTiKov, Top TTOIETV
TrdvTa, oTov n TEXVTI npos TT\V uAr)v TTETTOVSEV, dvdyKr) Kai EV Trj yuxfj uTrapxeiv
T a u T a j Ta$ 8ia<popd$- Kai EOTIV 6 [ikv TOIOUTOS VOGS TCO TTOVTO yivsaSai, 6 8e
Tcp TrdvTa TTOIETV, d>sfe'^15T15, oTov TO cpcos- TpoTrov y a p Tiva Kai TO cpcbs TTOIET

207

TCC 8uvd|aei

ovxa xpcoiiaTa EVEpysig xpconaxa. Kai OUTO$ 6 vouj x ^ P 1 0 ^ ?

Kotl

diraSris Kai duiyris, Trj ouaig cbv EVEpysia- OCEI y a p TinicoTepov TO TTOIOUV TOU
TT&axovxos Kai fi dpxr) T % vXris. [TO 8' auTO EOTIV f\ KOT' EVEpysiav ETrioTrmr)
Tcp TTpdyuaTi- fi 8E KaTa 8uvauiv XP o v c P "npoTEpa ev Tcp evi, oXcos 5e OUSE
Xpdvcp, dXX' oux OTE [xkv VOET OTE 5' ou VOET.] X"P' a 9 E i? 5' EOTI IJOVOV T O 0 8 ' OTTEP
EOTi, Kai TOUTO UOVOV dSdvaTov Kai d'i'Biov (ou MVTIU.OVEUOU.EV 8E, 6 T I TOUTO uiv
diraSEs, 6 8E Tra6r|TiK6s voug q>6apTO$)- Kai &VEU TOUTOU OU8EV VOET. (DA 430al025)
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See: Harold Henry Joachim, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1951); Charles H. Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology,"
Archivfuer Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1966): 43 - 81; K. W. Hamlyn, "Koine
Aisthesis," Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry
52 (April 1968): 195 - 209; Stephen Richard Lyster Clark, Aristotle's Man: Speculations
Upon Aristotelian Anthropology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Franz Brentano, The
Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, trans. Rolf
George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
33

See Michael Wedin, "Keeping the Matter in Mind: Aristotle on the Passions and the

Soul," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 3 & 4 (September - December 1995): 183
- 221; "Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind," Southern Journal of Philosophy 31
(1992): 4 9 - 1 0 5 ; Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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Aristotle's Nous Poietikos." Review of Metaphysics 57.4 (2004): 726. Numerous other
attempts to categorize interpretive approaches to nous in Aristotle can be found
throughout the literature including Wedin's (1988): 160.
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See: Victor Caston "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal," Phronesis: A

Journal of Ancient Philosophy AA, no. 3 (August 1999): 199 - 227; Jonathan Barnes
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Cornell University Press, 1961).
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See: S. Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism" in Essays on Aristotle's De
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unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation Alexander of Aphrodisias on Soul as Form [de anima 126 BrunsJ, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto).
Zeller's Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics is, in fact, a collection of excerpts from
his voluminous Die Philosophic Der Griechen in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung, the
first edition of which was published in 1845.
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ZellerVol2(1897): 130-31.
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For a full account of the polemic see Joseph Novak, "The Zeller-Brentano Debate on

the Origin of Mind," Journal ofNeoplatonic Studies 3, no. 2 (Fall 1995).
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Brentano (1977): 107.
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Brentano (1977): 107-108.
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Brentano (1977): 108.
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Brentano (1977): 108.
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Brentano (1977): 111.

45

As we will see later, Caston reads the 'in' {en) that occurs in 430al0 (and later at

430al4) in a much different way. Brentano's own reading is supported by the authority
of Themistius, Aquinas, Trendelenburg, Brandis, and "others". (Brentano [1977]: 111.)
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Brentano (1977): 110,112-113.
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Brentano (1977): 112.
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Wedin(1988): 168.
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Wedin (1988): 185.

51

Wedin(1988): 185.
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Caston (1999): 200.
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Caston (1999): 200.
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Caston (1999): 200.
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Caston (1999): 203.

56

Caston (1999): 203.
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Caston reinforces this point with a blanket rejection of attempts to "fill in the gaps" of
Aristotle's psychology by plugging in the active intellect wherever it is arguably possible.
This sort of approach to the active intellect and the gaps that it might fill is tantamount,
says Caston, to proposing a deus ex machina, an inexplicable potency that is no more
valuable in terms of the understanding it conveys than is the maintenance of the gap it is
meant to fill. (Caston [1999]: 204.).
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(ZX4 429M0-11)
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Caston (1999): 206.

60

Caston (1999): 206.

61

Caston (1999): 209.

62

Caston (1999): 211 - 212. It is worth noting that the passages Caston identifies in

Metaph. 12.7 - 9 that comprise the comparable list of attributes are, just as Caston says,
comparable and not, by any means, identical. The list Caston's draws out of Metaph. is
as follows: (1) kechorismene ton aistheton, 1073a4, (2) apathes kai analloioton, 1073al 1,
(3) ouk echei hulen, 1074a33 - 34, (4) energeia ousia, 1072a25 - 26 and b27 - 28, (5)
timiotaton, 1074a26 and ariston, 1072a35 - bl and b28, (6) he episteme to pragma,
1075al - 5, (7) 1072b25, (8) ton apanta aidna, 1075al0, (9) 1075al - 5, (10) aidion,
1072a25 and 1073a4, and (11) 1072M3 - 14. (Caston [1999]: 212) Indeed, there are, in
the minority of cases, clear similarities in the expression of the characteristics attributed
to intellect in DA III.5 and to God here. However, for the majority of the characteristics,
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there are significant differences between the way in which Aristotle expresses them in
DA III.5 and here.
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Caston(1999):212.
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They are again: (1) How is thinking possible if thinking seems to be an affection of the

intellect yet the intellect is unmixed and unaffected? And (2) is intellect intelligible? (DA
429b22-26)
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Gerson (2004): 362.
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Gerson (2004): 365.

67

Gerson (2004): 366. An exact quote of this passage is found at 43 lal-2. Frede (1992),

Charles (2000), and White (2004) interpret these passages as expressing a literal identity
whereas Ross puts forth a weaker reading: "we must suppose it to mean that when one is
really knowing, the nature of that which is being known is exactly reflected in the mind
of the knower, his mind exercising no disturbing influence." See Michael Frede, "On
Aristotle's Conception of the Soul," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, eds. M.
Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 93 - 108; and David
Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), andDe
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Clarendoniano, 1959): 295. See also Metaph. 1074b36-1075a3.
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This is often the contention of those who follow what I have described as the "divine

substance/Platonic holdover" strategy for interpreting DA III. 5.
70

Gerson (2004): 368.
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Gerson (2004): 369. Gerson takes the composite of the body and soul to be the subject
of "thinks" (noei).
72

Were it the case that the potency of intellect were to be expended in the actualization of

the material object, thought would not be possible, for such actualization requires
embodiment and, as we discussed previously, bodies do not exhibit sufficient potency for
thought.
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dvdyKri d p a , ETTEI TrdvTa VOET, duiyfj eTvai, cooTrep cpriaiv A v a £ a y 6 p a s , \ ' v a

KpotTrj, TOUTO 8' EOTIV Yva yvcop[£rj (TrapEH<paiv6|JiEvov y a p KCOXUEI TO
dXXoTpiov Kai dvTicppdTTEi)- COOTE [xr)h' auTou ETvai cpuaiv ur|8Euiav dXX' r]
TauTr)V, o n BuvaTos. (DA 429al8-24)
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KCCI OUTOS

6 vous 74 xcoptoTog KCCI d-rraOfis Kai dmyrjs, TTJ o u a i a cbv EVspyEia.

(XL4 430al7-18)
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8io fi yvxA EOTIV EVTEXEXEIO f| TrpcoTr] ocbuaTog cpuoiKou 8uvduEi £cof)v

e X ovTos. (DA 412a27-412bl)
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xc«3P iaT d, KaGotTrep TIVE$ 9aatv- (DA 413b24-29)

dTTopiav 8' E'XEI Kai T O Trd6ri Tfjs yuxfjs, TroTEpov EOTI irdvTa Koivd Kai TOU
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rj EOTI TI Kai Tfjs yuxrjs i8iov auTfJs- TOUTO y a p Xa^sTv HEV dvayKaTov,

213

ou pdSiov 8e. <pa(v8Tai 8e TCOV U.EV TrXe(aTcov OU9EV dveu TOU acb|aaTos Trdaxeiv
OU5E TTOIETV, oTov

E'OIKEV

6pyi£ea0cu, BappeTv, ETTIOUHETV, oAcos aio0dvEa8ai, udAicrra 5'

18(cp TO VOETV- ei 8' eaxi KCCI TOUTO cpavxaaia T15 rj \xr\ dveu (pavxaalaj, 7 7

OUK EVSEXOIT'

dv OU5E TOUT' dvsu acbuaTos ETVCU. (DA 403a3-10)

78

Gerson (2004): 350.

79

Although he does not follow Heinaman (1990) entirely, Gerson cites his reading.

Specifically, Gerson cites Heinaman's analysis of the relationship between soul and the
composite body as being analogous to that of the intellects and the soul.
80

Gerson (2004): 351.

81

Gerson (2004): 352.

82

ei 8r) ecm TO VOETV coonrrep TO aioSdvEaOai, r\ irdoxEiv TI dv e'tri UTTO TOU

vor|TOU f\ TI TOIOUTOV ETEpov. (DA 429al3-15)
83

Kal auToj 8E voriTos EOTIV coaTrep T O vor)Ta. ETTI [xkv y a p TCOV dvsu uXris TO

auTo EOTI TO voouv Kai TO voouiasvov- fi y a p ETTiOTrjuri r) 8Ecopr)TiKfi Kai TO
OUTCOS ETTiaTriTOV TO aUTO EOTIV (TOU 8 E [iT] OEl VOETv TO a'lTlOV ETTIOKETTTEOV)-

(DA 430a2-6)
84

By 'conventional' I mean to refer to the sort of actualization that occurs in the creation

of one thing out of another, e.g., when nutrients in soul become the tissue of a plant, or
when building materials become a structure of something particular.
85

Brentano (1977): 84.

86

Brentano (1977): 84 - 85.
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Wedin's work on nous in Aristotle spans numerous publications, the most accessible of
which include his book, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (1988), and two articles,
"Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind" (1993) and "Keeping the Matter in Mind:
Aristotle on the Passions and the Soul" (1995). This last title is most telling with respect
to Wedin's interpretive position and the tradition he represents. His reading of nous is
heavily informed by his strictly physicalist reading of Aristotle's biology. He asserts that
Aristotle's DA represents the first work of cognitivistic psychology, and his use of the
language of cognitivism orients his investigation away from the ontology of soul, nous,
and thought per se and towards the functional organization of the physical organism in
which such capacities reside.
88

Number (1) and (2) can be found in Wedin (1988): 163.

89

Number (3), (4), (5), and (6) can be found in Wedin (1988): 164.

90

Wedin (1988): 167.

91

'H |j£v ouv TCOV ocSicupETcov vor|ai$ EV TOUTOIS Trspi a OUK EOTI TO ysuBos, EV OTJ

5E KCCI TO ^EOBOS

Kai TO a\r|0ES auvSsais TI$ f\br\ voriudTcov COOTTEP EV OVTCOV-

Ka6aTT£p. (DA 430a26-28)
92

TO

y a p vyEuBos EV OUVBEOEI CXEI- Kai y a p av TO XEUKOV [XT\ XEUKOV <cpfi, TO XEUKOV

Ka\> TO uri XEUKOV OUVESTIKEV- (DA 430M-3)
evBe^exai Se Kai Siaipeaiv cpdvai T r a v x a . aXX' o u v eaxi ye ou n o v o v x o y e u B o j

r] dXr)0E5 OTI XEUKO^ KXECOV Ecrriv, dXXa Kai OTI fjv f\ EOTOI. TO BE EV TTOIOUV
EKOOTOV, TOUTO

6 vous. (DA 430b3-6)
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TO

8' d8ia(pETOv ETTEI Bixcog, f\ 8uvd|iEi f\ Evspysig, ouSev KCOXUEI VOETV TO

dSiafpsTov OTav vorj TO MTIKOS (dSiaipETov y a p EVEpyEig), Kai EV xpovcp
d5iaipETcp- 6|ao(cos y a p 6 xpovog 8iaipsTos Kai aBiaipETog TCO UHKEI. (DA 430b610)
95

OUKOUV EOTIV E'ITTETV EV TCO fiiaiaEi T( EVOEI

EKaTspcp- ou y a p EOTIV, dv \ir\

8iaipE0fj, dXX' fi 8uvd|jEi. x^P^S 8' EKdTEpov vocbv TCOV fiuioEcov 8iaipsT Kai TOV
Xpovov a n a , TOTE 8' OIOVEI urJKTV si 8' cos sE, diacpotv, Kai EV TCO xpovcp TCO ETT'
du<poTv. (DA 430bl0-14)
96

97

Apostle (1981): 170 note 11.
< T O 8E

[xt] Kara TO TTOOOV d8ia(p£Tov dXXd TCO ET8EI VOET EV d8iaipETcp xpovcp

Kai dSiaipETcp <TCO> TTJS yuxf)s.>
fi 8E oTiynf) Kai iraaa 8iaipEais, Kai TO OUTCOS d8ia(pETOV,
8r)XouTai COOTTEP f] crrepriais. Kai onoios 6 Xoyos ETTI TCOV dXXcov, oTov TTCOS TO
KaKov yvcopi^Ei f\ TO ueXav- Tcp evavTicp y a p TTCOS yvcopiCei. (DA 430b20a-23)
98

Apostle (1981): 170 - 171 note 16.

99

TO HEV ouv

aio0dvEO0ai onoiov TCO 9 d v a i \xovov Kai VOETV- OTOV Ss f|8u f\

Xuirripov, oTov KaTacpaaa f\ dirocpaaa 8ICOKEI f\ cpEuysi- (DA 421a8-10)
Kai i] cpuyri OE KOI ri ops^is TOUTO, i] KOT Evspysiav, Kai oux ETEpov TO
opsKTiKov Kai TO cpEUKTiKov, OUT' dXXr|Xcov OUTE Tou aia0r|TiKou- dXXd TO slvai
dXXo. (DA 431&12-U)
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101

Tfj Se 8iccvor)TiKfj yuxfi TO. cpavTdanaTcc oTov aiaSruaaTa imapxEt, OTCCV 8E

d y a 0 6 v f\ KCCKOV cpiiari f\ dirocpriori, cpEuyEi f\ BICOKEI- (DA 431al4-16)
102

Apostle (1981): 175 note 10.

103

816 OUSETTOTE VOET OCVEU cpavTdanaTog fi yuxTl- (P-A 431al6-17)

104

TOC |i£v

o\5v Ei8r| TO voriTiKov EV TOT$ cpavTdonaoi VOET, KOCI COS EV EKE(VOIS

copiorai auTcp TO SICOKTOV KCCI cpsuKTOv, KCCI EKTOS Tfjs aia0r|O"Ecos, 6TCCV ETTI TGOV
(pavTaaiaaTcov rj, KIVETTCU- oTov, aia0av6u£vos TOV cppuKTov OTI m/p, Trj KOIVTJ
opcbv KIVOUJJEVOV yvcopi^Ei OTI TTOXEHIOJ- OTE 8E TOT$ EV TTJ yvyjS <pocvTdG|iaaiv f\
voriuaaiv, COOTTEP opcov, Xoyi^ETca KCCI (BOUXEUETCU TCC UEXXOVTCI irpog Ta
irapovTa- KCCI 6TCCV EiTrri cbg EKET TO f|8u f\ Xuirripov, EVTCCUOOC cpsuysi f\ BICOKEI-KCCI
oXcos EV Trpd^Ei. (DA 431b2-10)
105

Apostle (1981): 178 note 21.

106

816 vofjoai UEV ETT' ai/Tcp, OTTOTCCV POUXTITCCI, aia0dvEO0ai 5' OUK ETT' auTop-

dvayKocTov y a p uirapxEiv TO aia0rjTov. (DA 417b24-26)
107

816 fi tyvxA EOTIV EVTEXEXEICC fi TrpcoTTi acbuctTos cpuaiKou 8uvd|jEi £cof|v

E'XOVTOS.

(DA 412a27-412bl)

108

Brentano(1995):77.

109

Brentano(1995):88.

110

m

Brentano (1995): 10.

Brentano(1995):92.
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OUGEV KCOAUEI VOETV TO

d8iaipETov OTCCV vofi TO lifJKOs (a8ia(pETOv y a p

svspyEig), Kai EV xpovcp aBiaipsTcp- onolcog y a p 6 xpdvo$ BiaipsTog Kai
dBiaipETOs TCO UTIKEI. (DA 430b7-10)
113

114

Brentano(1995):88.

In fact in his later Descriptive Psychology Brentano reorients his analysis of

consciousness in order to explicitly account for what he calls its adjectival character.
115

TO UEV

ov5v aio0dvEo8ai ouoiov TCO cpdvai uovov Kai VOETV- OTOV 8E f|8u r]

XuTrripov, oTov KaTacpdaa r] dirocpdaa 8ICOKEI r] cpsuyEi- (DA 421a8-10)
116

Trj 8E 8iavor|TiKrj yuxrj T& cpavTaaiaaTa oTov aiaSrmaTa uTrdpxEi, OTOV 8E

d y a 8 6 v rj KOKOV (priori f\ dircxpriar], cpEuysi r] 8ICOKEI- (DA 431al4-16)
117

Brentano (1995): 89.

118

Brentano (1995): 6.

119

Brentano (1995): 88.

120

Brentano (1995): 92.

121

dEi y d p TiuicoTEpov TO TTOIOUV TOU TrdoxovTog Kai f) dpxn Trig OAriS- (DA

430al8-19)
122

Brentano (1995): 102.

123

Brentano (1995): 102.

124

This, i.e., judgement, as we have already seen, is precisely the sort of act that occurs in

the second actuality of nous.
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125

Jeff Mitscherling, "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", Symposium: Journal of the

Canadian Society for Hermeneutic and Postmodern Thought 8 no. 2 (Summer 2004):
379-388.
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